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Sometimes the scholarly community comes to realise that it should have a second
look at an old idea. Sometimes circumstances change so that the old idea
acquires extra salience. Sometimes, for one reason or another, it turns out that
an old idea had not previously been understood correctly. When this happens
and the old idea is re-examined, prompting a change in the general consensus
as to its nature and importance, a reappraisal has taken place.
In recent times scholars of twentieth century philosophy have begun to recon-
sider their views about the German philosopher Rudolf Carnap and the ‘logical
positivist’ movement that he championed. Carnap and the other logical pos-
itivists had previously been understood as continuing the tradition of British
empiricists such as Locke, who sought to establish that sensory experience was
the foundation of all human knowledge. Lately, works such as Friedman (1999)
and Richardson (1998) have argued convincingly that the logical positivists
were not primarily interested in this foundational project, and that their work
is better understood in the context of Austro-German neo-Kantianism. Logi-
cal positivism had been thought of as an apolitical movement, if not one with
reactionary tendencies: a well-informed activist once commented “I cant see
anything progressive. . . coming out of positivism. It just seems to exclude it
completely.” Chomsky et al. (1988). Recent scholarship, for example Carus
(2010) and Yap (2010), has revealed that many of the logical positivists saw
their work as part of an emancipatory social project and that that their ideas
can make interesting and useful contributions to current such projects. Close
examination of the historical record has also overthrown the previous view that
the positivists held academic activities other than physics in disregard. For
example, Galison (1990) and Potochnik and Yap (2006) unearth connections
between the logical positivists and the Bauhaus movement.
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This sustained rethinking of Carnap’s place in the intellectual-historical land-
scape amounts to what might be called a historical reappraisal.
At the same time, many philosophers have begun to argue that some of Car-
nap’s philosophical positions might have greater merit than had previously been
supposed. Early examples of this kind of substantive reappraisal can be found
in Creath (1991) and Stein (1992), which argue that Carnap might not have
been so dogmatic about the controversial topics of analyticity and reductionism
as had previously been believed. There has been renewed interest in Carnap’s
method of explication, expressed by Maher (2007) and Olsson (2014). Peregrin
(2015), Awodey (2015) and Restall (2002) have reappraised Carnap’s contribu-
tions to the philosophy of logic. Psillos (2000) reappraises Carnap’s views on
formalising scientific theories. Awodey and Carus (2001) reappraise Carnap’s
views on the philosophy of mathematics. Lutz (2012), Leitgeb (2013) and Carus
(2014) reappraise Carnap’s meta-philosophical stance.
It seems that most, if not almost all, of Carnap’s philosophical positions are
currently being historically and substantively reappraised. The most striking
exception to this general trend is the topic that most occupied Carnap towards
the end of his career and is the main subject of this thesis, namely Carnapian
inductive logic.
From the 1940s until his death in 1970, Carnap and several co-researchers con-
ceived and developed a distinctive method of formalising inductive reasoning,
which they claimed was strongly analogous to deductive logic. While this re-
search has been discussed in the recent philosophical literature1, and some as-
pects of it have been extended, principally in the work of a group of inductive
logicians based in Manchester, culminating in Paris and Vencovska´ (2015), it
has not yet been reappraised. Among philosophers, the prevailing consensus re-
mains substantially the same as it was when Carnap’s publications on inductive
logic were first criticised in works such as Goodman (1946), Toulmin (1953),
Putnam (1963), Salmon (1967) and Lakatos (1968a).
This thesis makes the case that Carnapian inductive should not remain the
exception to the general trend towards reappraising Carnap’s philosophy. It
argues that the time is ripe for both a historical and a substantive reappraisal
and begins to carry out both of these tasks.
I aim to begin a historical reappraisal by proposing and defending a new account
of Carnapian inductive logic. This account challenges the current understanding
of both the nature of Carnapian inductive logic and its relationships with other
aspects of Carnap’s philosophy and the work of other philosophers.
On a substantive level, this thesis argues that Carnapian inductive logic is a
viable research programme that has much to offer contemporary philosophical
debates. In what follows I argue that its most prominent critiques can be
1See, for example, Skyrms (1996), Zabell (2011) and Fitelson (2005), Glaister (2007),
Hawthorne (2014), Uebel (2012), Wagner (2011), Romeijn (2005) and Romeijn (2011).
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overcome, that it compares favourably with rival research programmes and that
it can usefully be applied to a modern debate in the philosophy of statistics.
1.2 Structure
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In chapter 2, I explain the key features
of Carnapian inductive logic and describe its development. I construe Car-
napian inductive logic as a scientific research programme in Lakatos’s sense of
the term and argue that it was progressive according to Lakatos’s methodology.
Next, in chapter 3, I examine the principal critiques of Carnapian inductive
logic and argue that each of these can be overcome. Chapters 4 and 5 com-
pare Carnapian inductive logic with related research programmes arising from
subjective and objective Bayesian epistemology, arguing that it has advantages
over both. In chapter 6 I present an application of Carnapian inductive logic to
a contemporary philosophical debate in the philosophy of statistics. Chapter 7
concludes, summing up my historical and substantive claims and setting out a
future research agenda.
The following subsections summarise the main points of each chapter.
Chapter 2: Carnapian inductive logic
This chapter presents my main historical claims about Carnapian inductive
logic and evaluates it according to Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research
programmes. It shows how Carnapian inductive logic can be thought of as
a scientific research programme, describes how it changed through the three
decades during which Carnap worked on it, and argues that it was ‘progressive’
according to Lakatos’s methodology.
I begin by briefly describing the development of Carnapian inductive logic and
some related research programmes. Next I introduce Lakatos’s methodology and
explain how, with minor modifications, it can be applied to Carnapian inductive
logic.
I then introduce the key features of Carnapian inductive logic, characterising
them as the research programme’s ‘hard-core’ commitments:
1. Explication The first commitment is to the overall goal of formalising,
or in Carnap’s terms ‘explicating’, inductive assumptions in a way that is
useful in everyday life and science.
2. Systems of inductive logic The second commitment is to using a certain
kind of formal tool to explicate inductive assumptions, namely ‘systems
of inductive logic’.
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3. Tolerance The third commitment is to tolerance, at the philosophical
level. According to Carnapian inductive logic, the question of whether a
system of inductive logic should be adopted is fundamentally practical,
not philosophical.
I also classify the other parts of Carnapian inductive logic according to Lakatos’s
methodology and document the main ways in which the research programme
changed as it developed.
This is not the first time that Carnapian inductive logic has been analysed
using the methodology of scientific research programmes: Lakatos (1967a) and
Niiniluoto (2011) have also done so. However, my conclusions are different
because they are based on a novel reading of Carnapian inductive logic; the
key difference is my claim that it was committed to tolerance. I defend various
aspects of this reading in an appendix. The way I present Carnap’s technical
apparatus draws considerably from the presentation in Paris and Vencovska´
(2015), though it is also novel in some ways, and preserves most of Carnap’s
original terminology.
Based on my reading, I argue that Carnapian inductive logic had the features
that, according to Lakatos, characterise ‘progressive’ research programmes. It
steadily expanded its stock of auxiliary claims, broadly stayed within the pa-
rameters it originally set for itself and had the potential to be useful in everyday
life and science.
I conclude that, while it is interesting that Carnapian inductive logic was pro-
gressive in this sense, much work remains to be done. Both a historical and sub-
stantive reappraisal require engagement with the many critiques of Carnapian
inductive logic. In addition, in order to make a convincing case that Carnapian
inductive logic has something to offer present-day philosophy, it must be estab-
lished how it compares with rival research programmes, and if it has any useful
contemporary applications. The remaining chapters seek to fill in these gaps.
Chapter 3: Critiques
This chapter addresses what I consider to be the most important critiques of
Carnapian inductive logic, arguing that none of them succeeded in showing that
it was unviable.
Lakatos
Lakatos claimed, contrary to my analysis in chapter 2, that Carnapian inductive
logic was a degenerate, rather than a progressive, research programme. Lakatos
claimed that Carnapian inductive logic abandoned a hard-core commitment,
thereby committing what the methodology of scientific research programmes
considered an unforgiveable sin. I argue that Lakatos made a crucial mistake
in his reading of Carnap’s earlier work, leading him to mistakenly attribute
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to early Carnapian inductive logic the goal of finding true axioms. Whereas
Lakatos’s critique depends on Carnapian inductive logic having abandoned this
goal, I show that Carnapian inductive logic never had it in the first place.
Grue
Next, I consider the ‘grue’ problem. I present two versions of this prominent
objection: the first claims that Carnapian inductive logic cannot formalise in-
ductive assumptions about ‘projectability’, whereas the second claims that Car-
napian inductive logic cannot show that any one such assumption is more jus-
tified than any other. I argue, contrary to the first kind of objection, that
Carnapian inductive logic can formalise distinctions between projectability and
non-projectability. The second objection, I contend, sets the bar too high. Nei-
ther Carnapian inductive logic nor any other intellectual endeavour has yet
shown how to justify assumptions about projectability, a goal to which Car-
napian inductive logic never aspired.
Logical independence of distinct events
The third critique that I consider is by Salmon, who argued that Carnapian
inductive logic cannot simultaneously formalise two intuitive inductive assump-
tions. These are the assumption of positive instantial relevance, according to
which instances of experimental results make future results of the same kind
more plausible, and an assumption that Salmon called ‘Hume’s principle’, ac-
cording to which all distinct events are logically independent. I present an
inductive logical axiom that, I claim, formalises Hume’s principle. As Salmon
postulated, it is inconsistent with the axiom that is usually chosen to formalise
positive instantial relevance. I highlight critical responses to Salmon’s essay by
two of Carnap’s co-workers, Richard Jeffrey and John Kemeny, that I think have
received insufficient attention in the literature on Carnapian inductive logic. I
agree with Kemeny’s assessment that Carnapian inductive logic need not for-
malise both Hume’s principle and instantial relevance at the same time.
Other critiques
I then address in less detail some critiques that I think are less important.
Contrary to a criticism made by Popper, I argue that Carnapian inductive
logic need not formalise inductive assumptions about universal laws in order
to be successful. Carnapian inductive logic has been criticised for formalising
assumptions of exchangeability, according to which the order of observations
carries no information: these are seen as related to the controversial principle
of indifference. I argue that, whatever their philosophical status, Carnapian
inductive logic can legitimately formalise exchangeability assumptions because
they are ubiquitous in statistics. Finally, I address a claim by Putnam that
Carnapian inductive logic is inferior with respect to long-run reliability to an
alternative formal method that he devised. I argue, following Kelly, Juhl and
Glymour, that this is not the case.
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I conclude that Carnapian inductive logic survives its most prominent critiques.
Chapter 4: Subjective Bayesian inductive logic
The next stage of my thesis considers two similar research programmes, arguing
that Carnapian inductive logic has some advantages over both.
The first is subjective Bayesian inductive logic, a programme that has recently
been defended by Colin Howson in a series of works. I construe subjective Bayes-
ian inductive logic as similar to Carnapian inductive logic, except that it rejects
the latter programme’s commitment to tolerance, while embracing alternative
hard-core commitments inspired by subjective Bayesian epistemology. These
take the form of the following claims about rational states of partial belief:
• Probabilistic necessity Every rational state of partial belief can be
represented by a probability function.
• Probabilistic sufficiency Every state of partial belief that can be rep-
resented by a probability function is rational.
• Conditionalisation The way rational agents take evidence into account
can be represented using the ‘conditional probability’ method.
I discuss in detail the epistemological motivation for probabilistic necessity and
sufficiency, arguing that neither of these claims is conclusively established by
currently available arguments. I argue that subjective Bayesian inductive logic’s
commitment to conditionalisation is methodologically disadvantageous.
I consider three kinds of argument for probabilistic necessity: betting arguments,
axiomatic arguments and accuracy arguments. I claim that betting arguments
are thrown into doubt by objections arising from Weatherson (2003) and Schick
(1986), while axiomatic arguments have struggled to overcome an objection first
highlighted by Halpern (1999a). I claim, contrary to all accuracy arguments,
that rational agents may sometimes knowingly choose an inaccurate state of be-
lief. For example, they may do so in order to benefit their epistemic community.
In addition, I argue against some properties that have been proposed as legit-
imacy conditions for measures of inaccuracy. While some of these arguments
have appeared elsewhere, I believe that others, including my objections to the
putative legitimacy conditions continuity and proposition-neutrality, are novel.
Before concluding my discussion of probabilistic necessity, I consider whether,
considered togther, the different kinds of argument for this claim combine into a
compelling collective argument. I argue that they are not, as the many similar-
ities between the three main kinds of argument makes the fact that they share
the same conclusion unsurprising.
I also consider three kinds of argument for probabilistic sufficiency: grue-based
arguments, accuracy-dominance arguments and a logic-based argument due to
Howson. Grue-based arguments assert that genuine rationality constraints must
1.2. STRUCTURE 15
be interpretation-neutral: the axioms that formalise them must always formalise
rationality principles, regardless of any interpretative considerations. I claim,
contrary to this kind of argument, that there are genuine interpretation-sensitive
rationality constraints. Accuracy-dominance arguments claim that all states
of partial belief that are not dominated with respect to their inaccuracy are
rational, and use this claim to build an argument. I dispute the claim, arguing
that irrational states of belief can be un-dominated. Finally, Howson’s logic-
based argument defends probabilistic sufficiency on the grounds that axioms
that are stronger than the probability axioms fail to satisfy criteria that, he
claims, are required for genuine logicality. I present a stronger set of axioms
that, I claim, either satisfy Howson’s criteria or show that they are unsound.
Finally, I consider subjective Bayesian inductive logic’s commitment to condi-
tionalisation. Whereas Carnapian inductive logic can formalise all inductive
assumptions that can be captured by subjective Bayesian inductive logic, con-
ditionalisation prevents the reverse from being true. As a result, Carnapian
inductive logic is the more flexible research programme.
In light of these arguments, I compare Carnapian inductive logic with subjective
Bayesian inductive logic. Carnapian inductive logic, which was not committed
to either probabilistic necessity or probabilistic sufficiency, has the advantage of
being less philosophically controversial than subjective Bayesian inductive logic.
From a methodological point of view, Carnapian inductive logic is more flexible,
whereas subjective Bayesian inductive logic is simpler in a certain sense.
I conclude that the balance of advantages favours working within Carnapian
inductive logic rather than subjective Bayesian inductive logic for the majority
of applications.
Chapter 5: Objective Bayesian epistemology and inductive logic
In this chapter I investigate how objective Bayesian epistemology can be con-
nected with inductive logic. Focusing on the form of objective Bayesian episte-
mology defended by Jon Williamson, I consider two options. The first option is
to construct a distinctive objective Bayesian inductive logic, while the second
is to formalise the norms of objective Bayesian epistemology within Carnapian
inductive logic.
The objective Bayesian inductive logic that I consider is similar to Carnapian
inductive logic, except that it is committed to the norms of objective Bayesian
epistemology, as outlined in Williamson (2010). Since these include probabilistic
necessity, I argue that objective Bayesian inductive logic shares a philosophical
disadvantage, compared to Carnapian inductive logic, with subjective Bayesian
inductive logic. In addition, I argue that objective Bayesian inductive logic has
a methodological disadvantage, as it cannot easily represent certain kinds of
evidence. I illustrate this problem with an example involving evidence according
to which one kind of observation is positively relevant to another. On the
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other hand, objective Bayesian inductive logic has an important methodological
advantage compared to Carnapian inductive logic, as it affords less discretion
to the inductive logician. I conclude that objective Bayesian and Carnapian
inductive logic can each be useful, depending on the application.
In order to formalise the norms of objective Bayesian epistemology within Car-
napian inductive logic, the latter discipline must be enriched. Following a sug-
gestion in Skyrms (1985), I sketch how this could be done in principle, showing
how objective Bayesian epistemology can be thought of as defining a Carnapian
system of inductive logic. I argue that carrying out this ‘assimilative approach’
would be worthwhile as it would both clarify the debate about the status of
the norms and allow pragmatic arguments, as opposed to epistemological ones,
to be given for and against them. I note that, while the assimilative approach
would be somewhat disconnected from the rest of Carnapian inductive logic,
this issue does not fatally undermine it.
I conclude by claiming that both approaches to relating objective Bayesian
epistemology and inductive logic are viable and perhaps even complementary.
Chapter 6: Applications of Carnapian inductive logic
The final part of my argument considers ways in which Carnapian inductive
logic can be applied in order to solve contemporary philosophical problems. My
main case study is an argument in the philosophy of statistics. I argue that, in
general, it is helpful to conceive of statistical model-choice as Carnap conceived
of choices between systems of inductive logic. Doing so allows this activity
to be described in a way that does justice to the actual practice of statistical
research while at the same time being philosophically well-grounded. In order to
make this point I discuss in detail a recent argument from Gelman and Shalizi
(2012), which claims that subjective Bayesian inductive logic cannot capture the
kind of reasoning that practising statisticians employ when choosing between
statistical models. Gelman and Shalizi go on to claim that thinking about such
choices within a Popperian philosophical framework would be preferable. I agree
with the first claim, but not the second: the Popperian framework is neither
philosophically well-grounded nor capable of doing justice to statistical practice.
In contrast, Carnapian inductive logic does much better.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
I conclude by summing up the present state of the reappraisal of Carnapian
inductive logic. I claim that new historical and substantive positions have
emerged, and that there is a strong case for continuing to reappraise Carnapian
inductive logic, a research programme which succeeds according to Lakatos’s
criteria, survives its critiques, has advantages compared to its rivals and has in-
teresting applications to contemporary philosophical debates. I end by outlining
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a research agenda according to which this reappraisal may be completed.
1.3 Limitations of this analysis
I believe that this thesis presents a compelling case for reappraising Carnapian
inductive logic, and makes useful progress towards such a reappraisal. However,
it is limited in several ways: I list a few of the most conspicuous limitations
below.
Sources
I have not been able to take into account material that Carnap wrote in his
native German but has not yet been translated. Fortunately, most of Carnap’s
published work on inductive logic was written in English: see section 2.2 in
the next chapter for a summary of the published works that I have drawn on.
One important exception is Carnap and Stegmu¨ller (1959), which was written
in German and, to my knowledge, has not yet been translated into English.
Being able to take this work into account would doubtless have improved the
presentation given here.
It would also have been useful for the sake of context to have been able to
analyse Carnap’s unpublished writing in German on the topic, as well as earlier
German-language publications.
Secondly, I was unable to take advantage of many handwritten notes by Car-
nap on inductive logic that are available at the Pittsburgh archives. Carnap
wrote many of these using an unusual shorthand method—the now very un-
usual ‘Stolze-Schrey’ method—to which he reportedly added several personal
modifications.
Philosophical questions about logic
Some of the philosophical controversy that has surrounded Carnapian inductive
logic since its inception has had to do with its use of the term ‘logic’. Various
authors have been dubious about the very idea of inductive logic on the grounds
that inductive reasoning falls outside of the proper purview of logic.
In this regard I devote a section of the appendix to chapter 1 to Carnap’s use of
the term ‘logic’. I argue that Carnap had principled reasons for using the term,
based on his general conception of logic and analogies that he drew between
inductive and deductive logic.
However, I do not assess whether Carnapian inductive logic should properly be
regarded as part of logic according to other conceptions, or engage at length
with philosophical discussion of which conception is best.
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Although situating inductive logic within these philosophical debates is an inter-
esting task for future research, I felt that that it would not improve this thesis’s
dialectic. Ultimately, whether or not Carnapian inductive logic is part of logic
does not determine whether it is worth reappraising. The arguments I present
do not appeal to any special status of logicality: hopefully even readers who are
not convinced that Carnapian inductive logic is part of logic will be persuaded
despite their terminological reservations.
Critique by Popper
While I address a criticism by Popper of Carnapian inductive logic according to
which it does not correctly formalise reasoning involving general laws, I leave
many of his other critical remarks undiscussed. There are many such remarks:
for example, (Popper, 1959, p. 409), Popper claimed that Carnapian inductive
logic was totally unviable, apparently for reasons unrelated to its treatment
of general laws. I have omitted discussion of this criticism because I felt that
Popper’s point remained unclear. In addition, Popper had a separate extended
debate with Carnap about whether the term ‘confirmation’ should be under-
stood in an absolute or relative sense. I avoided discussing this debate because
I felt that, whatever the outcome, the question of Carnapian inductive logic’s
reappraisability would not be greatly affected. The reader is directed to Micha-
los (1971) for a full account of the Popper-Carnap controversy.
Non-Lakatosian evaluative frameworks
In Chapter 2 I claim that Carnapian inductive logic does well according to
Lakatos’s methodology of scientific reseach programmes, arguing that this shows
that a reappraisal might be in order. While I note that Lakatos’s evaluative
methodology is controversial and has prominent rivals, I do not address these
controversies at length or investigate how well Carnapian inductive logic does
according to any rival methodologies. Instead I offer the reader additional,
independent reasons to believe that Carnapian inductive logic merits substan-
tive reappraisal, which I hope will outweigh any doubts that they have about
Lakatos’s methodology.
For the sake of completeness, and in order to come to a definitive view as
to whether Carnapian inductive logic was a successful research programme, it
would be helpful for future research to assess how it ought to be assessed and




If recent analytic philosophy has one settled opinion about Carnapian induc-
tive logic, it is that it was not successful. Even before the publication of its
first comprehensive statement in Carnap (1950b), Carnapian inductive logic
had already been influentially critiqued by Goodman in Goodman (1946) and
Goodman (1947). As Carnapian inductive logic developed during the 1950s and
1960s, distinguished philosophers continued to denounce it. A general idea of
the reception of Carnapian inductive logic in the philosophical community can
be gleaned from Popper (1968), Toulmin (1953), Putnam (1963), Salmon (1967)
and Lakatos (1968a).
Since Carnap’s death in 1970, the philosophical community has continued to
produce critiques of his project, some of which we will encounter in chapter 3.
Support for Carnapian inductive logic has been less emphatic. Carnap’s co-
workers often defended the programme as it progressed, or in its immediate
aftermath, but subsequently either went on to work on different projects like
Kemeny and Gaifman or took substantially different points of view like Jeffrey
and the Finnish school of inductive logicians. While there have been sympa-
thetic contemporary accounts, for example by Zabell (2011), Maher (2010) and
the Manchester school, these have tended not to challenge the critical ones di-
rectly.
At least within philosophy, then, there is a consensus that Carnapian induc-
tive logic was unsuccessful. But what is, or was Carnapian inductive logic?
Neither the critical nor the supportive literature is always entirely clear about
this question. Even Carnap’s own writings on the subject are somewhat inac-
cessible, thanks to their length and Carnap’s idiosyncratic presentational and
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stylistic choices. This chapter aims to improve on the status quo by presenting
a comprehensive and accessible account of Carnapian inductive logic.
In what follows I defend a novel assessment of the nature and aims of Carnapian
inductive logic. I claim that Carnapian inductive logic is best construed as a
research programme, that is, as a movement in the history of science. I at-
tempt a taxonomy of Carnapian inductive logic according to Lakatos’s method-
ology of scientific research programmes. I identify hardcore commitments that
characterised Carnapian inductive logic, less important secondary commitments
that could be modified or discarded if necessary and ‘heuristics’ that guided
researchers, as well as describing how these features changed as the research
programme developed.
Based on this account, I argue that Carnapian inductive logic was a progressive
research programme according to Lakatos’s criteria.
Before beginning to apply Lakatos’s methodology, I will briefly describe the
history of Carnapian inductive logic and some related research programmes.
2.2 Historical sketch
Along with several co-workers, Rudolf Carnap studied inductive logic between
around 1940 and 1970.
This research is largely encapsulated in three major works. The book Logi-
cal Foundations of Probability, Carnap (1950b), was aimed at philosophers. It
explains what Carnap saw as the overall task of inductive logic, tentatively
proposes a particular inductive logical system and attempts to answer some
questions about its philosophical and mathematical status. The monograph
The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Carnap (1952a), attempted to explain
a slightly modified form of this system to practising scientists and apply it to
some problems in statistics. Finally, A Basic System of Inductive Logic, pub-
lished in two parts after Carnap’s death, as Carnap (1971a) and Carnap (1980),
documents the programme’s later phase.
The intermediate stages of Carnapian inductive logic are discussed in Carnap
and Stegmu¨ller (1959), and in Carnap (1963b).
In addition, Carnap published many journal articles on the topic of inductive
logic. Aside from Carnap (1945a), which first introduced his programme, these
articles largely supplement the longer works. They include Carnap (1945b),
Carnap (1946), Carnap (1947b), Carnap (1947c), Carnap (1948), Carnap (1951),
Carnap (1953), Carnap (1966a) and Carnap (1968).
Carnap and his co-workers discussed inductive logic in some essays about on
other topics, such as the use of ‘meaning postulates’ in deductive logic Carnap
(1952b), the measurement of information Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953) and
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statistical mechanics Carnap and Shimony (1977). Finally, a substantial body
of unpublished material on inductive logic by Carnap—correspondence, notes
and manuscripts—survives, some of which I cite below.
After Carnap’s death in 1970, many of his co-workers, including Yehoushua Bar-
Hillel, Haim Gaifman and John Kemeny, wrote mostly about different topics.
Others, such as Richard Jeffrey and Abner Shimony, continued to write about
the topics that they had focused on as Carnapian inductive logicians, but took
a somewhat different perspective.
2.2.1 Related programmes
While Carnapian inductive logic can, I believe, be analysed based on the written
material referred to above, it is also important to mention some related research
programmes that it either influenced or was influenced by.
Cambridge authors
Though, as we shall see later, the relationship between Carnap’s views and
those of Keynes is not entirely straightforward, Carnap drew inspiration for his
work on inductive logic from Keynes (1921). Carnap was also influenced by
the writing on inductive reasoning of several other Cambridge authors, namely
Wittgenstein, Harold Jeffreys and Frank Ramsey. Ironically, another Cambridge
author, W.E. Johnson, anticipated much of Carnap’s work, though Carnap does
not seem to have read Johnson’s work until well after starting his own research
programme.
The Finnish school
Carnap’s programme was both pre and post dated by a related programme
which Niiniluoto calls “the Finnish school of induction”. Starting with the
work of Eino Kaila, several Finnish authors including von Wright, Hintikka and
Niiniluoto pursued research into inductive logic.
This research programme and its relationship with Carnapian inductive logic are
documented in Niiniluoto (2011). Niiniluoto notes that, at least on a sociological
level, this tradition was to a large extent distinct from Carnapian inductive logic,
having plotted an independent course from the work of Keynes.
The Manchester school
Since the mid 1980s a group of scholars based in Manchester has carried out
research into the mathematical structures that were the main subject matter of
Carnapian inductive logic, and their generalisations. This research has extended
the scope of Carnapian inductive logic, revealed new facts about alternative
systems and presented Carnap’s work in a much more accessible and modern
form. Much of this research is documented in Paris and Vencovska´ (2015).
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2.3 The methodology of scientific research pro-
grammes
In order to begin a historical reappraisal of Carnapian inductive logic, it might
be best to discuss it from a neutral perspective, identifying important claims,
influences and changes without commenting on their merit. However, this kind
of analysis would not be sufficient for our second purposes of substantive reap-
praisal. In order to determine whether Carnapian inductive logic still has some-
thing to offer, we need a philosophical framework within which it is possible to
distinguish good, reappraisal-worthy research programmes from bad ones that
do not deserve renewed attention.
I submit that Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes, as ar-
ticulated in Lakatos (1968b) and Lakatos (1970), is a sensible first candidate
for such a framework. Lakatos’s methodology sets out a taxonomy according to
which scientific research programmes can be classified, describes what they do
and sets out evaluative criteria according to which some research programmes
are good, or ‘progressive’, whereas others are bad and ‘degenerate’.
In this section I outline the main features of Lakatos’s methodology and argue
that it is a good starting point for an assessment of Carnapian inductive logic.
2.3.1 Lakatos’s methodology
The methodology of scientific research programmes analyses scientific research
programmes in terms of two kinds of rule: the ‘negative heuristic’ and the
‘positive heuristic’.
A research programme’s negative heuristic identifies a ‘hard core’ of dogmas
that constitute the research programme’s central commitments and stipulates
that these should not be revised under any circumstances. Only secondary com-
mitments, those identified by the negative heuristic as part of the programme’s
‘protective belt’, should ever be changed. The negative heuristic should pro-
vide researchers with instructions as to how they should react when confronted
with uncooperative facts that might tempt them to drop one of their hard core
commitments.
A research programme’s positive heuristic stipulates in advance a strategy for
devising and modifying secondary commitments so as to account for more and
more facts and eventually make novel predictions.
Lakatos saw Newtonian gravity as an apt example of a scientific research pro-
gramme. Its hard core consisted of Newton’s laws of motion, together with
certain other unarticulated commitments1: it’s negative heuristic prohibited
these from being modified. Newtonian gravity’s protective belt consisted of a
1See (Lakatos, 1968b, p.172).
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collection of secondary commitments which, together with the hard core dog-
mas, determined a collection of models of planetary movements. Its positive
heuristic gave Newtonian researchers instructions as to how to improve these
models, altering and adding secondary commitments along the way, so that they
could eventually be used to make novel predictions without contradicting any
core Newtonian dogmas.
Besides this taxonomy of a research programme’s components, Lakatos’s method-
ology also puts forward standards of success and failure. A research pro-
gramme is successful, or ‘progressive’ if it shows ‘theoretical progress’, ‘empirical
progress’ and ‘heuristic power’. Theoretical progress consists in making more
and more secondary commitments. Empirical progress occurs if, at least inter-
mittently, discoveries are made that would not have been possible without these
new commitments. Finally, in order for a research programme to have heuristic
power, changes in its protective belt must not be ‘ad-hoc’. Lakatos thought
that a change to a research programme could be ad-hoc in three specific ways2:
by failing to add genuine empirical content, by retrospectively accounting for
the discoveries of rival research programmes or by not being in the spirit of the
programme’s positive heuristic.
If a research programme fails to satisfy any of these criteria, then it is ‘degen-
erate’, according to the methodology of scientific research programmes.
See (Lakatos, 1968b, § 2(c) and § 3) and (Lakatos, 1968a, § 3) for Lakatos’s
discussions of theoretical and empirical progress. See (Lakatos, 1968b, p.174)
for comments on heuristic power and (Lakatos, 1970, p.125, footnote 34) for a
more detailed discussion of what it means for changes to be ad-hoc.
Newtonian gravity was progressive, according to Lakatos, because researchers
following its heuristics managed to build steadily more complicated models of
planetary movements, which they eventually used to make novel discoveries
about the planets. Moreover, according to Lakatos, the way in which Newtonian
researchers improved their models was anticipated by the pattern of Newton’s
initial research, and was therefore in the spirit of Newtonian gravity’s positive
heuristic.
2.3.2 The question of truth-directedness
There are two potential issues which might make the reader wary of my plan
to apply Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes to Carnapian
inductive logic.
First, the reader might wonder why it is necessary to apply Lakatos’s method-
ology to Carnapian inductive logic, given that Lakatos himself already did so
in Lakatos (1968a), coming to the conclusion in Lakatos (1973) that Carnapian
inductive logic showed “all the characteristics of a degenerating programme”.
2See (Lakatos, 1970, p.125, footnote 34).
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Unfortunately, we shall see in section 3.2 that Lakatos made some crucial errors
in his analysis of Carnapian inductive logic which invalidate this conclusion - as
a result further investigation is called for.
A second problem has to do with truth-directedness, and must be addressed
before going further. Lakatos’s methodology stresses the importance of truth-
directed propositions, that is, propositions that aim to make correct claims
about the nature of the world. Lakatos characterised a research programme’s
hard-core as consisting of such claims. For example, he characterised the hard
core of Newtonian gravity as consisting of Newton’s laws of motion together
with his law of gravitation3 and equated the hard core of algebraic topology
with that programme’s formal axioms4. In addition, Lakatos defined empirical
progress so that whether or not a research programme is progressive depends
on whether its truth-directed predictions are verified.
This presents a problem for our analysis, as Carnapian inductive logic’s commit-
ments and predictions were not straightforwardly truth-directed. Rather than
aiming to describe the world correctly, I shall argue, Carnapian inductive logic
aimed to be useful in everyday life and science. Rather than making commit-
ments to the truth of particular claims about the world, Carnapian inductive
logic made commitments to the usefulness of particular methodological pre-
scriptions. For this reason Lakatos’s methodology does not apply to Carnapian
inductive logic if it is taken overly literally.
Lakatos himself was aware of this kind of obstacle to the application of his
methodology to Carnapian inductive logic. Nonetheless, he thought that the
obstacles could be surmounted, and that Carnapian inductive logic could be
shown to be a degenerate research programme. Lakatos sought to solve the
problem in an unpublished essay entitled ‘The Criticism of Carnap’s Research
Programmes’ by identifying Carnapian inductive logic as an ‘a priori’ kind of
research programme, in contrast to the customary ‘empirical’ kind.
Carnap’s research programme is not a scientific (or empirical)
research programme: it does not attempt to set up theories that can
clash with facts. Carnap’s inductive logic aims not at an empirical
theory but at an a priori normative theory.
(Lakatos, 1967a, p.12)
According to Lakatos’s reading of Carnapian inductive logic, which is also ap-
parent in Lakatos (1968a), it did not aim to find ‘empirical’ truths that can in
principle be verified, but rather to find ‘a priori’ truths that can only be accessed
by means of intuition. We shall see in the discussion of Lakatos (1968a) in the
next chapter that Lakatos was mistaken to describe Carnapian inductive logic
in this way, since it was not even truth-directed in an ‘a priori’ way.
A better way to unite Carnapian inductive logic and the methodology of scien-
3See (Lakatos, 1968b, p. 169).
4See (Lakatos, 1978b, p.96).
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tific research programmes is to make the latter liberal enough to accommodate
research programmes with non-truth-directed hard core commitments. Corfield
argues that precisely this approach would improve Lakatos’s methodology:
A Newtonian if asked whether he thought the law of gravita-
tion and Newtons three Laws of motion were true, might well have
answered affirmatively, as would a seventeenth-century mathemati-
cian have responded to a similar question concerning the axioms
of Euclidean geometry. But were we to ask a mathematician to-
day whether he considered a system of axioms to be true, he would
most probably tell us that he thought it had interesting models or
that it described an important construction. Perhaps the distance
between the modern mathematician and scientist in this respect is
not so great in that the physicist is likely nowadays to say that she
thinks her theory a good model of some aspect of the universe. Thus,
Lakatos ought to have allowed a wider notion of hard core to allow
research programmes any chance of success in accurately portraying
science.
(Corfield, 2003, p. 182)
Corfield claims that allowing the inclusion of “higher-level beliefs and aims” in
research programmes’ hard cores is necessary in order for Lakatos’s method-
ology to describe mathematical and scientific research adequately. Following
this approach, I will apply a slightly modified version of Lakatos’s methodology,
allowing hard core commitments not to be truth-directed. This divergence, I
claim, is minor enough that I can still be said to be applying the methodology
of scientific research programmes.
2.4 Hard core commitments
The most important step towards analysing Carnapian inductive logic according
to Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes is to identify its
hard-core commitments. In this section I identify three main methodological
prescriptions which, I argue, play this role. These include commitments to:
• Explication Producing useful formal analogues or ‘explications’ of induc-
tive assumptions
• Systems of inductive logic Using a certain kind of formal tool, namely
‘systems of inductive logic’
• Tolerance Taking a philosophically tolerant attitude to the task of eval-
uating whether or not attempts at explication have been successful.
I shall now discuss these commitments, and their textual bases, in more detail.
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2.4.1 Explication
The main goal of Carnapian inductive logic was to produce useful formal re-
placements for assumptions about inductive reasoning.
Inductive assumptions assert rules as to how uncertain reasoning ought to pro-
ceed. An inductive assumption might assert, to take an important and fre-
quently adopted example, that instances of a certain kind of observation should
render future instances of the same kind more plausible. A formal replacement
for an inductive assumption restates it, or at least approximates it, in a formal
language.
The fact that producing formal replacements for inductive assumptions was the
main goal of Carnapian inductive logic throughout its development is a key
claim of my thesis. That it was an aim of late Carnapian inductive logic can
clearly be discerned from the following quotation:
Now it is just the purpose of IL to give explicit rules for induc-
tive reasoning, so that a subject can, whenever he regards it worth
the effort, choose to apply a rule-directed procedure instead of the
common instinct-directed procedure.
Carnap (1967b)
The first six sections of Carnap (1950b), the main statement of early Carnapian
inductive logic, are devoted to explaining Carnap’s goal of producing useful for-
mal replacements for inductive assumptions. In these sections Carnap provides
a general philosophical account of the process of producing useful formalisations,
which he called ‘explication’. Carnap describes different kinds of explication,
proposes criteria for evaluating formal replacements or ‘explicata’ and argues
that explication has played an important role in the history of ideas.
The general nature of this discussion can be gleaned from the following quota-
tion:
The task of explication consists in transforming a given more or
less inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the
first by the second. We call the given concept (or the term used
for it) the explicandum, and the exact concept proposed to take
the place of the first (or the term proposed for it) the explicatum.
The explicandum may belong to everyday language or to a previ-
ous stage in the development of scientific language. The explicatum
must be given by explicit rules for its use, for example, by a defini-
tion which incorporates it into a well-constructed system of scientific
either logico-mathematical or empirical concepts.
(Carnap, 1950b, p.3, emphasis original)
Importantly, according to Carnap’s conception, a successful explicatum for an
inductive assumption need not be true or justified in any non-trivial sense. It
must only be useful, in some cases, to replace the informal explicandum with the
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formal explicatum. This can be seen from some remarks by Carnap on Russell’s
theory of definite descriptions, which Carnap took to be an explicative project:
The different interpretations of descriptions are not meant as as-
sertions about the meaning of phrases of the form the so-and-so in
English, but as proposals for an interpretation and, consequently, for
deductive rules, concerning descriptions in symbolic systems. There-
fore, there is no theoretical issue of right or wrong between these
various conceptions, but only the practical question of the conve-
nience of the different methods.
(Carnap, 1947a, p.33)
Due to this commitment to explication, Carnapian inductive logic not straight-
forwardly normative. According to Carnap, the main purpose of inductive
logic was the useful formalisation of already-given inductive assumptions, rather
than the demonstration that some assumptions are better than others. Carnap
thought that inductive logic shared this non-normativity with deductive logic,
which he took to be a formal approximation of common patterns of deductive
reasoning. This view can be seen from the following quotation:
First I wish to emphasize that inductive logic does not propose new
ways of thinking, but merely to explicate old ways. It tries to make
explicit certain forms of reasoning which implicitly or instinctively
have always been applied both in every day life and in science. This
is analogous to the situation at the beginning of deductive logic.
Aristotle did not invent deductive reasoning; that had gone on as
long ago as there was human language. If somebody had said to
Aristotle: “What good is your new theory to us? We have done
well enough without it. Why should we change our ways of thinking
and accept your new invention?”, he might have answered: “I do
not propose new ways of thinking, I merely want to help you to do
consciously and hence with greater clarity and safety from pitfalls
what you have always done. I merely want to replace common sense
with exact rules” It is the same with inductive logic. . . .
Since inductive logic merely intends to explicate common ways of
inductive reasoning, the question of its usefulness leads back to the
general question: Is it desirable that procedures which are generally
applied, though only intuitively or instinctively, are brought into the
clear daylight, analyzed and systematized in the form of exact rules?
Whoever gives an affirmative answer to this general question will
acknowledge the importance of the special problem of explicating
inductive reasoning, that is, of constructing a system of inductive
logic with rules as exact as those of the older, well-established system
of deductive logic.
(Carnap, 1953, p.189)
As we shall see in what follows, discussions of Carnapian inductive logic often
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overlook this crucial aspect.
Despite the fact that Carnapian inductive logic was not normative but explica-
tive, questions of justification can be indirectly relevant to inductive logic. One
might, for example, be particularly interested in explicating inductive assump-
tions that one thinks are justified in a particular knowledge situation, in order
to find out how someone in that situation ought to reason, given those assump-
tions. In such cases it is especially important to keep in mind that the normative
question of whether a particular inductive assumption is justified is distinct from
the inductive logical question of how best to formalise it.
2.4.2 Systems of inductive logic
A second hard core commitment of Carnapian inductive logic was to a particular
kind of explicatum for inductive assumptions, namely systems of inductive logic.
The following exposition of this key concept matches Carnap’s on all substantive
points and uses the same terms as Carnap to describe abstract objects, but
follows a different presentation that is heavily informed by that of Paris and
Vencovska´ (2015). This presentation is more succinct than Carnap’s and, I
hope, should also be more accessible to modern readers.
A system of inductive logic is an ordered pair (D,M) consisting of a set D,
called an ‘inductive logical domain’ or simply ‘domain’, and a set M = {m :
D → R | axioms} of real valued ‘measure functions’ satisfying certain formal
conditions or ‘axioms’.
Inductive logical domains contain members that represent possible objects of
inductive assumptions; typically these are propositions, though we shall see
later that inductive assumptions can also concern states of evidence. Measure
functions represent possible degrees of plausibility of such objects. Measure
functions can often canonically be associated with two-place ‘conditional’ mea-
sure functions with the form mcond : D×D → R and interpreted as representing
attitudes about which propositions evidentially support which others. Carnap
used the term ‘confirmation function’ or ‘c-function’ to describe conditional
measure functions.
The procedure for associating unconditional and conditional place measure func-
tions in the case for commonly used domains and axiom systems is described at
(Paris and Vencovska´, 2015, Ch. 4). In the typical case where D is a proposi-
tional or predicate domain, m is a probability function, θ, φ ∈ D and m(φ) > 0,
the conditional measure function mcond associated with m is defined so that
mcond(θ | φ) = m(θ∧φ)m(φ) .
I shall now describe inductive logical domains and axioms in more detail, high-
lighting important examples that feature in the rest of the thesis.
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Inductive logical domains
Inductive logical domains are sets whose members are interpreted as repre-
senting propositions about which one might make inductive assumptions. The
following two kinds of domain were studied in the most detail by Carnapian
inductive logicians.
Finite Propositional domains
The simplest kind of inductive logical domain is the set of sentences SLprop
of a finite propositional language Lprop. Finite propositional languages consist
of propositional variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn and connectives ¬,∨,∧,→ and ↔,
together with rules determining which combinations of these symbols are well-
formed sentences.
An atomic state of a propositional language is a sentence with the form ωi =
±X1∧. . .∧±Xn, where each± indicates that the following propositional variable
appears either with or without a negation symbol in front of it.
Sentences of finite propositional languages are typically interpreted as repre-
senting propositions. For example, the sentence X1 ∧¬X2 might be interpreted
as representing the proposition that xylophone 1 is in tune but xylophone 2 is
not.
Unary predicate domains
In order to capture more complicated kinds of inductive reasoning, systems of
inductive logic often employ a richer kind of domain: unary predicate domains.
A unary predicate domain is the set SLpred of a unary predicate language.
Unary predicate languages consist of unary predicate symbols P1, P2, . . . , Pk,
constant symbols a1, a2, . . . , an, variable symbols x1, x2, . . ., quantifier symbols
∀ and ∃, connectives ¬,∨,∧,→ and ↔ and rules specifying which combinations
of these symbols are well-formed formulae and sentences.
An atom of a unary predicate language is a formula with the form αj(x) =
±P1x±∧P2x±∧ . . .∧±Pkx where, as above, each ± indicates either the presence
or absence of a negation symbol. When a constant ai is substituted for the
variable x in an atom, the result is an ‘atomic sentence’ which, in a sense,
describes ai as fully as possible within the given language.
Terms of the form θ(a1, . . . , am) should be understood as sentences that mention
all and only constants a1, . . . , am.
Sentences of unary predicate languages are typically interpreted so that the
constant symbols represent individuals, such as experiments, and the predicate
symbols represent properties of these individuals, such as possible experimental
results. For example, the sentence P1a1 ∧¬P5a2 might be interpreted as repre-
senting the proposition that, in an experiment in which apples are sequentially
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drawn out of a sack and examined, apple 1 is found to be green, while apple 2
is found not to be fresh.
Unary predicate domains can be made richer by making the set of constant sym-
bols countably infinite, by introducing non-unary relation symbols, by introduc-
ing equality symbols or by separating predicates into ‘families’ and specifying
that every constant must instantiate exactly one predicate in every family.
Axioms
The most important features of systems of inductive logic are the axioms which
determine sets of measure functions. These are typically interpreted as repre-
senting conditions that inductive attitudes must satisfy in order to be compati-
ble with the collection of assumptions that the overall system of inductive logic
formalises.
Inductive logical axioms must be formal in the sense that they only mention
measure functions’ logico-mathematical properties, and not their interpreta-
tions or those of their domains. Carnap discusses this point at (Carnap, 1950b,
§ 43). For example, it is possible for an inductive logical axiom to excludes
measure functions which assign positive numbers to logical contradictions, since
whether or not a given measure function satisfies this condition depends only
on its logico-mathematical properties. On the other hand, an inductive logical
axiom could not exclude measure functions that assign positive numbers to false
sentences. Whether or not a measure function assigns positive values to false
sentences depends on which sentences are false: this is not a logico-mathematical
property of the measure function but rather a feature of the interpretation of
its domain.
Some important inductive logical axioms are as follows. All of them assume a
unary predicate domain SLpred. Many interesting facts about these axioms and
more are demonstrated in Paris and Vencovska´ (2015).
Probability (unary predicate domains)
The probability axioms formalise the inductive assumption that attitudes about
propositions’ plausibilities can be represented by probability functions. It is im-
portant to note that representing this inductive assumption using the probability
axioms need not imply any commitment to the epistemological view that states
of rational partial belief should be representable by probability functions, which
we will discuss in chapter 4.
Axioms of probability (unary predicate domains): Probpred
For any sentences θ and φ ∈ SLpred, m : SLpred → [0, 1] must be such
that:
P1pred If θ is logically true then m(θ) = 1.
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P2pred If ¬(θ ∧ φ) is a logical truth, then m(θ ∨ φ) = m(θ) +m(φ).
P3pred For any sentence with the form ∃xθ(x), m(∃xθ(x)) = limn→∞m(θ(a1)∨
θ(a2) ∨ . . . ∨ θ(an))
These conditions ensure that measure functions are probability functions. The
first two conditions ensure that, as probability functions, measure functions sat-
isfying them give maximum values to logical truths and that the probabilities
of mutually exclusive sentences are additive. The third condition P3pred al-
lows the probability of sentences with quantifiers to be determined by those of
quantifier-free sentences. This axiom preserves the intuitive meaning of quan-
tifiers, so long as the individuals represented by constant symbols are assumed
to exhaust the relevant universe of discourse. See (Paris and Vencovska´, 2015,
Ch. 3) for more on this point.
Constant exchangeability
This axiom attempts to formalise the inductive assumption that the identity
of particular individuals makes no difference to the plausibility of propositions
about them.
Axiom of constant exchangeability: Ex
For any tuples of constants (a1, . . . , al) and (aσ(1), . . . , aσ(l)), where σ :
N+ → N+ is a permutation, and any sentence θ(a1, . . . , al) ∈ SLpred,
m(θ(a1, . . . , al)) = m(θ(aσ(1), . . . , aσ(l)).
See (Paris and Vencovska´, 2015, Ch. 6-9) for a discussion of the mathematical
properties of constant exchangeability and its relationships with other important
axioms.
Instantial relevance
Axioms of instantial relevance formalise inductive assumptions according to
which, when experimental results of a certain kind occur, the plausibility of
other results of the same kind should be affected in a certain way. The most
common such axioms are as follows.
Axiom of non-negative instantial relevance: PIR
For any atom αj(x) of Lpred and sentence θ(a1, . . . , al) ∈ SLpred,
m(αj(al+2) | αj(al+1) ∧ θ(a1, . . . , al)) ≥ m(αj(al+2) | θ(a1, . . . , al))
Axiom of postive instantial relevance: IR+
For any atom αj(x) of Lpred and sentence θ(a1, . . . , al) ∈ SLpred,
m(αj(al+2) | αj(al+1) ∧ θ(a1, . . . , al)) > m(αj(al+2) | θ(a1, . . . , al))
Axiom of negative instantial relevance: IR−
For any atom αj(x) of Lpred and sentence θ(a1, . . . , al) ∈ SLpred,
m(αj(al+2) | αj(al+1) ∧ θ(a1, . . . , al)) < m(αj(al+2) | θ(a1, . . . , al))
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In each case, constants are interpreted as representing experiments and the atom
αj as representing a certain kind of result. PIR allows only measure functions
representing attitudes according to which the proposition that a result of a
certain kind occurred does not count as evidence against the proposition that
another result of the same kind occurs subsequently. IR+ represents a stronger
assumption according to which instances must positively count in favour of
subsequent instances of the same kind. IR− represents an assumption that
goes the other way and insists that experimental results of a certain kind make
subsequent results of the same kind strictly less plausible.
The axiom of non-negative instantial relevance is sometimes called the ‘principle
of instantial relevance’, hence the abbreviation PIR and has been the subject
of the most study. See, for example, (Paris and Vencovska´, 2015, Ch. 11). It is
helpful to remember, however, that other axioms of instantial relevance exist.
Johnson’s sufficientness postulate
This axiom attempts to formalise the inductive assumption that, in order to
determine how plausible a sample of n experimental results makes an as-yet
unobserved experimental result of a certain kind, the only relevant information
is the number n of experiments that constitute the sample, together with the
number r of results of the same kind as the one whose future plausibility is
being assessed.
Johnson’s sufficientness postulate: JSP
m(αj(an+1) |
∧n
i=1 αhi(ai)) depends only on n and r =| {i : hi = j} |
In this formulation the atoms of Lpred are assumed to represent possible results
of experiments and the constant symbols to represent experiments. The number
r is the number of constant symbols in
∧n
i=1 αhi(ai) that instantiate the atom
αj , representing the number of experiments that had the result represented by
αj .
Johnson’s sufficientness postulate was first studied by W.E. Johnson, who char-
acterised it as a ‘postulate’ rather than an axiom, explaining the first and third
part of its name, which, according to (Paris and Vencovska´, 2015, p. 103), was
coined by I.J. Good. It is called a ‘sufficientness’ postulate because, according to
the assumption that it formalises, the numbers n and r are sufficient statistics.
Example of a system of inductive logic
An example of a system of inductive logic is (SLprop,Mprob). This system of
inductive logic consists of the set of sentences SLprop of a propositional language
Lprop, together with the set of all probability functions on those sentences. This
set of measure functions is determined by the probability axioms for proposi-
tional domains, which are as follows:
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Probability (propositional domains)
Axioms of probability (propositional domains)
For any sentences θ and φ ∈ SLprop, m : SLprop → [0, 1] must be such
that:
P1prop If θ is logically true then m(θ) = 1.
P2prop If ¬(θ ∧ φ) is a logical truth, then m(θ ∨ φ) = m(θ) +m(φ).
2.4.3 Tolerance
The final key commitment of Carnapian inductive logic was to the principle that
the success or failure of inductive logical explicatations should not be judged on
philosophical grounds, but rather on pragmatic ones. There were two aspects
to this tolerant stance. On the one hand, Carnap had a general view, that
went beyond the particular case of inductive logic, according to which ‘exter-
nal questions’ about whether to accept or reject the use of logical systems for
particular purposes should be answered by pragmatic rather than philosophical
means. Secondly, within inductive logic Carnap was careful to distinguish what
he called questions of ‘pure inductive logic’, in which only the formal proper-
ties of systems of inductive logic are taken into consideration, from questions
of ‘applied inductive logic’, for the purposes of which the components may be
thought of as representing features of the non-formal world, like propositions
and inductive assumptions. Carnap thought that all questions as to how well
systems of inductive logic perform as explicata should be considered within the
second category.
Pure and applied inductive logic
Carnapian inductive logic had two distinct branches: pure and applied inductive
logic. This distinction is explained most clearly at (Carnap, 1971a, § 4) but early
Carnap made it as well, as can be seen from (Carnap, 1950b, §44 A), where
Carnap distinguishes ‘logical’ and ‘methodological’ questions in very similar
terms to those of (Carnap, 1971a, § 4).
Pure inductive logic addressed questions about systems of inductive logic that
could be answered without interpreting their domains. It therefore investigated
only their mathematical properties, and did not address the question of justi-
fication. Applied inductive logic dealt with all tasks that required systems of
inductive logic to be interpreted. In particular, the task of discovering which
systems of inductive logic can usefully formalise which inductive assumptions re-
quired that the systems be interpreted, and so fell within the purview of applied
inductive logic.
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When he discusses the proper roles of pure and applied inductive logic at (Car-
nap, 1971a, § 4), Carnap draws a parallel with pure and applied geometry.
The relation between pure and applied IL is somewhat similar
to that between pure (mathematical) and empirical (physical) ge-
ometry. . . . In mathematical geometry we speak abstractly about
certain numerical magnitudes of geometrical entities, for example,
the lengths of the sides of a triangle and the measures of the three
angles, but without specifying a procedure of measuring these mag-
nitudes. General theorems are given, stating mathematical relations
between these parameters. A variety of possible structures of three-
dimensional space, the Euclidean and various non-Euclidean struc-
tures, are systematically studied. But the question which of these
possible structures is the actual structure of the space of nature is
not even raised. This question belongs to physical geometry.
(Carnap, 1971a, p. 69)
Carnap refers his reader to Hempel (1945) for a fuller discussion of the dis-
tinction between pure and applied geometry that he has in mind. It is worth
considering Hempel’s remarks on pure geometry:
Geometry thus construed is a purely formal discipline, we shall
refer to it also as pure geometry. A pure geometry, then—no mat-
ter whether it is of the euclidean or of a non-euclidean variety—
deals with no specific subject-matter; in particular, it asserts noth-
ing about physical space. All its theorems are analytic and thus
true with certainty precisely because they are devoid of factual con-
tent. Thus, to characterize the import of pure geometry, we might
use the standard form of a movie-disclaimer: No portrayal of the
characteristics of geometrical figures or of the spatial properties or
relationships of actual physical bodies is intended, and any similari-
ties between the primitive concepts and their customary geometrical
connotations are purely coincidental.
(Hempel, 1945, p.12, emphasis original)
With the help of this quotation from Hempel we can see that the analogy that
Carnap wished to draw between pure geometry and pure inductive logic is as
follows. Carnap thought that, just as the proper role of pure geometry was not
to indicate which structure should be used to model physical space, so too it
was beyond the role of pure inductive logic to specify which system of inductive
logic should be used for a given purpose.
The following quotation confirms Carnap’s view that the evaluation of systems
of inductive logic should only proceed within applied inductive logic:
Justifying an inductive method and, more specifically, offering rea-
sons for the acceptance of a proposed axiom, is a kind of reasoning
that lies outside pure IL and takes into consideration the application
of c-functions. (Carnap, 1971a, p. 105, emphasis original)
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This aspect of Carnap’s use of the term ‘pure inductive logic’ contrasts with
that of the contemporary Manchester school of inductive logicians, whose ap-
proach is more liberal. The Manchester school devote particular attention to
the question of which inductive logical axioms formalise rationality constraints
that bind agents who find themselves in what I call the ‘Manchester blank slate
situation’. We shall discuss blank slate situations in detail in section 2.9.1 be-
low. Briefly, the Manchester blank slate situation occurs when an agent finds
themself required to attach degrees of plausibility to members of an inductive
logical domain without knowing how these members are associated with propo-
sitions. According to the Manchester school, axioms that formalise blank-slate
rationality constraints constitute the subject matter of ‘pure inductive logic’.
Consequently, as the Manchester school use the term, ‘pure inductive logic’ in-
cludes activities—identifying blank-slate rationality constraints—that would be
ruled out according to Carnap’s use of the term.
Carnap’s general views about logical systems
Carnap’s views about ‘external questions’ whether to accept or reject a logical
system are expressed in Carnap (1950a) as follows:
. . . we take the position that the introduction of the new ways of
speaking does not need any theoretical justification because it does
not imply any assertion of reality.. . .
Above all, [the introduction of a new system] must not be interpreted
as referring to an assumption, belief, or assertion of “the reality of
the entities.” There is no such assertion. An alleged statement of
the reality of the system of entities is a pseudo-statement without
cognitive content. To be sure, we have to face at this point an
important question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical question;
it is the question of whether or not to accept the new linguistic
forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or
false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being
more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the
language is intended.
(Carnap, 1950a, § 3)
Semantic rules, Carnap thought, cannot be true or false, but only more or less
useful. Consequently the axioms that determine systems of inductive logic,
which Carnap saw as semantic rules, cannot be justified on a theoretical basis,
but only on the basis of how useful they are for particular purposes. This
connection is made by Carnap himself in the following quotation:
I agree with Burks’ view that. . . questions of justification of induction
in general. . . are external questions.
(Carnap, 1963a, p. 981-2)
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2.4.4 Summary of Carnapian inductive logic’s hard core
To sum up, the following commitments can be thought of as comprising the
hard core of Carnapian inductive logic:
HC1 Explication Inductive assumptions can usefully be explicated.
HC2 Systems of inductive logic Systems of inductive logic can be good
explicata for inductive assumptions.
HC3 Tolerance All systems of inductive logic should be tolerated at a philo-
sophical level: systems of inductive logic should only be evaluated on
pragmatic grounds, in the context of a given interpretation and applica-
tion.
As mentioned above, Lakatos tended to conceive of hard-core commitments as
truth-directed claims about the nature of the world, whereas HC1−3 are more
akin to methodological prescriptions. Nonetheless, HC1−3 play exactly the role
required by Lakatos’s methodology. They were all advocated by Carnapian in-
ductive logicians at all stages of their research programme’s development. They
are constitutive of the research programme: if a research programme does not
explicate inductive assumptions, uses means other than systems of inductive
logic to explicate them or seeks to justify systems of inductive logic on theoret-
ical rather than practical grounds, then it is certainly not Carnapian inductive
logic. HC1-3 are also specific enough to distinguish Carnapian inductive logic
from its rivals. For example, Timothy Williamson’s conception of evidential
probability, as presented at (Williamson, 2002, p.209-237), denies HC3 by pos-
tulating true degrees of evidential support and claiming that they satisfy the
probability axioms. Karl Popper, for example in (Popper, 1959, Ch. 1), denied
HC1, arguing that inductive assumptions are irrelevant to science and there-
fore unworthy of explication. Putnam (1963) rejected HC2, arguing instead
that inductive assumptions should be formalised using different mathematical
objects.
2.5 Other components
According to the methodology of scientific research programmes, the main com-
ponents of a research programme, besides the hard-core of unalterable commit-
ments, are the protective belt of secondary commitments, the negative heuristic
and the positive heuristic. In the case of Carnapian inductive logic, I claim that
these were as follows.
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2.5.1 Protective belt
Carnapian inductive logic’s protective belt consists of auxiliary hypotheses, each
of which asserts that a particular system of inductive logic successfully expli-
cates a particular inductive assumption. Since, in order to be successful, an
explicatum must both approximate the thing that it formalises and be useful,
claims in Carnapian inductive logic’s protective belt have at least the following
components. On the one hand they assert that a certain system of inductive
logic adequately approximates a certain inductive assumption; on the other they
claim that that system is useful for certain purposes.
For example, in Carnap (1952a), Carnap argued for the explicative merits of a
certain system of inductive logic, namely (SLpred,M1952) whereM1952 contains
all and only the measure functions in the so-called ‘continuum of inductive meth-
ods’. Carnap claimed that this system successfully explicates a commonly-made
collection of inductive assumptions. First he argued, for each of eleven axioms
with which he characterisedM19525, that it approximates a feature of common-
sense inductive reasoning. He then attempted to show that (SLpred,M1952) is
useful by finding applications for it to problems in statistics, such as the debate
over whether estimators should be unbiased. In order to make (SLpred,M1952)
easier to apply in this way, Carnap showed that the measure functions inM1952
can be described in terms of a single real-valued parameter λ.
It is important to recognise that, although claims as to the success of failure
of particular explicata are prominent in Carnap’s writing on inductive logic,
Carnapian inductive logic did not make a hard core committment to any such
claim. As we have seen, Carnap was in fact committed to a tolerant approach to
all such applied inductive logical questions. It is therefore, I believe, unwise to
identify Carnpian inductive logic with any particular system of inductive logic
or axiom.
2.5.2 Negative heuristic
A research programme’s negative heuristic instructs researchers as to how they
ought to react to ‘anomalies’: inconvenient facts that sit awkwardly with its
hard core commitments. In the case of Carnapian inductive logic, anomalies
are cases of inductive reasoning that prove difficult to explicate using currently
available systems of inductive logic.
For example, (Goodman, 1946, p.383) asks us to consider a situation where a
sequence of observations displays a periodic pattern. Perhaps an observation
of a red object is invariably followed immediately by an observation of a black
object. A natural inductive assumption asserts that, after many repetitions
5Carnap and his co-workers later improved upon this characterisation, successfully defining
M1952 using only the axioms Prob, Ex and JSP. See (Paris and Vencovska´, 2015, Ch. 16)
for more on Carnap’s continuum.
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of this pattern, observing a red object ought to make observing a black ob-
ject at the next stage highly plausible. However, this assumption is difficult to
capture without abandoning the technically important axiom of constant ex-
changeability which, according to a standard interpretation, forces the order of
observations to be evidentially irrelevant. Systems of inductive logic that do
not include constant exchangeability are not as well-understood as those that
do include it: Goodman’s example therefore seems to constitute an anomaly.
Carnapian inductive logic had two ways to accommodate such anomalies with-
out surrendering any hard core dogmas. The first blames the crude state of its
current machinery. Just as Newton’s early models were not sophisticated enough
to account for many celestial observations, so, Carnapian inductive logic’s neg-
ative heuristic might say, it would be unreasonable to expect early inductive
logic to account for all inductive assumptions. Carnap used this strategy in
Carnap (1948), his original response to Goodman, arguing that more sophisti-
cated systems of inductive logic would be needed to account for reasoning based
on periodicities.
Alternatively, failures of explication can be explained by directing attention
towards the explicandum. Perhaps a particular system of inductive logic does
not explicate some inductive reasoning very well because certain features of the
reasoning—perhaps distinctive background information or tacit assumptions—
have not yet been accounted for. For example, applying inductive logic to the
anomalous situation described above makes clear that the order of observations
is evidentially relevant in that situation. By explaining anomalies in this second
way, what seems initially to be a failure of inductive logic can turn out to
be a success, as difficulties with explication lead to new discoveries about our
inductive practices. Lakatos was particularly fond of this kind of application of
the negative heuristic: at (Lakatos, 1968b, p.169-170) he extolls the ability of
Newtonian researchers to “[turn] each new difficulty into a new victory of their
programme.”.
2.5.3 Positive heuristic
A research programme’s positive heuristic instructs researchers as to how they
should expand their research programme’s protective belt, making steadily more
secondary commitments. Broadly speaking, Carnapian inductive logic’s posi-
tive heuristic instructed researchers to do so by making more and more claims
according to which systems of inductive logic successfully explicate inductive
assumptions.
Carnap expressed more specific plans for expansion in Carnap (1945a) and (Car-
nap, 1950b, § 49). In Carnap (1945a) he set out different kinds of inductive
assumptions that he would like to be able to capture using inductive logic, in-
cluding assumptions that take into account the similarity or dissimilarity of
individuals and assumptions based on general laws. At (Carnap, 1950b, § 49)
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he envisaged the construction of more sophisticated domains, such as the sets of
sentences of a polyadic language. Carnap aimed eventually to develop systems
of inductive logic that would be rich enough to allow a full array of propositions
and inductive assumptions to do with real-valued magnitudes to be represented.
Although Carnap did not lay out an explicit programme for expansion in this
respect, the development of new axioms representing previously un-explicated
inductive attitudes and the investigation of such axioms’ mathematical proper-
ties was clearly another goal. The presence of this goal can be inferred from the
systematic way that Carnap and his coworkers carried it out.
2.6 How Carnapian inductive logic developed
Lakatos’s evaluative criteria are diachronic: rather than classifying a research
programme as progressive or degenerate based on its properties at a particular
moment in time, its assessment depends on how it develops as time goes by.
In order to evaluate Carnapian inductive logic according to Lakatos’s criteria,
then, we will need to assess how it changed during the course of its existence.
In this section I document the main ways in which Carnapian inductive logic
changed: this will make it possible to carry out a diachronic assessment.
2.6.1 Less restrictive systems of inductive logic
Early Carnapian inductive logic, up to and including Carnap (1950b), focuses
exclusively on systems of inductive logic where the set of measure functions
contains only one measure function. As Carnapian inductive logic developed,
it started to investigate systems of inductive logic with steadily larger sets of
measure functions. The set M1950 of measure functions allowed by the system
that Carnap investigated in Carnap (1950b) contains only the single measure
function m?. In Carnap (1952a) the focus is on a set M1952 that contains
uncountably infinitely many measure functions, including m?. Carnap (1971a)
and Carnap (1980) focus on systems with a still larger setM1971 of whichM1952
is a proper subset.
The reason for this steady liberalisation seems to have been technical progress.
Carnap restricted his attention to sets of measure functions whose members
can be fully described by relatively few real-valued parameters, which have
natural interpretations. For example, each measure function in the set M1952
is fully described by the real-valued parameter λ ∈ [0,∞], which can naturally
be interpreted as representing sensitivity to observational evidence.
As Carnapian inductive logic developed, Carnap and his co-workers discovered
more sophisticated parameterisations that could describe more comprehensive
sets of measure functions. Consequently, their attention shifted towards the
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task of investigating and finding uses for the larger sets of measure functions
they could describe using their new tools.
2.6.2 Different interpretative requirements
Early applied Carnapian inductive logic featured several requirements stipu-
lating how logical languages featuring in systems of inductive logic ought to
be interpreted. These requirements included, for example, the stipulation that
logical constants be interpreted as representing distinct individuals and that
predicates represent possible properties of those individuals. Another require-
ment, the ‘requirement of independence’ (Carnap, 1950b, §18 B), required that
inductive logical languages should be interpreted so that all distinct sentences
with the form Pi(ak) are logically independent.
Late Carnapian inductive logic relabelled all requirements of this kind ‘basic
assumptions’ and developed a framework for expressing them explicitly as meta-
linguistic stipulations, so that different requirements could easily be chosen for
the purposes of different applications. For example, in an application of induc-
tive logic to the investigation of an urn full of coloured balls, a basic assumption
might express the fact that each ball must have one and only one colour by stip-
ulating that each constant of a language must instantiate exactly one predicate.
See (Carnap, 1971a, Ch. 5) for Carnap’s discussion of basic assumptions.
2.6.3 Families of predicates
Later Carnapian inductive logic discussed logical predicates slightly differently
from early Carnapian inductive logic, organising them into ‘families’, corre-
sponding to mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of properties such as
possible colours, weights and volumes that a sampled individual might have. It
was stipulated by means of a basic assumption that every constant instantiates
exactly one member of each family. Families are introduced at (Carnap, 1971a,
p. 43-47), and the salient basic assumption is set out at (Carnap, 1971a, p. 81).
This additional structure had several attractive features. It allowed impossibili-
ties like the whole surface of a ball being both black and red to be ruled out and
brought inductive logic closer to mainstream statistics, since predicates with a
family structure can be thought of as values of random variables.
While families of predicates, and the means of describing them logically, fea-
ture prominently in late Carnapian inductive logic, their introduction did not
fundamentally alter the research programme. The organisation of predicates
into families is simply a matter of labelling, which could just as well have been
executed in early Carnapian inductive logic. The basic assumption stipulating
that individuals instantiate one predicate in each family, on the other hand, was
novel. However, it is properly seen as a generalisation of the original approach
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rather than a departure, because the presentation without a family structure
can be recovered by stipulating that all predicates belong to different families.
2.6.4 Measure-theoretic reformulation
Carnap recognised that the formal languages that featured in his early work on
inductive logic were unfamiliar to most practising scientists. In order to remedy
this situation, later Carnapian inductive logic discussed systems of inductive
logic whose domains are algebras generated by an underlying state space rather
than sets of sentences of a logical language.
This change was cosmetic, as the axioms that Carnap and his co-workers inves-
tigated did not exploit the differences between these kinds of domains. Instead
they simply reformulated axioms on sentence-domained measure functions in
the new measure-theoretic framework.
2.6.5 Versatility
A final noteworthy change concerns the versatility of systems of inductive logic.
Early Carnap seems to have believed that systems of inductive logic ought to be
highly versatile, so that, having chosen a particular system for a particular task,
an inductive logician should generally use the same system for all other appli-
cations of inductive logic. This is clear from Carnap’s postulation in Carnap
(1950b) of the generally accepted set of inductive assumptions ‘probability1’,
which is discussed in detail below in section 2.11.3, and from the following pas-
sage. Another indication of this position comes from the following passage,
where early Carnap argues that it is better to choose systems of inductive logic
that are generally applicable, rather than choosing different systems for the
purposes of different applications, or “inductive problems”:
Suppose that X has chosen a certain inductive method [‘inductive
method’ is Carnap’s word for a system of inductive logic with one
measure function m ∈ M1952 from his continuum.] and used it
during a certain period for the inductive problems which occurred.
If, in view of the service it has given him, he is not satisfied with
it, he may at any time abandon it and adopt a method that seems
to him preferable. This is not the same as a change in method
from problem to problem. Once he adopts the new method, he will
apply it to all inductive problems. . . One inductive method is here
envisaged as covering all inductive problems.
(Carnap, 1952a, p.54, square parentheses added)
Later Carnap took a more liberal view on this applied inductive logical ques-
tion, allowing different systems of inductive logic to be chosen to suit particular
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applications, or in Carnap’s words ‘investigations’. The first indication of this
change that I am aware of comes from correspondence with Shimony:
I emphasize now that it seems best to regard inductive logic as al-
ways applied to a particular scientific investigation, and therefore as
referring to the conceptual system (the “language”) of that investi-
gation.
(Shimony and Carnap, 1969, parentheses original)
In this correspondence Carnap agrees with Shimony that that different applica-
tions of inductive logic may require both different domains and different sets of
measure functions and assures him that this change would be put into practice
in his forthcoming book on the topic.
This did in fact happen: at (Carnap, 1971a, p.44) Carnap explicitly allowed that
features of inductive logical domain relevant to a particular application may be
chosen on the basis of the appropriate amount of precision in a particular case.
In an example Carnap argued that it might be worthwhile to use predicates that
represent individuals’ ages in whole years rather than, say, in months, “because
we decide that for the purposes of our statistical investigation higher precision
is unnecessary”.
Later in the same work Carnap allows that different applications may make
different axioms appropriate. For example, depending upon the application,
the ‘principle of symmetry’, which we have called ‘constant exchangeability’,
may or may not be appropriate:
In some series of events, the temporal order has no influence. For
example, we find that, in a long series of throws of any die, even if
it is loaded, the relative frequency of a an ace among those throws
that follow immediately on an ace (or a deuce), is not essentially
different from the relative frequency of an ace in the whole series.
Thus experience shows here statistical independence; and therefore
we treat the members of such a series as inductively independent. In
contrast, we find a strong dependence in a series of meteorological
observations made at a fixed place at noon every day. . . The rela-
tive frequency of rain immediately following on rain is much higher
than in the whole. If now in elementary inductive logic, we decide
to accept the principle of symmetry for a certain investigation, this
decision may either be based on the assumption that statistical in-
dependence actually holds, or else on the assumption that there is
some dependence, but so small that we may neglect it for the sake
of simplicity. . .
(Carnap, 1971a, p. 120 emphasis added)
In sum, it seems that, as time went by, Carnap changed his view on the applied
inductive logical question of how versatile systems of inductive logic should be.
At first he thought that systems of inductive logic should be very versatile,
whereas later he thought that they should be less versatile.
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2.7 Carnapian inductive logic was progressive
I shall now explain what it would have meant for Carnapian inductive logic to
exhibit the characteristics that, according to Lakatos’s methodology, made a
research programme progressive or degenerate. I consider each of the charac-
teristics that Lakatos saw as signs of progress—theoretical progress, empirical
progress and heuristic power—and claim that, to varying extents, Carnapian
inductive logic exhibited all three.
Theoretical progress
Carnapian inductive logic would display theoretical progress if its researchers
managed to add to its protective belt, making more and more claims to have
successfully explicated inductive assumptions.
The researchers who carried out Carnapian inductive logic seem to have done
this. Firstly, they fulfilled their positive heuristic’s demand to investigate more
complex domains. Carnap documents some tentative steps in this direction
at Carnap (1951) and later at (Carnap, 1971a, § 2B). While Carnap and his
co-workers did not make very substantial progress in this regard, subsequent
researchers have done much better. The Manchester school of inductive logicians
has developed and extended the investigation of polyadic languages—see for
example Landes et al. (2008) and Landes (2009). Blackwell and MacQueen
(1973) extend a broadly Carnapian approach to domains that can represent
continuous magnitudes.
The second proposed direction of expansion was more thoroughly fulfilled in
Carnap’s lifetime. Carnap and his co-workers devised various novel axioms to
capture previously un-described inductive phenomena, such as long-run agree-
ment with relative frequency (Carnap, 1980, § 20A), symmetry among proper-
ties (Carnap, 1980, p.75-76), degree of resistance to changing one’s mind (Car-
nap (1952a)), inductively relevant similarity between properties and individuals
(Carnap, 1980, Ch. 16) and uncertain evidence (Carnap (1967b)). This project
has also been continued by subsequent inductive logicians: for example, Hill
(2013) investigates new principles of analogical reasoning.
Carnapian inductive logic’s protective belt also expanded in ways that were
not anticipated by its positive heuristic. The change from rigid interpretative
requirements to flexible basic assumptions allowed the explication of inductive
assumptions involving logical dependencies, and therefore represented an ex-
pansion of the protective belt. However, at (Carnap, 1950b, § 18), early Carnap
describes the rigid requirements as “essential for inductive logic” - clearly this
expansion was not anticipated. Similarly, as we have seen, the shifts to less
versatile systems of inductive logic and larger sets of measure functions allowed
more inductive assumptions to be explicated, but represented minor departures
from Carnap’s earlier approach.
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Carnapian inductive logic therefore seems to have made considerable theoretical
progress.
Empirical progress
Since Carnapian inductive logic did not aim to produce novel predictions about
the world, it is not obvious what would constitute empirical progress. Nonethe-
less, it is possible to find an appropriate criterion by considering the role that
empirical progress plays in the history of science, on Lakatos’s account - that of
distinguishing successful research programmes and providing an ultimate goal
for researchers. Whereas, according to Lakatos, the ultimate goal of any scien-
tific research programme is to produce novel, verified, predictions, the ultimate
goal of Carnapian inductive logic was to produce useful formalisations. A plau-
sible definition of empirical progress for the case of Carnapian inductive logic
would therefore require the explicata that it produces to prove useful in science
and everyday life.
It must be admitted that there are few examples of scientists fruitfully expli-
cating inductive reasoning using Carnapian inductive logic. Carnap (1952a)
made several points that were relevant to and consciously directed towards con-
temporary debates among practising statisticians, but, as Carnap lamented in
his intellectual autobiography, these gained little attention from their target
audience:
I had expected that statisticians would offer counter-arguments
to defend their customary methods; but so far I have seen none. I
have often noticed in discussions that it seems very difficult for those
who have worked for years within the given framework of mathe-
matical statistics to adapt their thinking to the unfamiliar concept
of logical probability.
(Carnap, 1963d, p. 76)
Skyrms (1996) argues that a strand of modern statistics is similar in spirit to
Carnapian inductive logic, but does not demonstrate any direct influence. At
least as far as proving useful in science goes, then, Carnapian inductive logic
has not yet displayed significant empirical progress.
However, there is good reason to expect that Carnapian inductive logic will be
empirically progressive in the future. One reason for optimism in this regard
comes from Zabell (2011). Zabell argues that Carnapian inductive logic can be
used to help statisticians to choose between classes of statistical models. Many
popular families of statistical models can be interpreted as systems of inductive
logic: in such cases it makes sense to evaluate the models based on whether
their corresponding axioms explicate appropriate inductive assumptions. For
example, statistical models featuring symmetric Dirichlet priors over indepen-
dent, identically distributed random variables can be evaluated according to
whether Johnson’s sufficientness postulate, the corresponding axiom, represents
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an appropriate inductive stance. I shall develop Zabell’s argument in detail in
chapter 6.
Carnapian inductive logic has many other potential applications - any endeavour
that involves inductive reasoning can potentially benefit from Carnap’s clear
philosophical account of how it can be formalised. In chapter 7 I highlight
potential applications to debates over imprecise models of rational partial belief,
climate models and objective Bayesian epistemology.
Lakatos allowed that successful research programmes may take a long time be-
fore exhibiting empirical progress, and need only do so intermittently. Even
Newtonian gravity, he notes at (Lakatos, 1968b, p.172), needed to develop for
more than a decade before Newton was prepared to “look more anxiously at the
facts”. Since it has the potential to be useful in science, Carnapian inductive
logic cannot be dismissed as non-progressive on the basis of a lack of empirical
progress.
Heuristic power
Carnapian inductive logic would show heuristic power if its protective belt
tended to change in a way that was not ‘ad hoc’. Lakatos explains at (Lakatos,
1970, p.125) that a change to a research programme’s protective belt can be ad
hoc in three ways:
• Failing to add genuine empirical content (‘ad hoc1’).
• Merely reproducing the work of other research programmes (‘ad hoc2’).
• Straying from the spirit of the programme’s positive and negative heuris-
tics (‘ad hoc3’).
Adding genuine empirical content
Additions to Carnapian inductive logic’s protective belt were claims accord-
ing to which systems of inductive logic explicate inductive assumptions. The
epistemological status of such claims is somewhat ambiguous because successful
explication requires usefulness: testing whether an inductive assumption has
been explicated requires testing whether its formal replacement is useful. This
kind of test is less epistemologically straightforward than, for example, testing
whether a planet is orbiting the sun. It is therefore difficult to say precisely how
much empirical content is contained in a given addition to Carnapian inductive
logic’s protective belt.
However, in order to be ad-hoc in Lakatos’s first sense, Carnapian inductive
logic’s claims to explicate inductive assumptions would need to be completely
devoid of empirical content. This is surely not the case: any claim that a
particular system of inductive logic explicates a particular inductive assumption
has at least some empirically testable consequences. Thus it is difficult to argue
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that Carnapian inductive logic made changes that were ad-hoc in Lakatos’s first
sense.
Reproducing other research programmes’ work
Some additions to Carnapian inductive logic’s protective belt were ad-hoc in
Lakatos’s second sense, as they reproduced the work of rival research pro-
grammes. For example, Carnapian inductive logicians explicitly made use of De
Finetti’s results concerning the axiom constant exchangeability—see, for exam-
ple (Jeffrey, 1971, § 10) and Gaifman (1971)—as well as, seemingly unknowingly,
reproducing some work by W.E. Johnson: see Zabell (1982) for details.
However, these ad hoc additions are more than counterbalanced by many ad-
ditions that were not anticipated by rival research programmes. Examples of
novel additions include Carnap’s claim in Carnap (1952a) to have explicated de-
gree of unwillingness to change one’s mind using the parameter λ and his claim
to have explicated reasoning based on similarity between properties in (Carnap,
1980, Ch. 16). Overall, the way that Carnapian inductive logic’s protective belt
expanded seems not to have been ad hoc in Lakatos’s second sense.
The spirit of the heuristics
Finally, the development of Carnapian inductive logic stayed largely within the
spirit of both its positive and negative heuristic. Although some additions to the
protective belt required unforeseen changes, these changes were comparatively
minor, and many other changes were anticipated.
With respect to the negative heuristic, Carnap and his coworkers managed to
defend their work against perceived anomalies without sacrificing any hard-core
commitments. This consistency can be seen from the preface to the second edi-
tion of Logical Foundations of Probability, where Carnap writes that “the major
features of my theory, as explained in this book, are still maintained today”
(Carnap, 1950b, p. xiii). None of the changes outlined above in section 2.6
involved rejecting any of the hard core dogmas. Carnapian inductive logicians
therefore obeyed its negative heuristic.
Carnapian inductive logic also developed within the spirit of its positive heuris-
tic, explicating steadily more inductive phenomena as it developed. In some
cases later work explicitly developed earlier work, showing continuity of purpose
and spirit that would surely have impressed Lakatos. For example, in (Carnap,
1945a, § 11), Carnap discusses reasoning based on similarity, arguing that this
could be formalised within the system of inductive logic that he proposed in
that paper. In (Carnap, 1980, Ch. 16) this kind of reasoning is discussed in
considerably greater depth, and formalised using a more sophisticated system
of inductive logic. While several initial goals, such as investigating polyadic
languages and formalising reasoning involving continuous magnitudes, were not
fulfilled within Carnap’s lifetime, the development of Carnapian inductive logic
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proceeded roughly as he and his co-workers might have predicted at the outset.
In short, the positive heuristic was largely obeyed.
It seems that Carnapian inductive logic stayed broadly within the spirit of both
its positive and negative heuristic: it was therefore not ad-hoc in Lakatos’s third
sense.
Summary
In sum, then, Carnapian inductive logic displayed substantial theoretical progress,
adequate heuristic power and shows signs of producing empirical progress in the
future. This, I claim, is sufficient for it to be considered a progressive research
programme, according to Lakatos’s methodology.
2.8 Discussion
Let us now consider the argument up to this point. I have introduced Car-
napian inductive logic by construing it as a research programme. I classified
its components according to Lakatos’s methodology and set out the main ways
in which it changed as it developed. I then argued that Carnapian inductive
logic was progressive according to Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research
programmes.
If this chapter has done its job, then its novel textual arguments will have stim-
ulated the reader’s appetite for a historical reappraisal of Carnapian inductive
logic, while its application of Lakatos’s methodology might perhaps have made
them curious about the possibility of substantive reappraisal. Committed ad-
herents of Lakatos’s evaluative framework may even be ready for both courses.
However, others may retain some scepticism about Carnapian inductive logic’s
continuing relevance, as the methodology of scientific research programmes has
several important limitations.
Subjectivity
For one thing, Lakatos’s criteria are not universally accepted. One issue, raised
forcefully in (Feyerabend, 1981, Ch. 10), is that many of the various steps re-
quired in order to apply the methodology of scientific research programmes are
somewhat subjective. For example, practising scientists rarely explicitly dis-
tinguish between inalienable hard-core commitments and defeasible secondary
ones: the existence of such a distinction must usually be inferred, using the
interpreter’s judgement. To the extent that such judgements are unavoidably
subjective, the resultant attributions of progressiveness are correspondingly ar-
bitrary. Feyerabend believed that, due to this issue, Lakatos fell short of pro-
viding an objective means of assessing research programmes.
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Those who agree with Feyerabend’s assessment of the methodology of scientific
research programmes will neither be surprised nor impressed by the fact that
the methodology can be applied in such a way as to make Carnapian inductive
logic progressive.
Rigidity
(Laudan, 1978, p.76-78) criticises the methodology of scientific research pro-
grammes for a different reason. According to Laudan, it asks too much of
scientific research programmes by insisting that they be rigid in a certain sense.
Once a research programme’s positive and negative heuristic are set, Laudan
notes, they are, according to Lakatos, fixed forever. No new hard-core com-
mitments can be introduced, nor new strategies for dealing with uncooperative
facts, expanding the protective belt or making novel predictions. Thus Lakatos’s
methodology seems to favour rigid, dogmatic research programmes over flexible
ones. One might question whether this kind of rigidity is really a genuine mark
of scientific progress.
The reader might suspect that Carnapian inductive logic’s good Lakatosian
marks might not have been caused by reappraisal-meriting factors but by a
historical accident. Luckily for Carnapian inductive logic, it had a relatively
short lifespan; during this time, I have argued, it did not develop any new
hard-core commitments or diverge greatly from its original plans. As a result,
we assessed Carnapian inductive logic as having had adequate heuristic power.
However, if Carnapian inductive logic had had time to develop, it might not
have proved so rigid. Even if it had, this might not have been such a good thing
as Lakatos thought.
Contextual factors
Finally, there are a range of relevant contextual factors that are not obviously
captured within Lakatos’s framework. A number of famous critiques, which I
discuss in chapter 3, argue that Carnapian inductive logic was fundamentally
unviable. If any of these critiques were successful, then Carnapian inductive
cannot have much to offer contemporary philosophy. Studying these critiques,
and Carnapian inductive logicians’ responses to them, is also important in order
to gain a complete historical understanding.
Another important contextual factor is the existence of rival research pro-
grammes, particularly subjective and objective Bayesian inductive logic, that
address similar problems to Carnap’s. If Carnapian inductive logic cannot do
anything that these programmes cannot do better, this would be another reason
not to carry out a substantive reappraisal.
Defending the methodology of scientific research programmes against all of these
objections would take us too far away from the main focus of this thesis. Rather
than doing so, I will simply note that we would do best not to rely too heavily
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on it. In the remaining chapters, I shall present independent reasons to be op-
timistic about the prospects of Carnapian inductive logic, taking into account
the kind of contextual factors that the methodology of scientific research pro-
grammes arguably underplays. In chapter 3, I will address what I consider the
most important critiques of Carnapian inductive logic, aruging that they can
be overcome. Chapters 4 and 5 compare Carnapian inductive logic with two
rival research programmes, namely subjective and objective Bayesian inductive
logic. Finally in chapter 6 I argue that Carnapian inductive logic has useful
applications. These arguments will hopefully outweigh in the reader’s mind any
misgivings about Lakatos’s methodology.
Before doing so, however, it will be useful to address some textual issues relating
to the reading that I presented above.
2.9 Additional interpretative points
The account of Carnapian inductive logic that I present above relies on a reading
of Carnap’s publications on inductive logic that differs somewhat from most
others that appear in the secondary literature. My reading is substantially in
agreement with those of several authors who collaborated with Carnap: see, for
example, Jeffrey (1975), Jeffrey (1973) and Kemeny (1963b). However, unlike
my account, these works tend simply to assert positions that Carnap held, rather
than arguing for them on the basis of what Carnap wrote.
Before we proceed to the task of evaluating the critiques of Carnapian inductive
logic, it will be useful to discuss some ways in which my account of Carnapian
inductive logic differs from others. These differences are to some extent implicit
in the discussion above, but here they are spelled out more fully.
2.9.1 Blank slate situations
In a late essay that appeared in several different versions—Carnap (1966a),
Carnap (1968) and finally Carnap (1971b)—Carnap described a procedure for
justifying inductive logical axioms involving what I shall call ‘blank slate situ-
ations’: scenarios where a certain kind of knowledge is completely unavailable.
Carnap’s remarks on blank slate situations have caused some misconceptions,
which I aim to dispel in this section.
Carnap thought that inductive logical axioms could sometimes be justified on
the grounds that they formalise rationality conditions that apply to agents who
find themselves in blank slate situations. His reasons for focusing on blank
slate rationality, rather than rationality in general, were as follows. Carnap
claimed that, subject to certain epistemological assumptions, which he admit-
ted were very unrealistic, the state of belief of an agent who starts in a blank
slate situation and then receives some evidence can be identified with the state
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of belief that, in the blank slate situation, they had thought that they would
develop given this contingency. For this reason, Carnap believed that, in a cer-
tain sense, blank slate states of belief indicate permanent epistemic dispositions,
whereas other states of belief reflect mere momentary opinions. Carnap thought
that just as, when making ethical judgments, a person’s permanent underlying
character might be considered more pertinent than their motives at a particular
moment, so an underlying epistemic disposition is more pertinent for assessing
a person’s rationality.
Unfortunately, given their prominence in Carnap’s late work, his remarks on
exactly what an agent can be taken to know in a blank slate situation were
somewhat incomplete. What explanation there is comes largely from the fol-
lowing quotation. In it, Cr0 is an ‘initial credence’ function representing the
blank slate state of belief belonging either to a robot or a human being.
How can we understand Cr0? In terms of the robot, Cr0 is the
credence function that we initially build in and that he transforms
step for step, with regard to the incoming data, into the later cre-
dence functions. In the case of a human being X, suppose that we
find at the time Tn his credence function Crn. Then we can, under
suitable conditions, reconstruct a sequence E1, . . . , En, the proposi-
tion Kn and a function Cr0 such that:
(a) E1, . . . , En are possible observation data,
(b) Kn is defined by [Kn = ∩nEn],
(c) Cr0 satisfies all requirements of rationality for initial credence
functions, and
(d) the application of [Crn(H) = Cr0(H | Kn)] to the assumed
function Cr0 and Kn would lead to the ascertained function
Crn.
(Carnap, 1971b, p.18, square brackets added)
This passage does not specify in full exactly what the blank slate agent should
be taken to know, other than implying that they have no ‘observation data’.
Carnap provides some clarification a few pages later at (Carnap, 1971b, p.23),
stipulating that blank slate agents do not know about any differences between
individuals. We are asked to consider two propositions H and H ′ which dif-
fer only in that H ′ attributes to one individual exactly the properties that H
attributes to another.
H and H ′ have exactly the same logical form; they differ merely
by their reference to two distinct individuals. These individuals
may happen to be quite different. But since their differences are
not known to X at time T0, they cannot have any influence on the
Cr0-values of H and H
′.. . .
Suppose that X is a robot constructed by us. Since the propo-
sitions H and H ′ are alike in all their logical properties, it would
be entirely arbitrary and therefore unreasonable for us to assign to
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them different Cr0 values in the construction of X.
(Carnap, 1971b, p.23)
These remarks seem to motivate imposing the axiom of constant exchangeability
on all initial credence functions. This line of reasoning is in apparent tension
with what Carnap goes on to say later in the same volume, when at (Carnap,
1971a, p. 120) he explicitly considers situations in which a rational agent’s
credences might not obey this axiom.
Carnap seems to be arguing that if two propositions share the same ‘logical
form’, then an agent or robot in a blank slate situation should believe them to
the same degree. Furthermore, H and H ′ in the example above are examples
of propositions that share the same logical form. However, the situation is still
not entirely clear: Carnap does not specify in general which propositions have
the same logical form. What if, for example, two propositions differ only by
reference to two distinct properties?
The Manchester reading
The Manchester school of inductive logicians pursue an approach that effec-
tively fills this gap in Carnap’s account of blank slate situations. This approach
suggests the following ‘Manchester reading’ of Carnap’s remarks on blank slate
situations.6
The Manchester reading gives a fully fleshed out account of the blank slate situ-
ation: call this situation the Manchester blank slate situation. An agent in this
blank slate situation is presented with an inductive logical domain D, but given
absolutely no other information. In particular, they do not know how D should
be interpreted, or what propositions, if any, its members represent. Nonetheless,
the agent must choose a credence function representing their degrees of belief in
whatever propositions the members of D happen to stand for. The Manchester
reading of Carnap’s remarks claims that the blank slate situation that he had
in mind was the Manchester blank slate situation.
The Manchester reading coheres with Carnap’s stipulation that propositions
with the same ‘logical form’ should be given equal credence in blank slate sit-
uations, and might seem at first glance to chime with his remarks about the
distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ inductive logic. On a natural account,
pure inductive logic might be thought to be directed to the task of finding ax-
ioms that formalise rationality constraints for agents in the Manchester blank
slate situation, whereas ‘applied’ inductive logic might be thought to focus on
axioms that formalise rationality constraints for agents with background knowl-
6This choice of terminology is perhaps slightly misleading, as it suggests that views of
members of the Manchester school about blank slate situations are motivated by a reading of
Carnap’s writing on this topic. In fact, the Manchester school’s views predate their study of
the relevant passage from Carnap (1971b).
52 CHAPTER 2. CARNAPIAN INDUCTIVE LOGIC
edge, including about how to interpret the domains of their systems of inductive
logic.
The follosing quotations give the gist of the Manchester reading. The reader
should note that ‘pure inductive logic’ is here used in the liberal sense of the
Manchester school, rather than in Carnap’s more restricted sense.
To capture the underlying problem that PIL [pure inductive
logic] aims to address we can imagine an agent who inhabits some
structure M ∈ T L but knows nothing about what is true in M .
Then the problem is
Q: In this situation of zero knowledge, logically, or
rationally, what belief should our agent give to a sentence
θ ∈ SL being true in M?
There are several terms in this question which need explaining.
Firstly zero knowledge means that the agent has no intended in-
terpretation of the ai nor the Rj .
. . .
In a way this is at the heart of the difference between the ‘Pure
Inductive Logic’ proposed here as Mathematics and the ‘Applied In-
ductive Logic’ of Philosophy. For many philosophers would argue
that in this latter the language is intended to carry with it an in-
terpretation and that without it one is doing Pure Mathematics not
Philosophy. It is the reason why Grue is a paradox in Philosophy and
simply an invalid argument in Mathematics. Nevertheless, mathe-
maticians or not, we all need to be on our guard against allowing
interpretations to slip in subconsciously. Carnap himself was very
well aware of this distinction, and the dangers presented by ignoring
it, and spent some effort explaining it in [Carnap (1971a)]. Indeed in
that paper he describes Inductive Logic as the study of the rational
beliefs of just such a zero knowledge agent, a ‘robot’ as he terms it.
(Paris and Vencovska´, 2015, p. 10, square parentheses added)
For Carnap’s strategy to work, one must find a blank slate func-
tion, i.e., a probability function that captures the case in which we
have zero information. One might naturally object that, in practice,
we never really have zero information. In response, one may accept
that, as a matter of fact, we always take a large variety of proposi-
tions for granted in our reasoning, but maintain that one can still
think counterfactually about a blank slate function. Thus one can
ask, what would be a reasonable probability function were one to
have no information?
This demands that one imagine a scenario in which there is a
total absence of contextual and premiss propositions. In particular,
there should be no contextual information about the meanings of
the non-logical symbols in the language L. Thus one must take the
language to be uninterpreted: one must work in pure inductive logic.
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(Williamson, 2015, p. 50)
I think that the Manchester reading does not quite capture what Carnap was
getting at. First, the Manchester reading clashes with Carnap’s remarks about
the distinction between pure and applied inductive logic; second, it is at odds
with some specific things he says about blank slate situations; finally, it suggests
a view about logical languages that Carnap would not have agreed with.
Pure and applied inductive logic
Close attention to Carnap’s remarks on the distinction between pure and ap-
plied inductive logic seems to undermine the Manchester reading. Carnap was
clear that, according to his use of the term ‘applied’, arguments to do with the
justification of inductive logical axioms should proceed only within applied in-
ductive logic. Since Carnap introduced the blank slate situation in the context
of an investigation into which inductive logical axioms are justified, his remarks
must be read in the context of applied, rather than pure, inductive logic. This
impression is reinforced by the following quotation, in which Carnap explicitly
puts questions of rationality and credibility in the ‘applied’ pigeonhole.
It is the task of pure inductive logic to state axioms for c-functions
and derive theorems from these axioms. In applied IL, the theorems
are used for practical purposes, e.g., for the determination of the
credibility of a hypothesis under consideration in a given knowledge
situation, or for the choice of a rational decision.
(Carnap, 1971a, p.105)
For Carnap, pure inductive logic could only state axioms and derive theorems
from them. It was only within applied inductive logic that questions about
whether particular axioms formalise rationality constraints could arise. This
would be the case even for rationality constraints that are so general that they
apply to agents who find themselves in the Manchester blank slate situation.
It is informative to recall the analogy that Carnap drew between pure and ap-
plied inductive logic and pure and physical geometry. Just as, Carnap thought,
the question of which structures represent physical space does not arise within
pure geometry, the question of which systems of inductive logic represent ratio-
nality constraints did not arise within pure inductive logic.
Carnap’s remarks on pure and applied inductive logic therefore do not support
the Manchester reading. Moreover, without the motivation of working within
pure inductive logic, there is little reason to think that Carnap would have had
such a stark scenario as the Manchester blank slate situation in mind. The
situation where an agent has to attach credences to an uninterpreted domain is
very atypical of ordinary inductive reasoning, which was Carnap’s main focus.
Carnap’s remarks on blank slate situations
Some aspects of Carnap’s remarks on blank slate situations give further reasons
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to be dubious that he had the Manchester blank slate situation in mind.
First, it is clear that Carnap envisaged some non-logical background knowledge
being available in blank slate situations. In both the case of the robot and the
idealised human Carnap talks about ‘observations’. If either agent were meant,
as in the Manchester blank slate situation, to have access to no knowledge
besides possession of an uninterpreted inductive logical domain, this term would
be inapt: the agent would not be able to tell whether a given domain-member
should be thought of as representing an observation. This would have been odd
if Carnap had had the Manchester blank slate situation in mind.
Another reason comes from Carnap’s comments on the axiom of constant ex-
changeability, which his blank slate scenario is meant to help justify. Carnap
thought that constant exchangeability formalises a rationality constraint in his
blank slate situation, but also wrote that it should not always be adopted. In
particular, Carnap thought that constant exchangeability is typically inappro-
priate in the case of ‘coordinate languages’.
It is to be noted that symmetry with respect to individuals should
be required only for those languages in which all individual constants
have the same logical nature. The situation is different for a coordi-
nate language, i.e., one in which the standard individual expressions
indicate the positions of the individuals. . .
(Carnap, 1971a, p. 119, emphasis original)
Whether a given language L is a coordinate language does not depend on its
formal properties, but rather on a question of interpretation. Specifically, it
must be ascertained whether certain elements are taken to represent positions
of individuals that affect the ‘logical nature’ of the constants that they attach
to. Suppose that L is a predicate language with constants a1, a2, . . ., where
the indices 1, 2, . . . are taken to represent inductively relevant positions - for
example the position of an experiment in a sequence where the result of one
round is relevant to the result of the next. Then the constants a1, a2, . . . do not
have ‘the same logical nature’, and L is a coordinate language. On the other
hand, if the indices were taken to represent inductively irrelevant positions in a
sequence of coin flips, then L would not be a coordinate language.
Suppose that an agent in the Manchester blank slate situation is presented with
a domain SL. Depending on how L’s indices are interpreted, L may be a non-
coordinate language, in which case constant exchangeability might be appropri-
ate, or it may be a coordinate language, in which case constant exchangeability
would be inappropriate. The agent cannot tell which of these possibilities is the
case because, by stipulation, they do not know how to interpret L.
There therefore seem to be little grounds, according to Carnap’s own criteria,
to base an argument for constant exchangeability on the Manchester blank slate
situation. Yet Carnap clearly did want to use his blank slate situation to mo-
tivate constant exchangeability. The best explanation for this state of affairs is
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that the blank slate situation that Carnap had in mind was not the Manchester
one.
Voluntarism
A final, broader, reason to doubt that Carnap had the Manchester blank slate
situation in mind has to do with his attitudes towards language. One of the
central features of Carnap’s mature philosophy was his emphasis on the freedom
that human agents have to choose between different languages, and his rejection
of the view that any particular language is unavoidable. He devotes a chapter
of his Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics to arguing against what he calls
the ‘magical’ view of language, according to which “there is some mysterious
magical connection of some sort between certain words. . . and their meanings”
(Carnap, 1966b, p. 115-116).
However, an agent in the Manchester blank slate situation finds themself in
exactly the position that Carnap was so keen to stress was not the typical one.
They are simply presented with a domain D and told that it represents some-
thing, but not told what that something is. They can choose their credibility
function but not their language. Effectively, the agent is forced to adopt a very
general form of the magical view of language.
While this link does not show definitively that Carnap could not have had
the Manchester blank slate situation in mind, the fact that this scenario is so
incongruous with his general attitude weighs against the Manchester reading.
An alternative reading
Here is an alternative reading of how Carnap intended his blank slate situation
to be understood. An agent in a ‘Carnap blank slate situation’, I believe, should
be thought of as a scientist who is about to conduct a series of experiments which
they wish to learn from. They have no observational information in the narrow
sense that they have not yet learned the results of the experiments. However
they should also be thought of as having some non-observational background
knowledge - in particular they know what the possible results of the experiments
are and know enough about the experiments to judge that their order conveys
no information.
This reading agrees with what Carnap says about the blank slate situation.
Knowing the nature of the setup, the agent is in a position to treat the outcomes
of the experiments as “incoming data” and determine a strategy for learning
from them. When Carnap introduces the blank slate situation in (Carnap,
1971b, Ch. 4) he talks only about the agent lacking ‘observational knowledge’;
the fact that other kinds of knowledge are not discussed supports my reading’s
attribution of non-observational information to the blank slate agent. Finally,
there is a clear sense in which two propositions that are the same except for
referring to different experiments have the same “logical form”: the agent’s
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information about the two propositions is the same, given the assumption that
the order of experiments conveys no information. This explains why Carnap
used his blank slate situation to motivate constant exchangeability.
Conclusion
Carnap’s broad aim in Carnap (1971b) was to show that his theory of inductive
logic could be connected with the then-standard theory of rational decision-
making under uncertainty. In his writing about inductive logic in general, there
is little discussion of the blank slate situation: it provides just one out of many
possible methods for showing that a system of inductive logic usefully formalises
an inductive assumption. For this reason I do not think blank slate situations
are an essential component of Carnapian inductive logic and so did not discuss
it in the section above.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the Manchester blank slate situation,
according to which an agent is presented with an uninterpreted inductive logical
domain, seems not to be what Carnap had in mind, and can be replaced by an
alternative account.
2.9.2 The term ‘logic’
In the context of philosophy, the term ‘logic’ typically connotes formal rules
concerning deductive entailment. Given this context, using the term ‘logic’ in
connection with inductive reasoning might be considered inappropriate. Leit-
geb, for example, argues that doing so is uninformative and that ‘logic proper’
encompasses only theories of deductive consequence relations:
In [a] sense, the probabilistic explication of the confirmation of
hypotheses (as initiated by Carnap 1950) may, for example, be re-
garded as a kind of probabilistic (or inductive) logic. . . On the other
hand, if used in such a broad manner, the label ‘probabilistic logic’
is no longer particularly informative as far as its ‘logic’ component
is concerned. In this chapter, we will restrict the term ‘logic’ to
logic proper : a logic or logical system is a triple of the form 〈L,,`〉
where (i) L is a formal language, (ii)  is a semantically (model-
theoretically) specified relation of logical consequence defined for
the members of L (iii) ` is a proof-theoretically (in terms of axioms
and rules) specified relation of deductive consequence for the mem-
bers of L.
(Leitgeb, ming, p. 1-2, square brackets added)
Howson puts a related point somewhat more bluntly:
Talk of probabilities on sentences of a language brings us nat-
urally, and indeed inevitably, to the case of Carnap. In [Logical
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Foundations of Probability ] he inaugurated a research tradition of
combining logic with probability in the following way: define a real-
valued, finitely additive normalised function on the sentences of a
formal language. . . . Carnap called the result logical probability,
without much in the way of argument to support this terminology,
and none of it very convincing. If one wanted to be funny one might
describe Carnaps model as affirming something like
logic + probability = logical probability
≈ cheese + souffle´ = cheese souffle´
(Howson, 2009, p.1)
The question of whether Carnapian inductive logic should really be called ‘logic’
is fundamentally terminological, and therefore not critical to the success or
failure of Carnap’s research programme. Nonetheless, it is interesting to consider
why Carnap chose to use the term ‘inductive logic’. Contrary to Howson, Carnap
did present reasons for this choice. First, systems of inductive logic are logical
entities according to Carnap’s conception of logic. Second, Carnap thought that
there were parallels between his research programme of inductive logic and that
of deductive logic.
Carnap’s conception of logic
According to Carnap’s conception, logic comprises one component of the gram-
mar of a language, indicating which sentences follow from which others. He
expressed this view as follows:
In [the logician’s] sense, a language is constituted by rules for
a vocabulary, rules for building sentences, rules for making logical
deductions from those sentences, and other rules.
(Carnap, 1966b, p. 58-59)
On this conception, choices between logical systems, just like other aspects of
language-choice, are essentially matters of convention. Carnap is famous for
having advocated tolerance between logical systems for this reason. He put this
view picturesquely as follows:
In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his
own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is
required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his
methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical
arguments.
(Carnap, 1937, p.52)
While Carnap later came to acknowledge that semantic rules as well as syntactic
ones are indispensable, this remained his view during his later work. This can
be seen from his remarks at the end of Carnap (1950a):
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To decree dogmatic prohibitions of certain linguistic forms in-
stead of testing them by their success or failure in practical use, is
worse than futile; it is positively harmful because it may obstruct
scientific progress. . . .
Let us be cautious in making assertions and critical in examining
them, but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms.
(Carnap, 1950a, § 5)
According to Carnap’s conception of logic, then, any system of rules specifying
what follows from what within a language merits being called a logic. Thus
Carnap defended his use of the term ‘inductive logic’ by pointing out that his
programme aimed to specify formal rules according to which certain statements
about measure functions follow from certain other ones:
All axioms of inductive logic state relations among values of m
or c as dependent only upon the logical properties and relations of
the propositions involved (with respect to language systems with
specified logical rules). Inductive logic is the theory based upon
these axioms. It may be regarded as part of logic in view of the fact
that the concepts occurring are logical concepts.
(Carnap, 1971b, p. 26)
Analogies with deductive logic
Carnap’s second reason for using the term ‘logic’ in connection with inductive
reasoning was that there are similarities between inductive and deductive logic.
At (Carnap, 1950b, § 43) he explains at length what he thought the similarities
were. The guiding thought behind this analogy can be illustrated as follows.
Carnapian inductive logic is concerned primarily with formal axioms that pick
out measure functions representing degrees of plausibility that agree with given
assumptions about how inductive reasoning should proceed. Deductive logical
semantics can be thought of as concerned with formal admissibility conditions
that pick out valuation functions representing configurations of truth or falsity
of propositions that agree with given assumptions. Looked at in this way, in-
ductive logical axioms are analogous to admissibility constraints on valuation
functions. Whereas admissibility constraints represent intuitions about truth—
one might label them ‘deductive assumptions’—axioms in Carnapian inductive
logic represent inductive assumptions about plausibility.
To take an example, it is normal in classical logic to require valuation func-
tions to behave in such a way that v(θ ∧ φ) ≤ min(v(θ), v(φ)). This is because,
according to a commonly made deductive assumption, it is not possible for a
conjunction to be more true than either of its conjuncts. Similarly, a useful
inductive logical axiom stipulates that m(θ ∧ φ) ≤ min(m(θ),m(φ)). This con-
straint is useful because according to a commonly made inductive assumption,
a conjunction cannot be more plausible than one of its conjuncts.
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While not all admissibility conditions for valuation functions have such neat
inductive logical analogues, there are clearly structural similarities between the
formal frameworks that describe deductive and inductive assumptions. Ar-
guably, if the term ‘logic’ is merited in one case, then it should also be used
in the other.
Conclusion
It strikes me that Carnap’s conventionalist conception of logic was sensible, and
that there are indeed strong analogies between Carnapian inductive logic and
deductive logic. However, as noted in the introduction, I do not intend to defend
his use of the term ‘logic’ in this thesis. It is sufficient for my purposes to make
clear that Carnap did have principled reasons for using the term.
2.9.3 Probability1
In Carnap (1950b), Carnap uses the term ‘probability1’ to describe the collection
of inductive assumptions that collectively constitute the norms of inductive
reasoning in science and everyday life, and which he aims to explicate in that
book. Since I think that Carnap’s use of term is somewhat loaded—it implies a
certain degree of agreement about rules of inductive reasoning, and a special role
for probability functions—I did not mention it in the account sketched above.
Nonetheless it is useful to discuss Carnap’s remarks about probability1 carefully,
and in particular his assertions that probability1 is ‘objective’, ‘logical’ and
‘analytic’, as these have been widely misconstrued.
Carnap explains that ‘probability1’ is the concept of “degree of confirmation”(Carnap,
1950b, p.19) or “weight of evidence”(Carnap, 1950b, p.163) which is in “ gen-
eral”(Carnap, 1950b, p.19) and “presystematic”(Carnap, 1950b, p.23) use, for
example by scientists trying to work out to what extent observational evidence
support particular hypotheses (Carnap, 1950b, p.20).
Carnap emphasises that that probability1 is a ‘logical’ concept, putting the
point as follows.
We call [the question to what degree one statement confirms another]
a logical question because. . . the problem whether and how much h
is confirmed by e is to be answered merely by a logical analysis of h
and e and their relations. . . . [O]nce h and e are given, the question
mentioned requires only that we be able to understand them, that is,
to understand their meanings and to grasp certain relations which
are based upon their meanings. (Carnap, 1950b, p. 20)
It is important to note that, despite the use of the symbols ‘h’ and ‘e’ as abbre-
viations for longer statements, and the reference to ‘logical analysis’, Carnap
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is here making a socio-linguistic claim about how inductive assumptions are
expressed in ordinary non-symbolic discourse. If it was not a part of ordinary
discourse, then probability1 would not, as Carnap claims, be in “general” and
“presystematic” use. Carnap’s claim is that, when someone utters a sentence
such as ‘Mrs X’s testimony strongly suggests that the defendant is guilty’, they
do not thereby express a claim about the testimony, the defendant, or any other
contingent matter. Instad, Carnap thought, this kind of utterance expresses
a certain meta-linguistic about the semantic rules of the prevailing language,
namely that the sentence expressing the testimony is related in a certain way to
the sentence expressing the defendant’s guilt. Whether or not this relationship
obtains is a matter to be determined not by investing the world but by through
logical analysis.
The same might be said about the phrase ‘Either it is true that it is raining or it
is false that it is raining’. This phrase, Carnap would say, does not express a fact
about the weather, but rather a fact about the semantic rules of its language,
namely that its truth predicate obeys the law of excluded middle.
All kinds of inductive assumptions, and not just the generally used ones that
constitute probability1, can be thought of as semantic rules in this way, and are
‘logical’ in this sense that Carnap attributed to probability1.
The second fact about probability1 that Carnap emphasises is that, in virtue
of being logical, it is an ‘objective’ concept. Logical concepts are ‘objective’,
Carnap says, because
a sentence which ascribes one of these concepts in a concrete case. . . is
complete without any reference to the properties or behaviour of a
particular person.
(Carnap, 1950b, p.38)
In contrast, Carnap points out, the concept of ‘familiarity’ is subjective because,
grammatically, it can only correctly be ascribed if it is clear to whom something
or other is familiar. Carnap’s assertion that probability1 is ‘objective’ is there-
fore very weak: all inductive assumptions, including ones that sanction very bad
inductive reasoning, are objective in exactly the same sense.
Finally, Carnap sometimes says that true statements about probability1 are
analytic—that is, true in virtue of meaning rather than in virtue of corre-
spondence with the world. This is a trivial consequence of Carnap’s view
that probability1 is an essentially a semantic phenomenon. Statements about
probability1 were, according to Carnap, typically made in the context of an im-
plicitly accepted system of semantic rules: if true at all, such statements must
be consequences of these rules and, in this sense, true in virtue of meaning.
Thus, Carnap’s assertions that probability1 is a ‘logical’, ‘objective’ and ‘an-
alytic’ concept does not single it out in comparison with other collections of
inductive assumptions, or say anything at all about his systems of inductive
logic. Rather, they merely serve to emphasise Carnap’s claim, which is perhaps
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not entirely uncontroversial, that real-world inductive assumptions are essen-
tially expressions of semantic rules. While this claim is somewhat difficult to
appraise, as the logico-grammatical structure of natural language is difficult to
pin down, it is not important for the evaluation of Carnapian inductive logic. All
that is really required is that real-world inductive assumptions, whatever their
true nature, are germane to the kind of formalisation that Carnapian inductive
logic proposes.




This chapter defends Carnapian inductive logic against some of the most promi-
nent attempts to show that it was a bad research programme.
I discuss at length what I consider to be the most important critiques. The
first was made by Lakatos, who argued that Carnapian inductive logic failed
due to being unable to identify true axioms. I then address the ‘grue’ critique,
which alleges that Carnapian inductive logic is undesirably ‘syntactic’, and a
critique due to Salmon based on logical entailment. Finally I consider three
additional critiques that arise from worries about symmetry, general statements
and long-run reliability.
3.2 Lakatos’s critique
As well as supplying a useful framework with which to analyse Carnapian induc-
tive logic, Lakatos was also one of its most influential critics. His highly-cited
article Lakatos (1968a) claims that, as it developed, Carnapian inductive logic
became degenerate by disobeying its negative heuristic - the most serious way in
which a research programme can fail according to the methodology of scientific
research programmes. According to Lakatos, Carnapian inductive logic gave up
a hard-core commitment to searching for true inductive logical axioms in order
to pursue a less ambitious goal. This account of how Carnapian inductive logic
developed is still widely believed, and although modern philosophers rarely ex-
plicitly apply the methodology of scientific research programmes to Carnapian
inductive logic, I believe that many would agree with Lakatos’s assessment.
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However, Lakatos was mistaken: Carnapian inductive logic never made any
commitment, hard-core or not, to the existence of true inductive logical axioms.
In fact, it was a central feature of Carnap’s mature philosophy that logical
axioms should not be thought of as true or false, but only as more or less useful.
In this section I reproduce Lakatos’s argument, argue that it was faulty and
attempt to explain what might have caused Lakatos’s error.
3.2.1 Historical background
In July 1965, a section of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of
Science in London was devoted to “The Problem of Inductive Logic”. The
conference, organised by Imre Lakatos and Karl Popper among others, was at-
tended by Rudolf Carnap, and focused on Carnapian inductive logic. Three
years later, a proceedings volume entitled The Problem of Inductive logic was
published, edited by Lakatos. The volume consists of a series of what Lakatos
called “rational reconstructions”1 of the conference talks and ensuing discus-
sions, in which each speaker submitted an essay reflecting their talk, followed
by critical responses from the discussants and then rejoinders from the origi-
nal speaker. This series is followed by Lakatos (1968a), a long essay originally
conceived as a response to Carnap’s contribution, Carnap (1968)2.
Unlike the other essays in the proceedings volume, Lakatos (1968a) does not
attempt to reconstruct the discussions from the London conference. It is only
loosely related to Carnap (1968) and is not followed by a final response from
Carnap, who did not see the final version prior to publication3. Instead, Lakatos
attempts to set contemporary discussions about inductive logic in the context
of a dialectical history of thought culminating in a conflict between a tendency
represented by Carnapian inductive logic—‘neo-classical empiricism’—and ‘crit-
ical empiricism’, a position embodied by Popper and himself. As part of this
presentation Lakatos argued that Carnapian inductive logic had made what he
calls “a degenerating problem-shift”.
With this locution, Lakatos was implicitly invoking his methodology of scientific
research programmes, which he was working on simultaneously4. At (Lakatos,
1968a, p. 357), Lakatos refers to “Carnap’s research programme of inductive
logic”, showing that he was thinking about it in these terms.
Carnap did not respond to Lakatos’s essay in any published work, though he
did send Lakatos a letter Carnap (1967a) in response to an early draft Lakatos
(1967c). In the letter Carnap made several critical remarks and asked Lakatos
not to publish the essay in the proceedings volume. Unfortunately the letter does
1Lakatos describes the contributions as such in Lakatos (1966).
2Lakatos explains how he came to write his essay in Lakatos (1967b).
3Lakatos points this out at (Lakatos, 1968a, p.1).
4The first major statement of Lakatos’s methodology, Lakatos (1968b), was published only
a few months after Lakatos (1968a).
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not reveal Carnap’s opinion about Lakatos’s main argument for the degeneracy
of his research programme, which did not appear in the draft that he received.
According to Lakatos’s argument, the primary goal of Carnapian inductive logic
was to identify a formal system that was in some sense true, and could be used
to pronounce on the rationality or irrationality of beliefs and scientific theories.
However, Lakatos’s account continued, this task proved insurmountable, forcing
Carnapian inductive logic to become a ‘mere calculus of coherent beliefs’. Aban-
doning a core commitment in this way, Lakatos concluded, implicitly invoking
his nascent methodology, was a clear sign that Carnapian inductive logic was a
degenerate research programme.
Lakatos’s argument was well read and cited: at the time of writing Google
scholar records 285 citations of Lakatos (1968a). Today his view that Car-
napian inductive logic was degenerate is widely accepted, though Lakatos did
not achieve his goal of directing support towards the Popperian programme of
‘critical empiricism’ that he advocates in the second section of Lakatos (1968a).
3.2.2 Lakatos’s argument
Lakatos’s argument for Carnapian inductive logic’s degeneracy begins by of-
fering an account of the motivating ideas and goals behind Carnap’s research
programme:
Thus Carnap—following the Cambridge school (Johnson, Broad,
Keynes, Nicod, Ramsey, Jeffreys), Reichenbach, and others—set
out to solve the following problems: (1) to justify his claim that
the degree of confirmation satisfies Kolmogorov’s axioms of prob-
ability, (2) to find and justify further secondary adequacy require-
ments for the determination of the sought-for measure function; (3)
to construct—piecemeal—a complete, perfect language of science in
which all propositions of science can be expressed; and (4) to offer a
definition of a measure function which would satisfy the conditions
laid down in ( 1 ) and (2).
Carnap thought that while science was conjectural, the theory of
probabilistic confirmation would be a priori and infallible: the ax-
ioms, whether primary or secondary, would be seen to be true in the
light of inductive intuition and the language (the third ingredient)
would of course be irrefutable, for how can one refute a language?
(Lakatos, 1968a, p.323-324, emphasis original)
Lakatos thought that early Carnapian inductive logic aimed to find a system of
inductive logic whose axioms were ‘true in the light of inductive intuition’ and
whose domain was the set of sentences of a ‘complete’, ‘perfect’, ‘irrefutable’
language. The resulting system would be ‘a priori and infallible’. It is safe
to conclude, therefore, that Lakatos thought that the aim of finding inductive
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logical axioms that are true in some sense was part of the hard core of early
Carnapian inductive logic.
However, according to Lakatos, careful attention to scientific reasoning shows
that it is impossible in principle to identify such a system of inductive logic.
The language of science, he argues at (Lakatos, 1968a, § 2.3(a)), has sometimes
changed so radically as to alter which propositions are thought to provide induc-
tive support to which others. Since such volatility is likely to continue, Lakatos
concludes, it will never be possible to know for sure if any true axioms have
been found:
The growth of science may destroy any particular confirmation the-
ory: the inductive machine may have to be reprogrammed with each
new major theoretical advance.
(Lakatos, 1968a, p.364)
Lakatos claims that Carnapian inductive logic failed to anticipate this difficulty.
When the difficulty was encountered, he says, Carnapian inductive logic was
forced to relinquish its original goal of identifying true axioms. Rather than
acting as an “inductive judge”, ruling on substantive questions of rationality, he
says, late Carnapian inductive logic sought to achieve only the less ambitious
task of formalising inductive assumptions.
The abdication of the inductive judge is complete. He promised
to hand down judgement on the rationality of beliefs; now he is
ending up by trying to supply a calculus of coherent beliefs on whose
rationality he cannot pronounce.
(Lakatos, 1968a, p.372)
Lakatos concludes that this change, whereby a former component of Carnapian
inductive logic’s hard core was discarded, radically disobeyed its negative heuris-
tic. Carnapian inductive logic therefore failed the test of heuristic power and
became a degenerate research programme:
A mere calculus of coherent beliefs can at best have marginal signif-
icance relative to the central problem of the philosophy of science.
Thus, in the course of the evolution of the research programme of
inductive logic its problem has become much less interesting than
the original one: the historian of thought may have to record a ‘de-
generating problem-shift’.
(Lakatos, 1968a, p.373)
One might think that Lakatos could not have been applying his methodology
to Carnapian inductive logic because the latter is a philosophical, rather than
a scientific, research programme. In fact, Lakatos was prepared to apply his
methodology to to philosophical research programmes: at (Lakatos, 1978a, p.92)
he says that his method “can be generalised to any sort of rational discussion
and thus serve as tools for a general theory of criticism”, referring to Carnapian
inductive logic explicitly as a “degenerating programme”.
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3.2.3 Why Lakatos was mistaken
Lakatos’s main error was to assume that early Carnapian inductive logic aimed
to true axioms. In fact, as we saw in the previous chapter, and particularly
section 2.4.3, early Carnapian inductive logic was committed to the view that
axioms, like other parts of systems of inductive logic, were impossible to justify
on theoretical grounds, but could only be justified pragmatically as more or less
apt for particular applications.
In other words, Carnapian inductive logic always aimed simply to “supply a
calculus” with which patterns of inductive reasoning can be formalised. It never
aimed to find axioms that were true in any sense, let alone ‘a priori’, ‘infallible’,
etc. Nor did it aim to pass judgement on the rationality of scientific theories,
except insofar as such judgement can derive from formal statements of principles
which had previously been articulated unclearly or inconsistently.
The fact that Carnapian inductive logic never aimed to act as an “inductive
judge” can be seen from the following two quotations from Carnap’s early work:
The system of inductive logic here proposed. . . is intended as a recon-
struction. . . of inductive thinking as customarily applied in everyday
life and science. However, it is not meant merely as an uncritical
representation of customary ways of thinking with all their defects
and inconsistencies, but rather as a rational, critically corrected re-
construction. (Carnap, 1950b, p.576)
First I wish to emphasize that inductive logic does not propose new
ways of thinking, but merely to explicate old ways. It tries to make
explicit certain forms of reasoning which implicitly or instinctively
have always been applied both in every day life and in science. This
is analogous to the situation at the beginning of deductive logic.
Aristotle did not invent deductive reasoning; that had gone on as
long ago as there was human language. If somebody had said to
Aristotle: “What good is your new theory to us? We have done
well enough without it. Why should we change our ways of thinking
and accept your new invention?”, he might have answered: “I do
not propose new ways of thinking, I merely want to help you to do
consciously and hence with greater clarity and safety from pitfalls
what you have always done. I merely want to replace common sense
with exact rules” It is the same with inductive logic.
(Carnap, 1953, p.189)
Carnap was not aiming to demonstrate anything that was not already clear to
everyday inductive reasoners, but only, just as in Aristotle’s case, to articulate
clearly the standards that they already use. In particular, just as Aristotle’s
deductive logic was not designed to give reasons to choose one assumption about
how deductive reasoning ought to proceed over another, so inductive logic was
not designed to show that particular inductive assumptions are justified.
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It might be thought that, even if Lakatos was mistaken about Carnapian in-
ductive logic wanting to pass judgement on the question of which inductive
assumptions are rational, he was still right that systems of inductive logic were
meant to be true in a narrower sense, namely that they were meant to express
truths about generally accepted inductive assumptions. Systems of inductive
logic, were certainly meant to be ‘similar’ to the inductive assumptions they
formalise: we have seen in section 2.4.1 that this was one of the features that
could make an explication successful. However, the situation is not straight-
forward because similarity to the explicandum is only one of many possible
virtues—it is possible that a system of inductive logic that only very faintly
resembled any actually instantiated assumptions could still usefully explicate
them. In any case, even if Carnapian inductive logic did aim at truth in this
sense, this aim did not change from early to late Carnapian inductive logic. As
a result, Lakatos’s argument for degeneracy would still fail to go through.
3.2.4 Why did Lakatos go wrong?
The reader might wonder why Lakatos mis-characterised Carnapian inductive
logic in this way. I think that the cause was a combination of some misleading
writing in Carnap (1950b) as well as a tendency on Lakatos’s part to focus on
familiar problems.
Carnap’s misleading writing
Lakatos’s mis-characterisation may also have been caused by some unintention-
ally misleading writing in Carnap (1950b). In section 2.9.3 on probability1 we
saw that Carnap’s discussion of this topic in Carnap (1950b) is best understood
as consequences of Carnap’s view that real-world inductive assumptions are es-
sentially semantic. In particular, Carnap’s claims that probability1 is ‘analytic’,
‘logical’ and ‘objective’, were not as bold as they might seem at first glance.
Lakatos seems to have been misled by these remarks, as can be seen from his
comments about analyticity and the similarity of Carnap and Keynes’s views
on probability.
Analyticity
Carnap often writes in Carnap (1950b) and elsewhere that statements about
probability1, as well as certain statements of inductive logic, can only be ana-
lytically, as opposed to synthetically, true or false. Correctly interpreted, these
remarks refer only to ‘internal questions’ that concern the properties a given
linguistic system: either a system of inductive logic or whichever semantic rules
are expressed by natural-language inductive assumptions. Such statements, if
true, relate only to the properties of formal systems and would therefore, at
least according to Carnap, be uncontroversially analytic. That Carnap took
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this view can be seen from his discussion of the contrast between logical and
methodological problems at (Carnap, 1950b, § 44 A).
However, it is easy to misinterpret Carnap’s remarks about analyticity as claim-
ing that answers to external questions of inductive logic—those that concern
choices between systems—or questions about how particular systems of induc-
tive logic are related to the world, are also analytic, and thereby conclude that
Carnap intended to find true axioms. Lakatos seems to have made precisely this
mis-interpretation:
. . . Carnap took his inductive logic to be analytic.
(Lakatos, 1968a, p. 324)
Now Carnap’s ‘analytical’ inductive principles consist partly of his
explicit axioms, partly of his implicit meta-axioms. . .
(Lakatos, 1968a, p.368)
Discussion of Keynes
Carnap discusses Keynes (1921) at (Carnap, 1950b, § 12A). Carnap notes that
Keynes shared his view that probability should be thought of as in principle
independent of particular agents, that is, as degree of plausibility rather than
necessarily degree of belief. On this basis Carnap expresses substantial agree-
ment with Keynes’s project, even going so far as to note:
. . . the objective logical concept meant by Keynes is the same as
what we call probability1
(Carnap, 1950b, p.44)
However, on the question of whether the rules that constitute probability1 are
true, Carnap took exactly the opposite view to Keynes. As can be seen from the
following quotation, Keynes believed that probability relations between propo-
sitions existed in some sense, and that the task of inductive logic was to make
true claims about these relations:
We believe that there is some real objective relation between Dar-
win’s evidence and his conclusions . . .
We are claiming, in fact, to cognise correctly a logical connection
between one set of propositions which we call our evidence and which
we suppose ourselves to know, and another set which we call our
conclusions. . . . (Keynes, 1921, p. 5, emphasis added)
Carnap, on the other hand, did not think that probability1, or any other collec-
tion of semantic rules, existed or could be identified:
I hope that nobody will misinterpret my statement of the objectivity
of logical relations as a metaphysical statement of the ‘subsistence’
of these relations in a Platonic heaven. . . (Carnap, 1950b, p.38)
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At (Carnap, 1950b, p.45), Carnap explicitly distances himself from Keynes’s
view that it is possible to identify true probability relations using ‘inductive
intuition’.5
Lakatos seems not to have picked up on this distinction betwenn Carnap and
Keynes’s. He writes at (Lakatos, 1968a, p.323) that Carnap was “following the
Cambridge school”, which included Keynes, without pointing out the important
differences between their views.
Lakatos’s preoccupations
Lakatos’s mis-characterisation of early Carnapian inductive logic may also have
stemmed from a mistaken assumption that Carnap shared some of his own philo-
sophical preoccupations. Lakatos was passionately interested in distinguishing
science from pseudo-science, explaining why the history of science unfolds as it
does and in putting this unfolding on an objectively rational basis. He seems
to have thought that Carnapian inductive logic was directed at these problems
too.
Lakatos suggested in a lecture delivered some years after the publication of
Lakatos (1968a), that inductive logic—presumably including Carnapian induc-
tive logic—aimed to solve the problem of distinguishing science from pseudo-
science:
If all scientific theories are equally unprovable, what distinguishes
scientific knowledge from ignorance, science from pseudo-science?
One answer to this question was provided in the twentieth cen-
tury by ‘inductive logicians’. Inductive logic set out to define the
probabilities of different theories according to the available total evi-
dence. If the mathematical probability of a theory is high, it qualifies
as scientific; if it is low or even zero, it is not scientific. Thus the
hallmark of scientific honesty would be never to say anything that
is not at least highly probable.
(Lakatos, 1978c, p.3)
Only probabilities that follow from true axioms would be useful for the task of
distinguishing scientific theories from pseudo-scientific ones. If there were no
facts about which theories were highly probable, there would be no grounds on
which to distinguish pseudo-scientific theories.
Lakatos mistakenly thought that Carnapian inductive logic had, at least initially,
sought to formalise scientific theories within a “complete language of science”
(Lakatos, 1968a, p. 323) and to justify scientists’ choices of theories.6 Thus
5Carnap’s acknowledgement in Carnap (1968) of the role of inductive intuition in inductive
logic in no way represents a departure from this view. According to this paper, inductive
intuition does not identify true systems of inductive logic: rather inductive logic seeks to
codify our inductive intuitions.
6See (Carnap, 1950b, § 49) for early Carnap’s explicit disavowal of these goals.
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Lakatos seems to have thought that Carnapian inductive logic was interested in
demonstrating the supposed objectivity of scientific knowledge.
This mistaken assumption would have made it more plausible that Carnapian
inductive logic would have aimed to find true axioms. Indeed, unless it could
identify such axioms, it is difficult to see how Carnapian inductive logic could be
relevant to the question of whether scientific knowledge is objectively justified.
3.2.5 Summary
To sum up, Lakatos’s argument for the degeneracy of Carnapian inductive logic
depended on his claim that, in its early phase, Carnap’s research programme
sought to find true axioms. In fact, Lakatos was mistaken: Carnapian induc-
tive logic only ever aimed to find pragmatically justified axioms. As a result,
Lakatos’s critique of Carnapian inductive logic was unsuccessful.
3.3 Grue, projectability and instantial relevance
Besides Lakatos’s criticism, the most significant objection to Carnapian induc-
tive logic has been the suggestion that it fails to deal satisfactorily with the
‘grue’ problem. In essence, this objection criticises Carnapian inductive logic
on the grounds that it cannot formalise assumptions about both positive and
negative instantial relevance, or, in Goodman’s terms, ‘projectability’ and ‘non-
projectability’. Furthermore, Carnapian inductive logic gives no guidance as to
when different kinds of assumption about instantial relevance are justified.
In this section I argue that Carnapian inductive logic can formalise assump-
tions of non-projectability just as well as it can formalise assumptions about
projectability. On the other hand, it cannot show in what circumstances such
assumptions are justified, but this is a very difficult task which Carnapian in-
ductive logic never attempted and which no other research programme has ever
achieved. Objections to Carnapian inductive logic based on ‘grue’ are therefore
misplaced.
3.3.1 Historical background
The ‘grue’ problem emerged from an exchange between Carnap and Goodman
starting with Goodman (1946), an essay in which Goodman raised some general
objections to Hempel’s qualitative theory of confirmation and Carnap’s quanti-
tative theory, which was derived from his work on inductive logic.
Carnap addressed Goodman’s objection in Carnap (1947b), Goodman responded
in Goodman (1947) and Carnap responded in Carnap (1948). Goodman drew
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on this exchange to offer the definitive formulation of his objection in Goodman
(1954), introducing the term ‘grue’.
Many articles by other authors on ‘the new riddle of induction’ followed, includ-
ing Jeffrey (1966), which I quote from below. Carnap later addressed Goodman’s
objection again in (Carnap, 1971a, § 4B).
Today it is widely believed that the grue problem presented a serious obstacle
which Carnapian inductive logic failed to overcome.
3.3.2 The objection
The grue problem, it is generally agreed, has crucially to do with the distinc-
tion between ‘projectable’ and ‘non-projectable’ properties. While there has
been some philosophical discussion about exactly how ‘projectability’ should be
defined—see Earman (1989) for example—I shall here follow the definition that
was implicitly agreed in the original discussion between Carnap and Goodman.
During the exchange with Goodman, Carnap defined projectability as follows:
We call a property inductively projectible if the following is al-
ways the case: the higher the relative frequency of W in an observed
sample, the higher is, on this evidence, the probability that a non-
observed individual has the property W .
(Carnap, 1947b, p.146)
Since Goodman did not dispute Carnap’s definition, let us follow Carnap and
define a property as ‘projectable’ in a given context if, according to inductive
common sense, observed instances of that property make future instances more
plausible in that context. Otherwise it is non-projectable. In other words,
recalling the definition of the axiom of positive instantial relevance from section
2.4.2, a property is projectable whenever inductive common sense suggests an
assumption of positive instantial relevance with respect to it.
As it is normally formulated, the grue problem asks us to consider a situation in
which a series of emeralds are being examined. To fix a concrete image, imagine
that emeralds are extracted from an underground mine by a kind digger who
places them at regular intervals on a conveyor belt. When the emeralds reach
the surface they are examined, one by one, by an emerald inspector with a
penchant for inductive reasoning.
The property of ‘grueness’ is defined as follows: an emerald is ‘grue’ if it is
either examined before a certain time t and found to be green or else not so
examined and blue. According to generally agreed inductive common sense,
if the emerald inspector examined a long sequence of emeralds before t and
found them all to be green, this evidence should make it more plausible than
otherwise that an arbitrary emerald examined after t would be found to be green
as well. However, this same common-sensical inductive assumption implies that,
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if a long series of emeralds were examined before t and found to be grue, this
evidence would make it less plausible than otherwise that an arbitrary emerald
examined after t would be found to be grue. Common sense therefore seems to
support an assumption of positive instantial relevance in the case of greenness
while supporting an assumption of negative instantial relevance in the case of
grueness. In the context of emerald-extraction, then, greenness seems to be
projectable and grueness to be non-projectable.
The grue problem illustrates the difficulty of evaluating whether a system of
inductive logic is successful without fixing an interpretation of its domain. Sup-
pose that we are interested in evaluating how well the system of inductive logic
(SLpred,Mprob,IR+) formalises the inductive assumptions suggested by com-
mon sense in the emerald-extraction situation. Recall that prob represents the
probability axioms and IR+ the axiom of positive instantial relevance. Sup-
pose that Lpred features only one primitive predicate G and has a large but
finite number of constant symbols. If G is interpreted as representing green-
ness, then (SLpred,Mprob,IR+) seems to agree with inductive common sense,
and all is well. On the other hand, if G is interpreted as representing grueness,
then (SLpred,Mprob,IR+) is at odds with inductive common sense, according to
which observing instances of grueness should sometimes make observing further
instances less plausible. On one interpretation of G, (SLpred,Mprob,IR+) suc-
cessfully explicates inductive common sense, whereas on the other interpretation
it is unsuccessful.
3.3.3 Artificiality
While one might be tempted to dismiss this problem on the grounds that grue-
ness is a silly and artificial property, this is not a good response. Firstly, as
Goodman points out at (Goodman, 1954, p.77-81), grueness is arguably only
silly or artificial relative to the ways of describing emeralds that we happen to
employ at present. Relative to the emerald-describing method of a Martian for
whom grueness is serious and natural, the property of greenness might seem
artificial. After all, a given emerald is green if and only if it is either examined
before t and found to be grue or else examined after t and found to be ‘bleen’,
that is, observed before t and found to be blue or else not so observed and green.
To privilege greenness and blueness over grueness and bleenness without a good
reason would perhaps be chauvinistic.
There is another, in my opinion stronger, reason not to dismiss Goodman’s ob-
jection because grueness is silly and artificial. The reason is that here are many
cases of non-projectability that do not involve grueness or any other artificial
property. The grue emerald mine is merely one out of many contexts in which
common sense supports an assumption of non-positive instantial relevance. Ear-
man (1989) makes this somewhat under-appreciated point as follows:
. . . questions about projectability arise for the most mundane of hy-
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potheses and predicates where not the slightest hint of Goodmanian
trickery is present.
(Earman, 1989, p. 220)
Earman’s essay does not specify any examples of such mundane contexts: here
are a few. First, consider a person Sam munching their way through a tube of
fruit pastilles.7 Sam is interested in how likely it is that the last pastille to be
withdrawn from the tube will be blackcurrant flavoured. Nestle´, the company
that manufactures fruit pastilles, say that “we know that everyone has their
favourites which is why we try to make sure all packs include a really good
mix.”8 Sam might take this kind of comment to indicate that it is unlikely
that there will be more than four blackcurrant fruit pastilles in a tube. On this
assumption, Sam might reasonably take the observation of a blackcurrant fruit
pastille at the start of the tube to make future observations of blackcurrants in
the same tube less plausible. In Goodman’s terms, Sam considers blackcurrant-
flavour a non-projectable property of fruit pastilles in this context.
Similarly, an ecologist studying tigers might take the observation of a lone tiger
at a particular spot to make future observations of tigers at the same spot less
plausible than in the absence of such an observation, as the observation would
indicate that the spot is likely to lie within the territory of a tiger that is not
raising any children. If the spot had been within the territory of a mother who
was raising some children, then future sightings could be expected to be more
frequent, given the greater number of circulating tigers.
Even the property of greenness is non-projectable in certain contexts. Certain
decks of cards popular in Germany contain a finite number of green cards -
a person repeatedly drawing green cards from such a deck, just like a miner
extracting grue emeralds from the ground, may common-sensically hold that
instances of green before a certain time make instances of green after that time
less plausible.
In sum, the ubiquity of non-projectable properties, together with the fact that
grue is only artificial relative to a certain perspective, show that it is not a
good idea to respond to the grue objection by asserting that non-projectable
properties like grue are silly.
3.3.4 Carnapian inductive logic can formalise assumptions
about projectability
Fortunately, Carnapian inductive logic can address the grue problem without
asserting that non-projectable properties like grue should be ignored. The so-
lution is simple: if common sense suggests an assumption of negative instantial
7Fruit pastilles are cylindrical sweets that come in various flavours. Typically 14 or 15 fruit
pastilles are stacked on top of each other, wrapped in layers of foil and paper and sold as a
‘tube’.
8This is a quotation from a letter from Nestle´ customer services.
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relevance with respect to a particular property, then, in order to formalise this
assumption within a system of inductive logic, an axiom should be adopted
which imposes negative instantial relevance with respect to the predicate that
represents that property. Similarly, positive instantial relevance should be im-
posed with respect to predicates representing projectable properties.
For example, suppose that common sense stipulates only that greenness is pro-
jectable in a certain context; say, emerald extraction. One might formalise
this assumption as follows. First take a one-predicate unary language L1pred,
interpreted so that its single predicate G represents greenness and symbols
a1, a2, . . . , an represent successively drawn emeralds. Take as a domain the set
of sentences SL1pred. Next choose a set Mprob,IR+of measure functions that is
determined by the axioms of probability and positive instantial relevance. The
resulting system of inductive logic is therefore (SL1pred,Mprob,IR+).
Alternatively, if, in another context, common sense indicates only that green-
ness is non-projectable, then one could proceed in a similar way. The same
domain SL1pred would be used, and the predicate G would again be interpreted
as representing greenness. However, the axiom of positive instantial relevance
would not be employed. Since common sense now supports negative instantial
relevance with respect to greenness, the axiom of negative instantial relevance
must be employed. In this case the resulting system of inductive logic would be
(SL1pred,Mprob,IR−).
Finally, suppose that, in a third context, common sense indicates that green
is projectable and that grue is not. Then a Carnapian inductive logician can
proceed by choosing as a domain a new language L2pred with two predicates:
one predicate G representing greenness and a second predicate G′ representing
grueness. A basic assumption would need to be introduced in order to formalise
the logical relationship between greenness and grueness. This could take the
form of a stipulation that, for any constant ai of L2, the sentence G
′ai is true
if and only if either Gai is true and i < t or else Gai is false and i ≥ t. The
projectability of greenness could be represented by a restricted form of the axiom
of positive instantial relevance that applies only to G but not to G′. This would
be as follows:
Restricted axiom of positive instantial relevance
For the predicate G and any sentence θ(a1, . . . , al) ∈ SLpred,
m(G(al+2) | G(al+1) ∧ θ(a1, . . . , al)) > m(G(al+2) | θ(a1, . . . , al))
Thus positive instantial relevance would be ensured for the predicate G, which
represents a projectable property, but not for the non-projectable G′.
This procedure agrees the spirit of Carnap’s last proposal for addressing the
grue problem:
Let us briefly consider a richer language L′ of such a kind that
Goodman’s abnormal predicates can be defined in it. . .
Now it is clear that certain customary inductive procedures that
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are valid for ‘Blue’ and for ‘Green’ would lead to counterintuitive
results if they were applied to the predicate ‘Grue’ . . .
The difficulty may be presented in the following way. Suppose
that we are constructing a system of IL for the language L′. We
choose one of those procedures or principles which are valid for de-
scriptional attributes like Blue and Green, but invalid for Grue and
similar attributes9. Suppose we wish to represent this principle by
an axiom A of IL. . . . . The essential point in the formulation of
the axiom A is the obvious necessity of including into A a suitable
restricting condition, in order to prevent its application to attributes
like Grue.
(Carnap, 1980, p. 75-76, footnote added)
Carnap proposes a more sophisticated procedure according to which axioms
like the principle of instantial relevance could be restricted on a principled ba-
sis. As well ensuring that such axioms do not apply to predicates representing
grueness, Carnap’s procedure ensures that they would only apply to predicates
representing ‘descriptional’ properties: see (Carnap, 1980, § 4B) for full details.
Thus it seems that Carnapian inductive logic can formalise the assumption
suggested by common sense in the case of the grue emeralds.
3.3.5 Why has grue been such a big issue?
Interpretation-neutrality
The widespread belief that the grue problem is a major obstacle for Carnapian
inductive logic may be due in part to the common misconception according to
which it restricted its attention to interpretation-neutral inductive logical ax-
ioms. Such axioms would formalise common-sense inductive assumptions under
all interpretations of the domains of the measure functions to which they apply.
A system of inductive logic that employed only interpretation-neutral axioms
would be ‘syntactic’ in the sense that it would formalise only those features of
common-sense inductive reasoning which depend on nothing but syntax.
The grue problem does indeed show that the axiom of positive instantial rel-
evance is not an interpretation-neutral axiom. If a predicate G is interpreted
in an emerald-extraction context as representing grueness, then common sense
does not support the assumption that observing the property that G represents
makes future observations of the same property more plausible. On the other
hand, if G is interpreted as representing greenness, then common sense does
support this kind of assumption in the emerald situation. Clearly, this axiom’s
common-sensicality is interpretation-sensitive.
9Carnap used the word ‘attribute’ as we use the word ‘property’
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However, this fact does not affect the viability of Carnapian inductive logic,
because it did not in fact restrict its attention to interpretation-neutral axioms.
This can be seen in general from Carnap’s remarks on pure and applied inductive
logic. Recall from section 2.4.3 that Carnap thought that the evaluation of
systems of inductive logic could only occur within applied inductive logic. By
definition, in applied inductive logic, an interpretation is available.
The fact that Carnapian inductive logic did not aim at interpretation-neutrality
is also clear from Carnap’s final response to Goodman. In this passage he notes
that an axiom excluding predicates that represent ‘non-descriptional’ proper-
ties should be evaluated within applied inductive logic, i.e. with respect to an
interpretation:
While this axiom is formulated within pure IL, any argument
intended to show its adequacy, and in particular, to show that it
excludes nondescriptional attributes like Grue, has to proceed within
applied IL.
(Carnap, 1971a, p.76, emphasis original)
Carnap made essentially the same point in his first reply to Goodman, where
he argued that inductive logical axioms like positive instantial relevance, which
at this stage he called ‘inductive rules’, should be formulated so as not to apply
to properties like grue:
It seems that those authors who have formulated inductive rules
without specifying the kind of properties to which they are appli-
cable (for example, Laplace’s rule of succession and Reichenbach’s
rule of induction) intended them to be applied to purely qualitative
properties only [These are essentially the properties that Carnap
later referred to as ‘descriptional attributes’.]. This was tacitly pre-
supposed; a complete formulation should contain this or a similar
restriction.
(Carnap, 1947b, p.146, round brackets original, square brackets added)
This passage shows that Carnap was happy to distinguish between properties,
either ‘tacitly’ by employing particular axioms in some applications but not oth-
ers, or explicitly by employing axioms like the restricted principle of instantial
relevance that explicitly represent distinctions that common sense may make
between different properties.
Richard Jeffrey emphasises that Carnapian inductive logic was not searching
for interpretation-neutral axioms in the following passage, written when he was
working in close collaboration with Carnap:
. . . Goodman’s strictures weighed rather differently upon Hempel’s
purely syntactical theory than upon Carnap’s more semantical one.
Goodman’s Query underlined the impossibility of a purely syn-
tactical account of confirmation. No confirmation function can be
78 CHAPTER 3. CRITIQUES
attached with equal felicity to all syntactically identical languages. . .
Then, in choosing a confirmation function to use with a certain
language, one must take account of the meanings of predicate expres-
sions that occur in that language. Now I submit that the permanent
impact of Goodman’s Query on Carnapian confirmation theory con-
sists in having made it abundantly clear that credibilities depend
on meanings, so that in choosing a c-function for a language it is
essential to consider the meanings of the terms in its vocabulary.
To one with Goodman’s philosophic conscience, this impact seems
deadly, vitiating all further discussion of confirmation in Carnap’s
terms; but to one who, like Carnap, finds no inherent fault in talk
of meaning and necessity, the impact is expected, and salutary.
(Jeffrey, 1966, p. 282-285)
Despite these clarifications, the misconception arose, and persists, that Car-
napian inductive logic was interested only in interpretation-neutral axioms, and
that the grue problem was an obstacle for this reason. For example:
Some Bayesian logicists (e.g., Carnap) have maintained that pos-
terior probabilities of hypotheses should be determined by logical
form alone. . . . Most logicians now take the project to have failed
because of a fatal flaw with the whole idea that reasonable prior
probabilities can be made to depend on logical form alone. Seman-
tic content should matter. Goodmanian grue-predicates provide one
way to illustrate the point.
(Hawthorne, 2014, § 3.2, brackets original)
Another Goodmanian lesson is that inductive logic must be sensi-
tive to the meanings of predicates, strongly suggesting that a purely
syntactic approach such as Carnap’s is doomed.
(Ha´jek, 2012, § 3.2)
For Carnap, probability1 is analytic and syntactic.. . . But after
his paper proposing a purely syntactic justification for inductive in-
ference [Carnap, 1945b], Nelson Goodman [1946] immediately pub-
lished a serious challenge to it. Goodman’s conclusion was that in-
ductive inference is not purely syntactic in nature. . . Although Good-
man and Carnap soon agreed to disagree, there was no escape; and
Goodman’s point is now generally accepted.
(Zabell, 2011, p.297-298, square brackets original)
These accounts either claim or imply that Carnapian inductive logic was ‘syn-
tactic’, by which they seem to mean that it sought to find axioms that were
common-sensical under all interpretations of the domains of their measure func-
tions. This misconception partly explains why the grue problem has been seen
as a serious obstacle for Carnapian inductive logic.
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Not justifying inductive common sense
The solution to the grue problem that I sketch above shows how Carnapian
inductive logic can formalise inductive common sense even in ‘non-projectable’
cases where it does not support assumptions of positive instantial relevance, or
even when it supports assumptions of negative instantial relevance. It does not
show that inductive common sense is justified. In other words, the old, Humean,
problem of induction—that of identifying justified inductive assumptions—remains
unsolved.
This is not a serious problem for Carnapian inductive logic. Its primary aim
was to formalise inductive assumptions rather than to show that particular as-
sumptions are justified. However, as the discussion of Lakatos’s critique showed,
it is widely believed that Carnapian inductive logic did in fact aim to find true
inductive logical axioms. True axioms, if they existed, would surely formalise
justified inductive assumptions. For this reason, someone who share’s Lakatos’s
analysis of its objectives might think that Carnapian inductive logic’s response
to the grue problem was unsatisfactory.
3.4 Salmon on partial entailment
Salmon (1967) presents another influential objection to Carnapian inductive
logic. In this essay Salmon argues that two important inductive assumptions
cannot simultaneously be formalised within Carnapian inductive logic.
3.4.1 Hume’s principle
The first assumption, which following Jeffrey (1967) I shall call ‘Hume’s princi-
ple’, stipulates that ‘distinct events’ should be ‘logically independent’. Salmon
explain’s Hume’s principle as follows:
[Carnap’s] conception faces one severe prima facie problem, namely
that, as Hume so forcefully showed, distinct events are logically inde-
pendent of one another. This is a transparently analytic statement,
but it has profound consequences. In particular, it means that the
future is logically independent of the past and that the unobserved
is logically independent of the observed. How, we must ask, can a
probability that is conceived as a logical relation play a fundamen-
tal role in inductive logic, if induction is concerned with relations
between the observed and the unobserved between the past and the
future?
(Salmon, 1967, p.729)
I shall understand Hume’s principle as asserting that propositions that pick out
different states of affairs (‘distinct events’) should neither support nor undermine
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one another, whether deductively or inductively (‘logical independence’). It is
difficult to say whether this is exactly what Salmon meant, as Salmon does not
explain at length what it means for events to be distinct or logically independent.
However, this reconstruction seems to capture Salmon’s drift. Hume’s principle
can plausibly be formalised within Carnapian inductive logic as ‘Hume’s axiom’:
Hume’s axiom
If θ and φ are logically independent sentences, then m(θ | φ) = m(θ)
3.4.2 Learning from experience
The second assumption, ‘learning from experience’, which we have already en-
countered, stipulates that instances of a certain kind of observation should in-
ductively support further instances of the same kind of observation. Learning
from experience can plausibly be formalised by the axiom of positive instantial
relevance.
Salmon claims that these two inductive assumptions are incompatible. Fittingly,
Hume’s axiom is indeed inconsistent with the axiom of positive instantial rele-
vance. To see why, consider the language L1pred whose only predicate is P , and
whose constants are a1, a2, . . . , an. Suppose that m is a measure function on
SL1pred, and let θ = Pa2 and φ = Pa1. Then, if m satisfies the axiom of positive
instantial relevance, it should be the case that m(θ | φ) > m(θ). However, since
θ and φ are logically independent, according to Hume’s principle it should also
be the case that m(θ | φ) = m(θ). Clearly the two axioms are incompatible.
3.4.3 Salmon’s argument
According to Salmon, Hume’s principle is obviously a true inductive assump-
tion, whereas learning from experience is not. He therefore concludes that the
incompatibility of the two assumptions shows that learning from experience
must be a false inductive assumption. Consequently, systems of inductive logic
that formalise only true inductive assumptions, or in Salmon’s terms ‘capture
partial entailment’, should rule out all measure functions that satisfy positive
instantial relevance:
Unfortunately for induction, statements strictly about the fu-
ture (unobserved) are completely independent of statements strictly
about the past (observed). Not only are they deductively indepen-
dent of each other, but also they fail to exhibit any partial entail-
ment. The force of Hume’s insight that the future is logically in-
dependent of the past is very great indeed. It rules out both full
entailment and partial entailment. If partial entailment were the
fundamental concept of inductive logic, then it would in fact be im-
possible to learn from experience. If instead, like Carnap, we adopt
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another confirmation function (such as c?) that permits learning
from experience, then we have abandoned the concept of partial en-
tailment as the basis for inductive logic.
(Salmon, 1967, p.731-732)
3.4.4 Responses to Salmon’s objection
The most important repsonses to Salmon’s critique are Jeffrey (1967) and Ke-
meny (1967).
Jeffrey’s response questioned the intelligibility of Hume’s principle. According
to Jeffrey, Salmon did not specify Hume’s principle sufficiently clearly for it to
have important consequences for inductive logic:
Now Hume’s principle, and Salmon’s, will be intelligible or not,
and will (if intelligible) be true or false, depending on how the follow-
ing terms are understood: event, logical independence of events, and
reference of sentences to events. None of these terms play any role
in logic, where logical independence is a relation between sentences.
I know of no standard usage for them and I conclude from the fact
that Professor Salmon uses them without explanation that passages
like the two I have quoted [Jeffrey quotes the passage from (Salmon,
1967, p.729) and another passage discussing Hume’s principle from
later in Salmon’s article.] are properly viewed not as parts of an ar-
gument against the logical interpretation of probability, but rather
as intimations of the sort of thing that troubles him.
(Jeffrey, 1967, § 0, square brackets added)
While Jeffrey was right to point out that Salmon had not expressed Hume’s
principle as clearly as he might have, I think that Jeffrey’s response is too
quick. An inductive logical axiom, namely Hume’s axiom, can be extracted
from what Salmon says about Hume’s principle by equating ‘distinct events’
with logically independent sentences and the inductive independence of distinct
events with the condition that Hume’s axiom imposes. The incompatibility of
Hume’s axiom and positive instantial relevance bears out Salmon’s fundamental
worry.
Kemeny (1967) shows how a better response to Salmon’s objection might pro-
ceed. While the main body of Kemeny’s essay focusses on the unrelated ques-
tion of how to formalise reasoning about scientific theories within Carnapian
inductive logic, Kemeny briefly touches on the issue of Hume’s principle in this
passage:
First of all, I should like to point out that Salmon discusses three
(not two) different problems: (1) Formulation of an inductive logic,
which we will identify with the choice of a confirmation function. (2)
The selection of a rule of induction.[Kemeny uses the term ‘rule’ as
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we use the term ‘axiom’] (3) The justification of induction in general,
or the justification of a particular inductive rule.
I am convinced that Hume has spoken the definitive words con-
cerning the third problem. One cannot justify induction. One can
at best proclaim it as an act of faith or give pragmatic reasons for
accepting it as a guide in life. I would, therefore, prefer to return
to Carnap’s original approach. Let us look not at the problem of
justification, but at the problem of explicating the method by which
scientists predict the future. The task of the philosopher is to make
clear what the scientist does, and to try to improve on it by substi-
tuting precise tools for a somewhat nebulous intuition.
(Kemeny, 1967, p. 2)
As Kemeny points out, although it is difficult, if not impossible, to justify the
assumption that observed instances make unobserved instances more plausible,
it can still be useful to formalise this inductive assumption. Carnapian inductive
logic is concerned mainly with whether inductive assumptions can usefully be
formalised, and not with whether or not they are true. Thus, whether or not they
agree with Salmon that Hume’s principle is ‘transparently analytic’, Carnapian
inductive logicians are free to define systems of inductive logic that do not
validate it.
It might seem like Salmon’s criticism is very different from that of Lakatos. This
is true as far as their conclusions went: whereas Lakatos concluded that Car-
nap’s whole programme was degenerate, Salmon drew only the more measured
conclusion that Carnapian inductive logic should not employ axioms that are
inconsistent with Hume’s axiom. However, the reasoning that led Salmon and
Lakatos to their different conclusions was surprisingly similar. Both authors’ ar-
guments assume that Carnapian inductive logic aimed to find true, theoretically
justified inductive logical axioms, whereas in fact it only aimed at pragmatic
justification. When we discard this mistaken assumption, we see that Carnapian
inductive logic survives both critiques.
Curiously, although he makes the same error as Lakatos, Salmon’s historical
account is the reverse. Rather than claiming, like Lakatos, that Carnapian
inductive logic began by searching for true axioms and then settled for mere
usefulness, Salmon claims that Carnapian inductive logic began by formalising
and ended by aiming for truth:
If Carnap were content, as he was twenty years ago, to claim that
his sole purpose is to explicate our intuitive sense of what constitutes
correct induction, without trying to provide any actual justification
for it, then one could hardly have any serious misgivings about the
approach via intuition. If, on the other hand, conformity with intu-
ition is taken as providing justification as well, as Carnap has more
recently maintained, fundamental problems do arise.
(Salmon, 1967, p. 737-738)
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It is unclear why Salmon took Carnap to have maintained that inductive intu-
ition can provide justification: fortunately we do not need to do so.
3.5 Other critiques of Carnapian inductive logic
3.5.1 Universal hypotheses
According to an objection frequently articulated by Popper, for example in
(Popper, 1959, § 80), Carnapian inductive logic was unsuccessful because it
could not capture reasoning about universal hypotheses such as ‘all ravens are
black’.
Unary predicate languages can represent universal hypotheses using universally
quantified sentences: for example, the sentence ∀x(Rx → Bx) might represent
the universal law according to which all ravens are black. However, the mea-
sure functions allowed by Carnap’s favoured systems of inductive logic assign
all such sentences the value 0, provided that the relevant language has count-
ably infinitely many constant symbols, as seems appropriate when formalising
hypothesis that does not refer to a specific number of ravens. Consequently, it
is difficult to represent reasoning about universal hypotheses using this kind of
system of inductive logic.
Carnap’s response to this kind of objection was to argue that, on the one hand,
it would be interesting to investigate systems of inductive logic that did not have
the property of forcing their measure functions to assign the value 0 to univer-
sally quantified sentences of languages with infinitely many constant symbols.
Carnap makes a comment to this effect at (Carnap, 1963b, p. 976) This ambi-
tion was realised by the work of Hintikka, who developed systems of inductive
logic in which measure functions assigning positive values to such sentences are
not excluded. This work is summarised in Niiniluoto (2011).
On the other hand, Carnap argued, his systems of inductive logic did not need
to be capable of representing reasoning about universal hypotheses in order to
be useful. While his systems could not describe reasoning about hypotheses
themselves, they could describe reasoning about specific instances of univer-
sal hypotheses (Carnap, 1950b, § 110G), and hypotheses themselves can often
be done without (Carnap, 1950b, § 110H). In addition, Carnap noted, just as
deductive logic is useful, despite the fact that not all deductive reasoning that
scientists carry out is formalised, so inductive logic need not formalise all aspects
of scientific reasoning. He put the point as follows:
The situation in inductive logic is similar [to the situation in
deductive logic]. . . . there are many situations which, by their com-
plexity, make the application of inductive logic practically impos-
sible. For instance, we cannot expect to apply inductive logic to
Einstein’s general theory of relativity. . . . The same holds for the
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other steps in the revolutionary transformation of modern physics,
especially in connection with the quantum theory. . . .
On the other hand, there are also cases in which there are good
reasons for the expectation that the application of inductive logic will
become useful for the scientist, or in which the useful application is
possible today.
(Carnap, 1950b, p. 243)
I think that this last response is by far the strongest to the objection based
on universal hypotheses. While statements like ‘all ravens are black’ may not
seem complex in comparison to the general theory of relativity, the same point
applies. Even systems of inductive logic which cannot describe reasoning about
any universal hypotheses may still usefully formalise other interesting aspects
of scientific reasoning.
3.5.2 Constant exchangeability
Many critiques of Carnapian inductive logic have taken the form of objections
to the axiom of constant exchangeability. Various authors have argued that
constant exchangeability, unlike weaker inductive logical axioms, is questionably
logical. The nature of this kind of objection can be discerned from the following
quotations:
At this point, it is important to ask, In what sense are Carnap’s
theories of logical probability (especially his later ones) logical ? His
early theories. . . applied something like the principle of indifference
to the state and/or structure descriptions of the formal language
L in order to determine the logical probabilities P (• | •). In this
sense, these early theories assume that certain sentences of L are
equiprobable a priori. Why is such an assumption logical? Or, more
to the point, how is logic supposed to tell one which statements are
equiprobable a priori?
(Fitelson, 2005, p. 390, emphasis original)
‘logical’ probability measures, whether based on the Principle of
Indifference or on some other method of distributing probabilities
a priori, do not, we believe, possess a genuinely logical status. For
such systems are ultimately quite arbitrary, and we take logic to be
essentially non-committal on substantive matters.
(Howson and Urbach, 1989, p. 72-73)
Significantly, Carnap’s various axioms of symmetry are hardly
logical truths.
Ha´jek (2012)
To some extent these objections merely reiterate Lakatos and Salmon’s view
that inductive logical axioms should be true—note that Ha´jek uses the term
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‘truth’ explicitly whereas the other two authors use the truth-related term ‘a
priori’—and claim that constant exchangeability is not true, or at least not true
a priori. This line of criticism can be overcome by pointing out, again, that
Carnapian inductive logic did not aim to find true axioms.
On another reading, these criticisms are not so concerned about truth, but
rather assert that, whether or not it is true, constant exchangeability goes too
far to be genuinely logical. On this reading, the objections can be overcome
by noting that, while some conceptions of logic may include weaker axioms
but exclude constant exchangeability, Carnap’s conception certainly did not.
According to Carnap’s tolerant conception, as we saw in section 2.9.2, any axiom
for measure functions is logical in the sense that it can be part of a system of
semantic rules specifying what follows from what. Even if Carnap’s conception
of logic were ultimately shown to be incorrect, his research programme could still
proceed exactly as before, though without the label ‘logic’. Rather than dwelling
on the issue of whether particular axioms are or are not genuinely logical, it
seems preferable to address the question of whether constant exchangeability
and other axioms play the role that they are supposed to within Carnapian
inductive logic: that of usefully formalising inductive assumptions.
Another line of criticism of constant exchangeability does address its usefulness,
asserting that the assumption that constant exchangeability formalises—loosely
that the order of experiments should be inductively irrelevant—is sometimes
inappropriate and therefore not useful to formalise. Specifically, this is the case
whenever inductive logic is being used to model reasoning in situations where
it is appropriate to take the order of experiments into account.
Such situations happen fairly often: to take one, consider Williamson’s example
from Williamson (2015) of a series of experiments recording the results of the
‘game of red and blue’:
In this game, a fair coin is tossed, changing a score s, which is
initially zero, to s+ 1 if heads occurs or s−1 if tails occurs. If s ≥ 0
the result of the toss is blue, if s < 0 the result is red.
(Williamson, 2015, Ch. 4)
It would almost always be appropriate to take into account the order of exper-
iments in this case, as the order of results of this game can be highly infor-
mative. For example, if one ‘blue’ result is followed by two ‘red’s, this implies
that s = −2, meaning that it is impossible for the next result to be ‘blue’. The
same results in a different order—say ‘red’, ‘blue’, ‘red’—would not have the
same implication. As a result, it would not be appropriate to impose constant
exchangeability when formalising assumptions about the game of red and blue.
Carnap was well aware of this issue, as can be seen from the following quotation
where he acknowledges that constant exchangeability, which he refers to as the
‘principle of symmetry’, is not always appropriate:
In some series of events, the temporal order has no influence. For
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example, we find that, in a long series of throws of any die, even if
it is loaded, the relative frequency of an ace among those throws
that follow immediately on an ace (or a deuce), is not essentially
different from the relative frequency of an ace in the whole series.
Thus experience shows here statistical independence; and therefore
we treat the members of such a series as inductively independent. In
contrast, we find a strong dependence in a series of meteorological
observations made at a fixed place at noon of every day; and still
higher dependence if made at intervals of one hour. The relative
frequency of rain immediately following on rain is much higher than
in the whole.
If now in elementary inductive logic, we decide to accept the prin-
ciple of symmetry for a certain investigation, this decision may either
be based on the assumption that statistical independence actually
holds; or else on the assumption that there is some dependence, but
so small that we may neglect it for the sake of simplicity; or finally
on the assumption that there may be noticeable dependencies in the
actual temporal order represented in another (unknown) language
L′, and that the order of indexes in our language L was produced
by an (unknown) permutation pi of the indices in L′, where pi is an
infinite permutation with bounded displacement.
(Carnap, 1971a, p.120)
Although constant exchangeability is not appropriate for all applications of Car-
napian inductive logic, this fact does not undermine the programme. Carnapian
inductive logic did not make any hard-core commitments involving constant ex-
changeability, and certainly was not committed to imposing this axiom in all
circumstances. Constant exchangeability featured only in secondary claims,
according to which certain axioms usefully explicate certain inductive assump-
tions.
In order for such claims to be warranted, it would only need to be the case
that constant exchangeability is a useful axiom in some circumstances: this
possibility is not precluded by the fact that it is sometimes not useful.
Despite this fact, given its technical importance and prominence within Car-
napian inductive logic’s protective belt, we might justifiably demand that con-
stant exchangeability be a useful axiom for many applications of inductive logic.
This is surely the case: there are many situations where formalising inductive
assumptions is called for and where it is appropriate to assume that the order in
which experiments are carried out does not convey any information. As Carnap
argued in the quotation above, such situations include those where statistical
independence is judged to hold, whether fully or approximately, as well as those
where it is not clear how the order of experiments is significant. This kind of
situation is very common in statistical research. Gelman et al. go so far as to
claim that it is typical for statistical investigations to begin with an assumption
that amounts to constant exchangeability:
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The usual starting point of a statistical analysis is the (often
tacit) assumption that the n values yi [representing experiments]
may be regarded as exchangeable.
(Gelman et al., 1995, p.5, emphasis original, square brackets added)
Given how often the kind of assumption that it formalises is made in practice,
it is clear that constant exchangeability is a useful inductive logical axiom.
Critiques of Carnapian inductive logic centred around objections to constant
exchangeability are therefore unsuccessful.
3.5.3 Reliability in the limit
Putnam (1963) contains an argument against Carnapian inductive logic that is
structurally similar to Salmon’s. Like Salmon, Putnam presents a putatively
essential inductive assumption, namely ‘reliability in the limit’, and argues that
Carnapian inductive logic cannot easily formalise it. Putnam’s criticism is more
ambitious than Salmon’s, however. Whereas Salmon claims that formalising
Hume’s principle frustrates Carnap’s attempt to capture learning from experi-
ence, Putnam aims to show that the difficulty of formalising reliability in the
limit shows that the whole enterprise of representing plausibility using mea-
sure functions is ill-founded. In addition, Putnam claims that an alternative
approach to formalising inductive reasoning does not suffer from this problem.
Reliability in the limit is an inductive assumption which asserts that, based on
evidence according to which sufficiently many observations agree with a given
hypothesis about the whole sequence of observations, it should be more likely
than not that the next observation in the sequence will also agree with the
hypothesis. In other words, after enough observations, it should be possible
to ‘learn’ any pattern in a sequence at least to the extent that all subsequent
manifestations of the pattern are plausible to a degree strictly greater than 1/2.
Putnam claims at (Putnam, 1963, p.766) that failing to accept reliability in the
limit as a reasonable inductive assumption amounts to the assertion that there
are certain true hypotheses that science is unable to accept permanently. Such
a claim, Putnam says, would be false, given the availability of the method of
‘trial and error’. According to this method, hypotheses are sequentially chosen
arbitrarily, accepted and then tested against incoming data until either refuted
or accepted forever. This method, Putnam argued, eventually accepts any true
hypothesis permanently.
In order to formalise reliability in the limit within Carnapian inductive logic,
Putnam introduces some new notions, which I summarise here using the termi-
nology of this thesis.
A data sequence ek,~i with length k ∈ N and characteristic vector ~i ∈ Nk is a
sentence αi1(a1) ∧ . . . ∧ αik(ak) asserting that constants a1, . . . , ak instantiate
atoms αi1 , . . . , αik .
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An effective hypothesis is a countably infinitely long data sequence.
Based on these definitions reliability in the limit can be defined as follows, as an
axiom applying to measure functions m : SLpred → R, where Lpred is a unary
predicate language with countably infinitely many constants:
Axiom of reliability in the limit: RL
For every possible effective hypothesis h, there is a number r ∈ N such
that, for all data sequences ek,~i such that k > r, if  h → ek,~i and
 h→ θ(ak+1), then m(θ(ak+1) | ek,~i) > 1/2.
There are no measure functions of the right kind satisfying the axiom of re-
liability in the limit. This is shown at (Putnam, 1963, p.768-769) and (Kelly
et al., 1994, p.6-7). This seems to show that Carnapian inductive logic cannot
formalise an important inductive assumption.
To make matters even worse for Carnapian inductive logic, Putnam proposed
an alternative formal method which, he argued, could capture reliability in the
limit. This method, which Putnam called M , attempts to formalise the method
of trial and error, according to which hypotheses are exhaustively accepted and
then rejected them if and when they disagree with incoming data. Putnam
compares M with acceptance procedures based on Carnapian inductive logic,
noting that someone using M “can do things... that he could not in principle
accomplish if he [used] degree of confirmation”(Putnam, 1963, p.773, emphasis
original).
If Putnam is correct that the axiom of reliability in the limit should be satisfied
if possible, then this seems to show that Carnapian inductive logic should be
rejected in favour of his method M in such cases. I argue below that reliability
in the limit is not, in fact, a useful axiom.
Carnap’s response
Carnap (1963c) disputes Putnam’s argument for three separate reasons. First
he claims that reliability in the limit cannot be satisfied by measure functions
that take into account other factors than compatibility with the evidence, such
as, for example, simplicity. Such measure functions never guarantee permanent
acceptance of true hypotheses, Carnap claims, because at any point a true but
bad-with-respect-to-the-extra-factor hypothesis might be rejected in favour of
a false hypothesis that is also compatible with the available evidence. Since
scientific reasoning takes into account such extra factors, Carnap concludes, it
would be unreasonable to insist that measure functions that formalise scientific
reasoning satisfy the axiom of reliability in the limit.
This objection strikes me as plausible, but it is hard to judge definitively because
simplicity and other theoretical virtues are difficult notions to pin down.
Carnap’s second objection to reliability in the limit contests the assumption,
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implicit in Putnam’s defence, that systems of inductive logic should be judged
according to their long-run properties. Such properties, he argues at (Carnap,
1963c, p.985), have little correlation with practical usefulness.
I think that this objection is potentially strong: a system of inductive logic
might be very useful for everyday purposes, where only data strings of length
up to say, 100 trillion, need to be considered, and yet begin to be problematic at
the 100 trillionth iteration. On the other hand a system with very good long-run
properties might be useless in every way until it reaches the 100 trillionth itera-
tion. Axioms such as reliability in the limit therefore seem only loosely related
to its usefulness. However, Carnap was prepared to consider other axioms that
refer to long-run properties, such as Reichenbach’s axiom, which he discusses
at (Carnap, 1980, § 20). As a result some additional argumentation would be
required to show a difference between good and bad long-run axioms. I will not
consider this question as there are alternative counterarguments to Putnam.
Carnap’s final objection to Putnam asserted that inductive logic should not
seek to guide decisions whether or not to accept hypotheses in the way that
the axiom of reliability in the limit assumes. Implicit in the axiom is the idea
that there should be some threshold t greater than 1/2 such that, if the m-value
of a sentence is greater than t, then m should be thought of as ‘accepting’ the
sentence. Carnap put his objection to this kind of ‘rule of acceptance’ as follows:
In my view, rules of this kind give in some respect too much, in
another respect too little. I shall briefly indicate my main reasons
for this opinion.
(a) Suppose that rules of acceptance are given which on the basis
of the total evidence e available to X determine the acceptance of
some hypothesis h. This means practically that the rules tell X to
act as if he knew that h were true. But such an action may be entirely
unreasonable. Therefore the rules say more than they should say. It
is impossible to give rational advice for practical action merely on
the basis of logical relations between e and h; for this purpose the
expected gains or losses (more exactly, their utilities for X) must
also be taken into account.
(b) In contrast, there are certain situations in which the rules
of acceptance would not provide X with any advice on how to act.
Suppose, for example, that X knows that 100 balls have been drawn
from an urn containing black and white balls, and that among them
were 60 black balls and 40 white balls. X is allowed to choose one of
the acts a1 and a2 ; if he chooses a1 he obtains $100 if the next ball
is black (H1), and otherwise nothing; similarly for a2 with white
(H2). Since on the basis of e neither H1 nor H2 can be predicted
with reasonable confidence, rules of acceptance of the customary
kind will leave both hypotheses in suspension and therefore will not
recommend either of the two acts. But obviously it would be rational
for X to choose a1.
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(Carnap, 1963c, p. 971-972)
Thiss objection to the axiom of reliability in the limit seems reasonable. It is
not clear that measure functions should guide acceptance rules in the way that
Putnam supposes.
Another response
I think there is another telling objection to Putnam’s critique that Carnap did
not identify. Putnam failed properly to distinguish the method M , which he
claimed is good, from measure function based methods, which he claimed are
bad.
Kelly, Juhl and Glymour show at (Kelly et al., 1994, p.7-16) that reliability in
the limit not only rules out acceptance methods based on Carnapian measure
functions, but in fact rules out all computable hypothesis-acceptance methods.
Putnam’s method M , they show, manages to formalise reliability in the limit
precisely because it is non-computable, requiring an ‘oracle’ to ensure that the
series of hypotheses it receives is both complete and free of infinite loops. Fur-
thermore, they show (Kelly et al., 1994, p.11) that, if Carnapian inductive logic
had been afforded a similar privilege, it would have been possible to define
measure functions that satisfy the axiom of reliability in the limit.
The comparison that Putnam invites is therefore unfair: the fact that M suc-
ceeds where Carnapian inductive logic fails owes more to the oracular advantage
that Putnam affords his method than to any failing of Carnapian inductive logic.
Conclusion
In sum, Putnam’s argument against Carnapian inductive logic was unsuccessful.
In light of Carnap’s second objection it is not clear that it is useful to formalise
reliability in the limit. Even if formalising reliability in the limit were a useful
goal, Kelly, Juhl and Glymour’s demonstrations show, contrary to Putnam, that
Carnapian inductive logic is as good a tool for the job as Putnam’s M .
3.6 Discussion
In this chapter I considered critiques of Carnapian inductive logic by Lakatos,
Goodman and Salmon, as well as several more minor critiques. I argued that
none of these critiques succeeded in showing that Carnap’s programme failed in
any significant way.
I have not touched on every prominent critique of Carnapian inductive logic.
In particular I have not discussed a dispute between Carnap and Popper over
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whether or not measure functions should be interpreted as representing ‘confir-
mation’. According to Popper, an objection arising out of this question shows
“that Carnap’s theory is self-contradictory, and that its contradictoriness is not
a minor matter which can be easily repaired, but is due to mistakes in its logical
foundations.” (Popper, 1959, p. 409) I have not been able to reconstruct Pop-
per’s argument so as to make it amount to anything more than a terminological
objection. Readers who hope to get to the bottom of the dispute are referred
to (Popper, 1959, Appendix 9), Popper (1968) and Carnap’s replies to Popper
in Lakatos (1968c) and Carnap (1963e).
3.6.1 Why were there so many critiques?
It is interesting and puzzling that critiques of Carnapian inductive logic have
been so abundant and diverse. Why did so many people think that Carnap was
wrong for so many different reasons?
Carnapian inductive logic might have provided such a hospitable environment
for critiques because of poor communication on Carnap’s part. All of the cri-
tiques depend crucially on misconceptions about Carnapian inductive logic: for
example that it aimed at truth, proposition-neutrality, long-run reliability or an
explanation of scientific theory-change, or that it sought to show that induc-
tive assumptions of independence or learning from experience are theoretically
justified.
These misattributions are understandable because Carnap’s writing on induc-
tive logic can be very difficult to interpret. Carnap used familiar terms like
‘objective’, ‘logical’, ‘analytic’ etc in un-orthodox and suggestive ways that en-
courage misreading. Often—for example in the cases of Carnap’s remarks on
the blank slate situation, the objectivity of probability1 and pure and applied
inductive logic—a very careful reading is required to work out exactly what Car-
nap meant. It seems that these issues combined to make it seem to secondary
authors that Carnap had made some obvious mistakes.
The importance of Carnap’s misleading writing is emphasised by the fact that
some of the only secondary accounts of Carnapian inductive logic that did not
make interpretative errors were written by Jeffrey and Kemeny. See, for example
Jeffrey (1975), Jeffrey (1966), Jeffrey (1973), Jeffrey (1967), Kemeny (1967),
Kemeny (1955), Kemeny (1963b) and Kemeny (1963a). Both of these authors
worked closely with Carnap in person over many years, giving them, unlike
other commentators, an alternative way to understand his views.
The task of interpreting these passages has been made much easier by some
relatively recent developments in the secondary literature on Carnap. Carnap’s
systems of inductive logic can now be understood at a mathematical level far
more easily than has been the case in the past thanks to the work of the Manch-
ester school, which has presented the formal aspects of Carnapian inductive logic
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in a modern and succinct way. In contrast, Carnap’s own mathematical presen-
tation is idiosyncratic, with unusual symbols that are difficult to decipher for
the modern reader, and interspersed with philosophical commentary, increasing
the effort required to read either.
In addition, Carnap’s overall approach to philosophy has been greatly clarified
by the many recent efforts towards a reappraisal of his overall approach to
philosophy, which I mentioned at the start of chapter 1. A proper understanding
of Carnap’s overall approach was therefore not available to many of the authors
who criticised Carnapian inductive logic.
3.6.2 What next?
Let us now assess where we stand. This thesis aims to show that Carnapian
inductive logic merits reappraisal and begin the process of reappraising it, both
historically and substantively. The previous chapter construed Carnapian in-
ductive logic as a research programme, argued that it had many of the features
that Lakatos saw as indicating success and addressed some interpretative points.
This chapter claimed that the most influential critiques of Carnapian inductive
logic were unsuccessful.
A reader who agrees with these arguments will recognise that Carnapian induc-
tive logic has at least two attractive features: it succeeds according to Lakatos’s
criteria and survives its most prominent critiques. However, the reader might
wonder whether there are might be other rival research programmes that tackle
the same problems as Carnapian inductive logic more successfully, and whether
Carnapian inductive logic has any practical applications.
The next chapter begins to address the first of these queries, arguing that one
rival research programme, namely subjective Bayesian inductive logic, is less





If there were a rival research programme which is so much more successful than
Carnapian inductive logic as to render it redundant, then the case for substantive
reappraisal would be weakened. Carnapian inductive logic might be interesting
from a historical point of view, but would not have much to offer philosophers
interested in reviving it. On the other hand, if Carnapian inductive logic had
any pronounced advantages over its rivals, this would strengthen the case. In
order to find out whether to substantively reappraise Carnapian inductive logic,
we must therefore investigate how it compares with rival research programmes.
The next two chapters compare Carnapian inductive logic with two rival research
programmes—subjective and objective Bayesian inductive logic—arguing that
Carnapian inductive logic has advantages over both, thanks to its compara-
tively uncontentious philosophical presuppositions and methodological flexibil-
ity. Whereas both objective and subjective Bayesian inductive logic are com-
mitted to bold and somewhat dubious epistemological positions, Carnapian in-
ductive logic leaves most epistemological issues open. Similarly, both objective
and subjective Bayesian inductive logic stipulate that evidence should be repre-
sented in certain ways but not others, whereas Carnapian inductive logic makes
neither of these methodological prescriptions.
Subjective Bayesian inductive logic proposes to formalise inductive assumptions
in a way that is consistent with the tenets of subjective Bayesian epistemology.
In this chapter I introduce subjective Bayesian epistemology and argue that two
of its epistemological commitments are dubious, whereas Carnapian inductive
logic does not make any similarly contentious epistemological claims. I take
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these conclusions to demonstrate that Carnapian inductive logic is preferable to
subjective Bayesian inductive logic, at least as far as its philosophical presup-
positions are concerned.
I also consider which form of inductive logic is preferable from a methodological
point of view. Here the picture is more complicated. On the one hand, subjective
Bayesian inductive logic has the advantage of being comparatively simple. On
the other hand, Carnapian inductive logic has a wider range of applications and
is not limited to representing evidence using only the conditional probability
method. I argue that, on balance, these methodological considerations favour
Carnapian inductive logic.
I conclude that, due to its philosophical and methological advantages, Carnapian
inductive logic is preferable to subjective Bayesian inductive logic.
4.1.1 Inductive logic and epistemology
This chapter and the next discuss various connections between inductive logical
and epistemological research programmes. It will be useful to discuss the rela-
tionship between inductive logic and epistemology in general before looking at
specific cases.
Inductive logic and epistemology differ principally in the type of claim that
they aim to produce. Whereas epistemological research programmes aim to
produce claims about the nature of rational belief, inductive logical research
programmes aim to produce formal representations of inductive reasoning. The
two disciplines are very closely related, as work in the epistemology of partial
belief often relies on idealised formal representations of inductive reasoning,
while inductive logic often focuses on formalising the inductive assumptions of
rational agents. Nonetheless, it is possible in principle to do one without doing
the other: inductive logic need not concern questions of rationality, and rational
partial belief can be studied without the use of formal representations.
I do not wish to defend the view that any discipline that aims to formalise in-
ductive reasoning is an inductive logic. There are many different conceptions
of inductive logic, not all of which are so liberal. We have seen that Carnap’s
conception is extremely liberal, allowing that any system of semantic rules ac-
cording to which some claims about inductive reasoning follow from others can,
in principle, amount to an inductive logic. Colin Howson’s conception is more
restrictive, stipulating that genuine inductive logics must produce consistency
constraints for degrees of partial belief. According to Williamson’s conception,
as presented in Williamson (2013), inductive logic must specify entailment rela-
tionships with the form φX11 , . . . , φ
Xk
k |≈ ψY , where φ1, . . . , φk and ψ represent
propositions and X1, . . . , Xk and Y represent inductive qualities.
Despite the differences between these conceptions, in each case inductive logic
aims to produce formal representations of inductive reasoning, and the task of
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doing so is conceptually distinct from the epistemological task of describing the
nature of rationality. Carnap was clear that formalisation was the principal
aim of his research programme, and explains in Carnap (1971b) his view about
the relationship between inductive logic and claims about rationality, according
to which the two are distinct. Howson emphasises the same distinction in the
following passage:
A set of constraints determining consistency does not by itself
assume that anyone does or even can satisfy them in every instance.
To weaken them so that they are all humanly achievable is a mis-
guided enterprise, rather like weakening the deductive principle that
a contradiction implies everything to one stating merely that known
contradictions imply everything.
(Howson, 2000, p.151)
Howson thinks that the epistemological phenomenon of rationality must be hu-
manly achievable, whereas the inductive logical phenomenon of consistency need
not: the two must therefore be distinct.
Williamson’s conception stipulates that inductive logic must specify entailment
relationships that represent valid inductive inferences. Again, according to this
conception, inductive logic is in the business of producing formal representations
of inductive reasoning and not necessarily that of identifying which states of
partial belief are rational.
By way of comparison, both deductive logicians and epistemologists who study
the rationality of states of full belief are careful to distinguish these two enter-
prises. The task of investigating the nature of rational full belief is typically
considered part of epistemology, whereas the task of constructing formal rep-
resentations of deductive reasoning is considered part of logic. Just as in the
inductive case, these two tasks are closely, but not necessarily, related, and
remain distinct according to various conceptions of deductive logic.
4.1.2 Subjective Bayesian epistemology
Subjective Bayesian inductive logic stems from subjective Bayesian epistemol-
ogy, a prominent philosophical programme which makes claims about the con-
ditions under which an agent’s state of partial belief is rational.
The most important claims that subjective Bayesian epistemology makes are
called probabilistic necessity, probabilistic sufficiency and conditionalisation.
Probabilistic necessity and sufficiency assert that, in order for a state of partial
belief to be rational, it is respectively necessary and sufficient that it can be rep-
resented by a probability function. Conditionalisation asserts that, in response
to obtaining novel evidence, rational agents update their states of partial belief
using a certain method. Specifically, a rational agent whose pre-evidence state
of belief is represented by the probability function prinitial(•) should ensure that
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the probability function prnew(•) representing their post-evidence state of belief
is the conditional probability function prinitial(• | E), defined in the standard
way as set out in section 2.4.2 above, where E is a member of the domain of
prinitial that represents the evidence.
Perhaps the most famous subjective Bayesian was Bruno De Finetti. His posi-
tion with respect to probabilistic necessity and sufficiency can be seen from the
following quotation:
Our goal is, in essence, to characterise the set of formally admis-
sible opinions. We are not concerned with the possibility of there
being another criterion which would allow us to consider one opinion
to be more or less correct than another. Those criteria would in fact
go beyond the purely logical aspect of the problem which can, and
should, be tackled only by mathematics.
As a consequence, a strict separation of two moments appears
to be necessary: the characterisation of non-incoherent opinions,
the formal moment which must be dealt with mathematically; the
choice of one among those possible opinions which must be left to
practice, common sense and the judgement of the individual.
The only difference between those who subscribe to the subjec-
tive point of view and those who subscribe to the objective one is
the following: whereas subjectivists consider such a practical choice
to be free and arbitrary, objectivists think that it can be made cor-
rectly in exactly one way.
(De Finetti, 1931, p.299)1
De Finetti thought that non-probabilistic states of partial belief, which he calls
‘opinions’, are ‘formally inadmissible’: they are ruled out by formal rationality
conditions. Choices between states of partial belief that are not so ruled out, on
the other hand, cannot be guided by principles but only by “free and arbitrary”
choices guided by informal common sense and judgement. In other words, rep-
resentability by a probability function is necessary and sufficient for a state of
partial belief to be rational.
Subjective Bayesian epistemology continues to be debated in the formal episte-
mological literature, and has been championed in various different forms. See
Joyce (2011) for an overview.
Howson’s subjective Bayesianism
Colin Howson is a prominent contemporary commentator on subjective Bay-
sesian epistemology, and, I shall now claim, is best thought of as a defender of
it.
1Translation very kindly provided by Hykel Hosni, to whom I am also grateful for bringing
the passage to my attention.
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Howson sometimes writes that, whereas the probability axioms are, in his view,
“laws of consistency”, they do not describe “rationality”. For example, at (How-
son, 2003, p. 154), he claims that it is “misguided” and a “misidentification” to
think of the probability axioms as providing a “model of rational belief”, and
that the “standard Bayesian model” does not provide a “plausible theory of
rationality”. In Howson (2000), he takes a more guarded but similar position,
giving the impression that rationality is not his main focus:
I have scrupulously avoided discussing scientific rationality, partly
because it is a highly contested area, but mainly because this is a
book about logic, not about rationality.
(Howson, 2000, p.239)
It might be thought, given these remarks about rationality, that Howson is
not committed to subjective Bayesian epistemology. Nonetheless, I believe
that Howson is best viewed as a subjective Bayesian epistemologist, albeit a
somewhat atypical one. This is because Howson appeals to another concept—
‘fairness’—which is functionally very similar to the epistemological concept of
‘rationality’, at least as far as it appears in the literature on subjective Bayesian
epistemology.
The main claim of Howson (2003) is that the probability axioms are fairness
constraints for ‘betting quotients’, which he regards as suitable measures of
degrees of partial belief:
How should one measure degrees of belief? The Bayesian liter-
ature contains a number of suggestions. It would take too long to
review all of them here. What I shall do is take one, and show how
the probability axioms emerge as the appropriate constraints. The
measure I will consider is the individuals fair odds, or to be more
precise, their fair betting quotient.
(Howson, 2003, p. 159, emphasis added)
Howson therefore sees the probability axioms as connected with states of partial
belief, via betting quotients. Moreover, it is a consequence of his approach that
representability by a probability function is necessary and sufficient for a state
of partial belief to be measured by a fair betting quotient. Just as subjective
Bayesian epistemologists see representability by a probability function as neces-
sary and sufficient for a state of partial belief to be rational, Howson sees it as
necessary and sufficient for a measure of partial belief to be fair. Howson also
endorses a fairness-based form of conditionalisation: see (Howson, 2003, § 5).
Howson is even comfortable with evaluating reasoning according to whether or
not it is probabilistic. In Howson (2000), he claims many times that the prob-
ability axioms provide standards of “sound” or “correct” reasoning. Fairness
therefore plays a very similar role within Howson’s set-up to that of rationality
within subjective Bayesian epistemology.
Howson’s objection to the term ‘rational’ seems not to stem from a conviction
that the probability axioms are inappropriate standards for states of partial
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belief, but rather from a specific view about rationality, compared to other
standards. Howson clearly believes that rationality, unlike measurability by a
fair betting quotient, should be achievable by real agents. Since, in his view,
representability by a probability function is unachievable, Howson concludes
that the probability axioms provide standards of fairness, but not of rationality.
In order to do full justice to Howson’s views, it would perhaps be best to cate-
gorise him as a fairness theorist rather than a subjective Bayesian epistemologist,
while addressing in detail the questions of whether rationality and fairness really
should be achievable by human agents. However, given the similarity between
subjective Bayesian standards for evaluating states of partial belief and How-
son’s, it seems best for our purposes to classify him as a subjective Bayesian
epistemologist while generally being careful not to assume that rationality must
be achievable when discussing his work. The notion of ‘rationality’ discussed
below should therefore be read as broad enough to capture what Howson means
by ‘fairness’.
4.1.3 Subjective Bayesian inductive logic
Subjective Bayesian inductive logic is a research programme that aims to pro-
duce a framework for formalising the inductive assumptions that might be made
by agents who are rational according to subjective Bayesian epistemology. It is
distinct from subjective Bayesian epistemology in that it aims to produce formal
models of inductive reasoning, rather than claims about the nature of rational
partial belief. However, since it aims only to formalise the inductive reasoning
of agents that subjective Bayesian epistemology would deem rational, it inherits
the commitments of its epistemological counterpart.
Since subjective Bayesian inductive logic is committed to probabilistic neces-
sity and sufficiency, it considers only probabilistic systems of inductive logic
to be suitable as formal models of inductive reasoning. In addition, subjective
Bayesian inductive logic follows subjective Bayesian epistemology’s commitment
to conditionalisation by stipulating that evidence should be represented using
the ‘conditional probability method’. According to this method, any possible
evidence must be represented by a member of the domain of a probability func-
tion, and the effect of taking into account evidence represented by the domain-
member E must be represented by differences between a pre-evidence probability
function prinitial(•) and a post-evidence function prnew(•) = prinitial(• | E).
Subjective Bayesian inductive logic has been defended by Colin Howson in a
series of published works, including Howson (1997b), Howson (1997a), Howson
(2000), Howson (2001), Howson (2003), Howson (2009) and Howson (2012).
Howson argues that subjective Bayesian inductive logic began with the work of
Ramsey, citing passages such as the following:
‘We find, therefore, that a precise account of the nature of partial
belief reveals that the laws of probability are laws of consistency, an
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extension to partial beliefs of formal logic, the logic of consistency.’
(Ramsey, 1931, p.182)
Romeijn expresses a similar point of view to Howson’s in Romeijn (2005) and
Romeijn (2011).
Subjective Bayesian inductive logic is similar to Carnapian inductive logic in
that it represents inductive assumptions using axiomatically defined sets of
measure functions with domains that are interpreted as representing possible
objects of belief; that is, using systems of inductive logic. However, subjective
Bayesian inductive logic is more restrictive than Carnapian inductive logic in
several important ways.
1. Focus on rational assumptions First, it restricts itself to the task of
formalising the inductive assumptions that might be made by rational
agents, rather than addressing the problem of formalising inductive as-
sumptions in general like Carnapian inductive logic.
2. Special status of probability axioms Second, whereas, according to
Carnapian inductive logic, there is no distinction in principle between the
probability axioms and any other formal axioms for measure functions,
subjective Bayesian inductive logic endows the probability axioms with a
special epistemological status.
3. The conditional probability method Finally, subjective Bayesian in-
ductive logic is committed to representing evidence using the conditional
probability method, rather than any other method. Carnapian induc-
tive logic makes no such commitment, as can be seen, for example, from
Carnap’s remarks on imposing axioms based on informal evidential as-
sessments at (Carnap, 1971a, p.120), and from his consideration of an
alternative to the conditional probability method in Carnap (1967b).
In what follows I focus on the second of these differences between subjective
Bayesian and Carnapian inductive logic, arguing that probabilistic necessity and
sufficiency are epistemologically dubious. The main message of this chapter is
therefore that subjective Bayesian inductive logic is epistemologically dubious. I
believe that this issue shows decisively that Carnapian inductive logic is prefer-
able. However, the other differences also weigh in favour of Carnapian inductive
logic. In the case of the first difference, it seems arbitrary to limit inductive logic
to representing assumptions that rational agents might entertain: a fully com-
prehensive inductive logic should surely go further. As for subjective Bayesian
inductive logic’s commitment to the conditional probability method of repre-
senting evidence, I argue below that it is methodologically dubious, though not
at the same length as in the case of probabilistic necessity and sufficiency. The
reader should therefore bear in mind that the epistemological problems high-
lighted below are not the only disadvantages of subjective Bayesian inductive
logic.
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Some terminology
In what follows I use the word ‘probabilistic’ as part of several artificial terms.
Given an inductive logical domain D, the symbol PD stands for the set of
probability functions on D. Where the domain is clear from the context I shall
sometimes simply use the symbol P. The axioms determining this set shall
sometimes be called “probabilism”.
I label as ‘super-probabilistic’ any collection of axioms that is strictly more re-
strictive than probabilism. In other words, given a domainD, super-probabilistic
axioms determine sets of measure functions that are proper subsets of PD.
Conversely, ‘sub-probabilistic’ sets of axioms are strictly less restrictive than
probabilism; they determine sets of measure functions of which PD is a proper
subset.
I call a system of inductive logic (D,M) ‘probabilistic’ ifM = PD, ‘superprob-
abilistic’ if M⊂ PD and ‘sub-probabilistic’ if M⊃ PD.
A state of belief is ‘probabilistic’ if it can be represented by a measure function
of a probabilistic system of inductive logic.
4.2 Probabilistic necessity
This section evaluates subjective Bayesian inductive logic’s commitment to
probabilistic necessity. I argue that it has not yet been established that ev-
ery possible rational state of partial belief can be represented by a probability
function: probabilistic necessity is therefore a dubious commitment.
I consider three kinds of argument for probabilistic necessity. Betting argu-
ments seek to show that the owners of non-probabilistic states of belief behave
unwisely in a certain scenario. Axiomatic arguments seek to show that, if a
state of belief cannot be represented by a probability function, then it neces-
sarily violates a formal axiom that all rational states of partial belief ought to
satisfy. Accuracy arguments claim that all non-probabilistic states of belief are
unnecessarily inaccurate.
In their currently available forms, I argue, none of these kinds of argument
establishes probabilistic necessity. Each kind of argument has unique problems.
Betting arguments suffer from scenario-relativity and the packaging objection;
currently available axiomatic arguments impose implausibly strict requirements
on rational states of belief; accuracy arguments make unwarranted claims about
the nature of inaccuracy. In addition, the arguments share several questionable
assumptions and are similar in various respects: as a result they do not combine
into a collectively compelling argument for probabilistic necessity.
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4.2.1 Betting arguments
Betting arguments for probabilistic necessity seek to establish the irrationality
of all non-probabilistic states of belief by exploiting a postulated link between
states of belief and betting behaviour.
Every betting argument appeals to a hypothetical betting scenario which is
supposed to makes this link apparent. In the scenario, it is claimed, agents with
non-probabilistic states of belief have dispositions to make unwise bets. Such
dispositions are taken to indicate irrationality.
The classic Dutch book argument proceeds as follows. First it is supposed that
an agent’s beliefs concern the set of sentences SLprop of a propositional language
Lprop, and that the true state of the world is described by a valuation function
v : SLprop → {0, 1} that assigns the value 1 to true sentences and 0 to false
ones. Valuation functions must agree with the rules of classical propositional
logic, so that, for example, if v(θ) = 1 and v(φ) = 1, then v(θ ∧ φ) = 1.2
Second, a scenario—the ‘classic Dutch book scenario’—is envisaged where, given
a set of sentences B = {θ1, . . . θn} ⊆ SLprop, the agent is forced to select a
‘betting’ function bet : B → R, upon which choice an adversarial being will
choose a ‘stake’ function s : B → R and present the agent with an outcome, for
every sentence θ ∈ B, with value to the agent of s(θ)(v(θ)− bet(θ)).
The classic Dutch book scenario is motivated by the idea that, for each sentence
θ, the number bet(θ) represents odds at which the agent is prepared to accept
either side of a bet on whether or not θ is true, with an arbitrary positive stake.
The size of the stake is determined by s(θ)’s absolute value, while this quantity’s
sign indicates which side of the bet the agent takes. Thus the agent’s behaviour
in the classic scenario arguably reflects how they are generally disposed to bet
on the relevant sentences.
In order to connect behaviour in the classic Dutch book scenario with irrational-
ity, a technical term—‘bookability’—is defined. A betting function is ‘bookable’
if and only if there is a set of sentences B? = {θ1, . . . θn} ⊆ B and a stake
function s? such that
∑n
i=1 s
?(θi)(v(θi) − bet(θi)) is negative for all possible
valuation functions.
It is claimed that, if an agent chooses a bookable betting function in the classic
Dutch book scenario, then they must have a pathological betting disposition.
Such betting functions, it is argued, represent a willingness to accept combina-
tions of bets that lose no matter what the true state of the world is.
Furthermore, it is supposed that such a pathological betting disposition indi-
cates an irrational state of belief.
2Equivalently, the targets of belief could be supposed to be the members, or ‘propositions’,
of a boolean algebra generated by an underlying state space, with the true state of the world
represented by one member of the state space. I prefer to use logical terminology in order to
emphasise common ground with the rest of my discussion.
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Finally, betting functions are shown to be non-bookable in the classic Dutch
book scenario if and only if they are probability functions. See Kemeny (1955)
for a proof of the full biconditional. This is taken to show that agents whose
states of belief cannot be represented by probability functions are irrational.
Objections to the classic Dutch book argument
This summary should have made clear that the classic Dutch book argument in-
volves many potentially questionable assumptions. Every time one thing is taken
to indicate another there is room to doubt the inevitability of the postulated
link. Thus it is possible to doubt the links that the classic Dutch book argu-
ment postulates between having a non-probabilistic state of belief and choosing
a non-probabilistic betting function, the link between choosing a bookable bet-
ting function and having a pathological betting disposition and the link between
having a pathological betting disposition and having an irrational state of belief.
Below I focus on two objections to the link between choosing a bookable betting
function in the classic Dutch book scenario and having a pathological betting
disposition. According to these objections, it is sometimes possible for some-
one with a non-pathological betting disposition to choose a bookable betting
function in the classic Dutch book scenario.
This kind of objection to the classic Dutch book argument is attractive, com-
pared to other potential objections, because it involves fairly weak argumenta-
tive commitments. It is compatible with the view that bookability in the classic
Dutch book argument is a useful proxy for irrationality in the vast majority
of cases, and that irrationality always manifests itself as pathological betting
behaviour of some kind. All that is required for the objection to succeed is that,
in some cases, bookability in the classic Dutch book scenario can occur at the
same time as a sensible, non-pathological, betting disposition.
The first objection compares the classic Dutch book scenario with another—the
‘intuitionistic Dutch book scenario’—which is plausibly a more reliable guide to
betting dispositions, yet does not yield probabilism as a rationality constraint.
The second asserts that the link between bookability and pathologicality fails in
cases where agents aggregate the values of combinations of bets by other means
than addition.
I argue that both objections are successful and that, as a result, the classic
Dutch book argument does not establish probabilistic necessity.
The intuitionistic Dutch book argument
There are other means that could be used to evaluate an agent’s betting dispo-
sition, which yield results that conflict with the classic Dutch book argument.
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For example, the Czech book argument, which features in Ha´jek (2008), seem-
ingly shows that agents in a certain alternative scenario should choose a non-
probabilistic betting function for exactly the same reason that an agent in the
classic Dutch book scenario should choose a probabilistic one.
The question therefore arises as to why choice of a non-probabilistic betting
function indicates a pathological betting disposition in the classic Dutch book
scenario but not in alternative scenarios like the Czech Book scenario.
The natural response to this objection asserts that the classic Dutch book sce-
nario is special because it corresponds to the kind of situations that occur in
everyday life when people find themselves obliged to make decisions in the face
of uncertainty. In the same way as situations that occur in sporting events
arguably elicit athletes’ true characters, despite being highly artificial, this re-
sponse claims, the classic Dutch book scenario reveals agents’ true betting dis-
positions. If it is the best scenario for this kind of elicitation, then this explains
why the classic Dutch book scenario is special.
However, as I shall now argue, there is another scenario—the intuitionistic Dutch
book scenario—which is even better than the classic Dutch book scenario at
eliciting agents’ betting dispositions, but conflicts with its conclusion.
The intuitionistic Dutch book scenario
The intuitionistic Dutch book scenario, set out at (Weatherson, 2003, §4), is
very similar to the classic Dutch book scenario, but does not render all agents
with non-probabilistic betting functions pathological. In this section I explain
the intuitionistic Dutch book scenario, and argue that, in cases where the clas-
sic and intuitionistic Dutch book scenarios disagree, the latter elicits betting
dispositions more reliably.
Like the classic Dutch book scenario, the intuitionistic Dutch book scenario en-
visages an agent whose beliefs concern the sentences of a propositional language.
However, the intuitionistic scenario differs from the classic Dutch book scenario
in the nature of its valuation functions, and in the way in which bets are settled.
Intuitionistic valuation functions, which I shall refer to with the symbol vint,
are identical to the valuation functions that appear in the classic Dutch book
scenario apart from the following characteristics. Instead of being two-valued
functions with the range {0, 1}, as in the classic Dutch book scenario, valuation
functions in the intuitionistic Dutch book scenario have the range {0, 12 , 1}.
Intuitionistic valuation functions assign the number 1 to sentences whose truth
is revealed after a certain amount of time, 0 to sentences whose falsity is revealed
and 12 to all other sentences.
3 Instead of agreeing with the rules of classical logic,
3This account simplifies the standard account of intuitionistic semantics. In general, the
range of an intuitionistic valuation function can be any Heyting algebra, allowing finer-grained
distinctions between different un-decidable sentences: see (Palmgren, 2009, §2) for details. I
restrict my attention to valuation functions with the range {0, 1
2
, 1}, as this is the simplest
Heyting algebra that is not a Boolean algebra. The relevant points about the intuitionistic
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intuitionistic valuation functions must agree with the rules of intuitionistic logic
in order to be admissible.
Bets in the intuitionistic Dutch book scenario are settled as follows. Just as
in the classic Dutch book scenario, a set B ⊆ SLprop is unveiled, the agent
chooses a betting function bet : B → R and a malevolent being chooses a stake
function s : B → R. For any sentence θ, betting function bet and stake function
s, if vint(θ) ∈ {0, 1}, then the value val(bet, s, vint, θ) of the agent’s outcome is
s(θ)(vint(θ) − bet(θ)), just as in the classic case. If vint(θ) = 12 , then the value
of the agent’s outcome is s(θ)(0− bet(θ)). In other words, if a sentence’s truth
is never revealed then the agent receives the same outcome as they would have
received had it been revealed to be false.
Bookability in the intuitionistic Dutch book scenario is determined in essentially
the same way as in the classic scenario. An agent with betting function bet is
bookable in the intuitionistic scenario if and only if there is a set of sentences
B? ⊆ B and a stake function s? such that ∑θ∈B? val(bet, s?, vint, theta) is less
than zero for all possible intuitionistic valuation functions.
Weatherson proves that betting functions are un-bookable in the intuitionistic
Dutch book scenario if and only if they can be extended into what he calls
‘intuitionistic’ probability functions, that is, measure functions satisfying the
following collection of axioms:
Intuitionistic probability axioms (propositional domains): IPprop
Let `Int represent the intuitionistic consequence relation. For any sen-
tences θ and φ ∈ SLprop, m : SLprop → R must be such that:
IP0 If θ `Int φ for all φ ∈ SLprop, then m(θ) = 0
IP1 If > `Int θ, then m(θ) = 1
IP2 If θ `Int φ, then m(θ) ≤ m(φ)
IP3 m(θ) +m(φ) = m(θ ∨ φ) +m(θ ∧ φ)
Relevance to the classic Dutch book argument’s plausibility
Two key features of the intuitionistic Dutch book argument make it relevant
to the classic Dutch book argument’s plausibility. First, not all intuitionistic
probability functions are classical probability functions - as a result, a betting
function can be bookable in the classic Dutch book scenario but un-bookable in
the intuitionistic scenario. Second, the intuitionistic scenario is a more realistic
tool for eliciting betting dispositions than the classic Dutch book scenario.
The first feature can be demonstrated as follows. First note that substituting
the classical consequence relation `Cl for the intuitionistic one `Int in IPprop
makes these axioms equivalent to probabilism. This is shown at (Weatherson,
2003, p.2). Next, consider that, whenever a sentence intuitionistically entails
scenario are already apparent in this simple case and extend to more complicated ones.
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another, it also classically entails it, but that the converse relationship does not
hold. For example, > entails (θ ∨ ¬θ) classically but not intuitionistically.
As a result, for each of the conditions in IP0 − IP2 there are cases where the
antecedent is satisfied on the classical interpretation of the consequence relation
but not on the intuitionistic interpretation. In these cases, classical probabil-
ity functions have to conform to restrictions that do not apply to intuitionistic
probability functions. The reverse is never the case, and IP3 applies to both
interpretations equally. The requirement to be a classical probability function
is therefore more restrictive than the requirement to be an intuitionistic proba-
bility function.
As a result of this fact, it is possible that a betting function bet is an intuitionistic
probability function but not a classical probability function. In this case, bet
would be bookable in the classic dutch book scenario but not in the intuitionistic
Dutch book scenario.
The intuitionistic Dutch book argument’s superiority as a means for eliciting
betting dispositions is shown by an argument in Harman (1983). When people
make bets in real life, they often face the possibility that the truth or falsity
of the propositions they bet on will not be revealed in time for the bet to be
settled. For example, when betting on whether or not a certain government
minister called a policeman a ‘pleb’ during an altercation, I must take into
account the fact that, whatever the truth or falsity or this proposition, it may
never be possible to settle a bet on the matter. The key question is not the
proposition’s truth, but whether or not it has been revealed to be true. Harman
argues that this kind of situation is typical of real-life betting.
The intuitionistic Dutch book scenario accommodates this possibility without
difficulty because, as we saw above, intuitionistic valuation functions vint :
B → {0, 12 , 1} can naturally be interpreted as representing whether a proposi-
tion’s truth has been revealed. On the other hand, classical valuation functions
v : SLprop → {0, 1} cannot easily be interpreted in this way: consequently the
classic Dutch book scenario must stipulate that the truth or falsity of all propo-
sitions is revealed before prizes are allocated. This unrealistic stipulation makes
the classic Dutch book scenario a less reliable guide to betting dispositions than
the intuitionistic Dutch book scenario.
Since the intuitionistic Dutch book scenario is a more realistic guide to betting
dispositions than the classic Dutch book scenario, its bookability constraints
must be better indicators of irrationality than those of the classic scenario.
However, the intuitionistic Dutch book argument is not restrictive enough to
ensure that all non-classically-probabilistic betting functions are bookable. Mak-
ing the classic Dutch book argument more realistic therefore seems to turn it
from an argument for probabilistic necessity to an argument against it. This
fact undermines betting arguments for probabilistic necessity.
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The packaging objection
A second objection to betting arguments for probabilistic necessity—the ‘pack-
aging objection’—asserts that the classic Dutch book argument’s definition of
bookability does not reflect betting in real life.
According to the classic Dutch book argument’s definition, a betting function
is bookable if there is a set of sentences and a stake function such that the
sum of the values of the sentences’ associated outcomes is negative, whatever
the true valuation function. The choice of a bookable betting function is taken
to indicate a pathological betting disposition, because it seemingly represents
willingness to accept a combination of bets that has a negative aggregate value
in all circumstances.
However, this line of reasoning tacitly assumes that, at least in cases relevant
to the classic Dutch book argument, the aggregate value of a combinations of
bet-outcomes is found by adding together the values of the individual outcomes.
The assumption that the aggregate value of a combination or ‘package’ of bet-
outcomes can always be found in this way, known as the ‘package principle’, is
what the packaging objection contests.
Schick argues at (Schick, 1986, p.114) that the package principle amounts to
an assumption of ‘value-wise independence’, according to which the impact of
adding a new outcome to a combination is the same, as far as the value of the
new combination is concerned, whatever the nature of the initial combination.
Schick claims that value-wise independence typically does not obtain in real-life
betting situations: adding a new outcome often has a different effect depeding
on the nature of the initial package.
The following example illustrates Schick’s point: a mildly bad bet outcome—say,
losing one pound out of a budget of fifty—might seem relatively innocuous when
considered individually. However, if it were part of a potential combination of
bet-outcomes that would leave one’s overall wealth below a certain threshold,
such as the cost of a bus ride home from the bookmaker’s shop, the value of the
outcome might seem different.
Similarly, if one needs to gain a certain amount of money, for example to pay a
ransom, one might take a bet in combination with other bets that would seem
imprudent in isolation. If a bet’s outcomes are not monetary, then value-wise
independence becomes even harder to achieve: for example, the prospect of
winning a sausage will surely add more value to a package of bets that may
result in the acquisition of potatoes than it will to a package involving lemons.
Schick’s objection demonstrates that the package principle does not always ob-
tain in real-life betting situations. As a result, it is not always safe to assume
that an agent’s choice of a bookable betting function in the classic Dutch book
scenario shows that, in the real world, they are willing to accept a combination of
bets that has negative aggregate value, whatever the state of the world. It could
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be that some agents who choose bookable betting functions do not have patho-
logical betting dispositions, but merely aggregate the values of bet-outcomes
using means other than summation.
The classic Dutch book argument could perhaps be saved from the packaging
objection by imposing value-wise independence on the Dutch book scenario
by stipulation. This response requires a corresponding restriction of the Dutch
book argument’s scope: instead of throwing light on agents’ betting dispositions
in general, the classic Dutch book scenario must be taken as showing nothing
beyond their dispositions to bet in situations where value-wise independence
obtains.
However, there are very few real life betting situations where value-wise inde-
pendence obtains. Real bettors typically have limited budgets, and are there-
fore potentially susceptible to avoiding bets when they are part of potentially-
bankrupting packages. On the other hand, in situations like the ransom case
above, it can also be sensible to avoid a bet on the grounds that the package
it appears in is too small. Such situations are plausibly fairly common: for
example, one might not be inclined to make any bets at all unless a package of
bets is available with the potential to produce enough money to outweigh the
cost in time and effort of going to a bookmaker’s shop.
Since value-dependence is so ubiquitous in real-life betting situations, imposing
value-independence on the Dutch book scenario seems to make it unrealistic
and is therefore not a viable response.
Conclusion
The intutionistic Dutch book objection and the packaging objection show that
betting arguments cannot currently establish probabilistic necessity. Both ob-
jections show that agents who choose bookable betting functions in the classic
Dutch book scenario do not necessarily have pathological betting dispositions.
Consequently, betting arguments cannot show that all non-probabilistic states
of belief are irrational.
4.2.2 Cox’s axiomatic argument
Axiomatic arguments aim to identify collections of requirements that, it is
claimed, measure functions must satisfy in order to represent rational states
of partial belief. They aim to demonstrate that all such measure functions are
probability functions.
Together with preliminary assumptions guaranteeing that all rational states of
partial belief can be represented by measure functions, axiomatic arguments can
be used to argue for probabilistic necessity.
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The most famous axiomatic argument is Cox’s, found in Cox (1947), which I
focus on below. I reproduce Cox’s argument in a somewhat modified form which
I hope will be more easily understood than Cox’s in the context of the preceding
discussion.
I argue that Cox’s argument is unsuccessful because some of its requirements
are not genuine rationality constraints.
Cox’s argument
Preliminary assumptions
Like the classic Dutch book argument, Cox’s argument imposes a preliminary
‘classicality’ requirement on rational partial beliefs, though it is slightly different
in this case. In order to satisfy Cox’s preliminary requirement, a state of partial
belief must concern the sentences SL∞prop of a propositional language L
∞
prop with
infinitely many propositional variables. In addition, a classically admissible
valuation function v : SL∞prop → {0, 1} must identify which of the sentences in
SL∞prop are true and false.
A second preliminary assumption of Cox’s argument is that every state of belief
is representable by a ‘belief function’ with the form b : SL∞prop → [0, 1]. ‘Condi-
tional’ belief functions are defined in the usual way, so that bcond(θ | ψ) = b(θ∧ψ)b(ψ)
if b(ψ) 6= 0 and are undefined otherwise. This assumption implies that ratio-
nal states of partial belief must be ‘sharp’, that is, representable by single real
numbers. This rules out alternative approaches which might use other mathe-
matical objects to represent rational partial belief, such as pairs of real numbers
or intervals.
Axioms
Having made these two preliminary assumptions, which ensure that rational
states of belief can be represented by belief functions, Cox’s argument imposes
additional rationality requirements in the form of axioms for belief functions.
It is not clear that the axioms in Cox’s original presentation are sufficient to
prove the mathematical result that underpins his argument: see Halpern (1999a)
for details on this point. I therefore present below the less controversial axioms
from (Paris, 1994, p.24), which do not suffer from this problem.
Cox’s axioms
For all sentences θ, ψ, φ ∈ SL∞prop, if b : SL∞prop → [0, 1] represents a
rational state of belief, then:
C1 If  θ ⇐⇒ θ′ and  ψ ⇐⇒ ψ′, then bcond(θ | ψ) = bcond(θ′ |
ψ′).
C2 If  ψ =⇒ θ, then bcond(θ | ψ) = 1 and bcond(¬θ | ψ) = 0.
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C3 There exists a continuous function F : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1]
which is strictly increasing on (0, 1]×(0, 1] and such that bcond(θ∧
φ | ψ) = F (bcond(θ | φ ∧ ψ), bcond(φ | ψ)).
C4 There exists a decreasing function S : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that
bcond(¬θ | ψ) = S (bcond (θ | ψ)).
C5 For any real numbers  > 0 and 0 ≤ α, β, γ ≤ 1 there are
sentences θ1, θ2, θ3 and θ4 such that:
• It is not the case that  ¬(θ1 ∧ θ2 ∧ θ3)
• | bcond(θ4 | θ1 ∧ θ2 ∧ θ3)− α |< .
• | bcond(θ3 | θ1 ∧ θ2)− β |< .
• | bcond(θ2 | θ1)− γ |< .
C1 and C2 impose restrictions on conditional belief functions based on deductive
logic, forcing them to behave as expected in cases of logical equivalence and
implication.
C3 and C4 impose functional relationships on conditional belief functions based
on intuitions about rational conditional belief in conjunctions and negations
respectively.
C3 requires that belief in any conjunction θ∧φ, conditional on any other sentence
ψ, is determined by the pair (b(θ | φ∧ψ), b(φ | ψ)) consisting of the conditional
belief in θ given φ ∧ ψ and the conditional belief in φ given ψ. In addition, the
function F expressing this dependence must be continuous and, provided that
both of these quantities are positive, strictly increasing.
Similarly, according to C4, belief in any negation ¬θ, conditional on any sen-
tence ψ, is determined by the value of b(θ | ψ), and the function S expressing
this dependence must be decreasing, though it need not be continuous. This
requirement ensures that, the more ψ increases θ’s credibility, the more it de-
creases the credibility of ¬θ, and is motivated by the intuition that rational
beliefs in negations behave in this way.
C5 requires that, given any three ‘target’ numbers α, β and γ between zero and
one and any rational belief function bcond, it is possible to choose sentences θ1,
θ2, θ3 and θ4 in such a way that the specified conditional beliefs take values
that are arbitrarily close to their targets.
Cox’s theorem
The centrepiece of Cox’s argument is Cox’s theorem.
Cox’s Theorem For any belief function b : SL∞prop → [0, 1] that
satisfies C1-C5, there is a continuous, strictly increasing, surjective
function g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that g ◦ b : SL∞prop → [0, 1] is a
probability function and g ◦ b(θ ∧ ψ) = g ◦ b(θ | ψ)× g ◦ b(ψ).
110 CHAPTER 4. SUBJECTIVE BAYESIAN INDUCTIVE LOGIC
This result is proved at (Paris, 1994, p.25-32).
Cox’s theorem shows that any state of belief satisfying classicality, sharpness
and C1-C5 can be represented by a belief function that is also a probability
function. Consequently, if all of these requirements were genuine rationality
constraints, then Cox’s argument would underpin a sound epistemological argu-
ment for probabilistic necessity. However, as I shall now argue, this is not the
case.
Criticism of Cox’s requirements
Colyvan (2004) argues that the preliminary classicality requirement is unwar-
ranted because it forces belief functions to conform to the law of excluded mid-
dle, which he argues does not always apply. In many situations, he claims, it
is unsafe to assume that every proposition either is or is not true. Such danger
may arise in connection with fictional discourse, vague properties and un-proved
mathematical conjectures.
According to the sharpness requirement, rational states of partial belief should
be represented by real-valued functions. Cox’s argument therefore has to assume
a difficult position regarding phenomena that are difficult for such functions to
represent, such as higher-order uncertainty and beliefs with degrees that are
impossible in principle to compare. It must either assert that these phenomena
can safely be disregarded by formal rationality principles, or else that they can
be represented in a sharp framework despite the apparent difficulty. See Dubois
et al. (1996) for a discussion of why both of these positions are unappealing.
C1 and C2 are implausible in the absence of logical omniscience, as, in order
to be sure that their belief function does not contravene these requirements, an
agent would need to know all of the logical equivalences and implications of the
language relevant to their beliefs.
Cox’s argument shares these problematic assumptions with other arguments for
probabilistic necessity: I discuss logical omniscience, sharpness and classicality
below in section 4.2.4. Specific objections to Cox’s argument arise in connection
with axioms C3 and C5.
Against C3 it can be objected that the dependence this axiom requires is
incorrect—that some values of bcond(θ ∧ φ | ψ) should not be determined by
bcond(θ | φ ∧ ψ) and bcond(φ | ψ)—or that the function expressing the depen-
dence should either be non-continuous or not strictly increasing. (Van Horn,
2003, §9) contains a discussion of the first point, arguing that independent in-
fluence by bcond(θ | ψ) or bcond(φ | θ ∧ ψ), or both of these quantities, should
not necessarily be ruled out on pain of irrationality.
The continuity of the function F is difficult to motivate on strictly epistemo-
logical grounds. It is not clear why it should be irrational for small changes
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in bcond(θ | φ ∧ ψ) and bcond(φ | ψ) to be associated with large changes in
bcond(θ ∧ φ | ψ).
Finally, axiom C5 is also problematic. As observed at (Halpern, 1999a, p.69),
C5 entails that all rational belief functions’ ranges are dense subsets of [0, 1].
This is an undesirable property in itself, as it imposes irrationality on all be-
lievers whose degrees of belief are not boundlessly fine-grained. It is not clear
that real states of partial beief are capable of such discernment. Whether or
not it is plausible for real agents to be able to make arbitrarily fine-grained
distinctions in their degrees of belief, this ability does not seem intuitively to be
connected with rationality. Since any agent’s fine-grainedness can only feasibly
be measured so as to fix it within a given range, it will be impossible to deter-
mine whether any agent’s beliefs are sufficiently fine-grained enough for them
to satisfy this requirement. In addition, Halpern points out that C5 prevents
Cox’s theorem from applying to belief functions with finite domains. Again, it
does not seem like whether or not an agent is rational should depends on how
many propositions they are able to form beliefs about.
Conclusion
Cox’s axioms C3 and C5 are not convincing epistemologically. For this rea-
son, Cox’s axiomatic argument does not provide convincing grounds on which
to believe in probabilistic necessity. However, these axioms may be convincing
methodologically, as approximations of rationality constraints that are ‘good
enough’ for practical purposes. Van Horn (2003) offers this kind of methodolog-
ical defences of C3 (§9) and C5 (§7), while (Halpern, 1999b, p.434) presents a
version of Cox’s argument where C5 is altered to allow belief functions to have
finite domains. Halpern acknowledges that this modification involves sacrific-
ing some epistemological plausibility, but defends his move on methodological
grounds.
4.2.3 Accuracy arguments
Like axiomatic arguments, accuracy arguments consist of putative requirements
of rational states of belief, namely that they be sharp, classical, respect logical
equivalence and, most importantly, obey some decision-theoretic norm involv-
ing accuracy. However, accuracy arguments differ from axiomatic arguments
because they also make descriptive claims about the nature of inaccuracy. Ac-
curacy arguments are exemplified by Joyce (1998), Joyce (2009) and Leitgeb
and Pettigrew (2010). Predd et al. (2009) contains a mathematical argument
that can be used as the basis for an accuracy argument, though the authors do
not explicitly endorse this approach.
Below I discuss accuracy arguments’ preliminary claims, before focusing on some
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specific claims about the nature of inaccuracy. I conclude that currently avail-
able accuracy arguments are open to objections at both levels.
Preliminary claims
Accuracy arguments make preliminary claims about states of belief, inaccuracy
and rationality, which are meant to be relatively uncontroversial, setting the
scene for more controversial subsequent claims about inaccuracy. I shall now
discuss some of these.
States of belief
Like Cox’s axiomatic argument, accuracy arguments begin with preliminary
assumptions which ensure that states of belief that need to be evaluated for
their accuracy can be represented by real-valued functions on an appropriate
domain. These differ slightly from Cox’s preliminary assumptions: whereas
Cox’s axioms jointly ensure that belief functions’ domains are infinite, accuracy
arguments typically assume that belief functions’ domains are finite.
‘Classicality’ stipulates that states of belief concern the sentences SLprop of a
propositional language Lprop with finitely many propositional variablesA1, . . . , An
and that the true state of the world is described by a classically admissible valu-
ation function v : SLprop → {0, 1}. I label the set of all such valuation functions
V.
‘Sharpness’ forces states of belief to be representable by real-valued belief func-
tions b : SLprop → R≥0.
‘Respect for logical equivalence’ forces belief functions to assign the same value
to all logically equivalent sentences. For any sentences θ and φ, if θ ⇐⇒ φ is
logically true, then it must be the case that b(θ) = b(φ). I denote by {θ}≡ the
equivalence class of sentences logically equivalent to θ and by SL≡prop the set of
all the equivalence classes of SLprop. I typically use the symbol X to represent
members of SL≡prop. B is the set of all belief functions satisfying respect for
logical equivalence.
Equivalently, these assumptions can be formulated as the adoption of a frame-
work in which beliefs concern the members or ‘propositions’ of the powerset of
a state-space Ω with finitely many atomic states. In this case each atomic state
ω ∈ Ω represents a ‘possible world’ and propositions are said to be ‘true at a
particular world’ if they contain that world’s atomic state. The atomic states
in this possible-world framework correspond exactly to the atomic sentences
±A1 ∧ . . . ∧ ±An in SLprop, and the propositions to the members of SL≡prop.
I discuss objections to these claims about states of partial belief below in section
4.2.4 as accuracy arguments share them with other arguments for probabilistic
necessity.
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Inaccuracy sharpness
Accuracy arguments make a preliminary sharpness assumption about inaccu-
racy, according to which the inaccuracies of states of belief can be measured by
functions with the form S : B× V→ R≥0.
Each such ‘inaccuracy measure’ assigns a positive real number to every possi-
ble belief-function-valuation-function pair (b, v) according to how accurate the
state of belief described by b is in the state of affairs designated by v. Following
Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010), I use the term ‘inaccuracy measure’ throughout,
but the reader should be aware that terminology in the field of accuracy argu-
ments has not yet settled, and ‘epistemic scoring rule’ and ‘epistemic dis-utility
function’ are sometimes used elsewhere.
It is not uncontroversially true that every state of belief is inaccurate to a precise
degree, as in some cases it seems that the inaccuracies of different states of beliefs
are not directly comparable.
Consider, for example, two agents whose states of belief are reasonable and
identical, except that agent A strongly believes that humans coexisted with
dinosaurs, while agent B equally strongly believes that cheddar cheese tastes
like cucumber. Due to the very different ways in which these beliefs are incorrect,
it does not seem quite right to say that both agents’ states of belief are equally
inaccurate, nor that one is less accurate than the other. Instead, it is arguably
more appropriate to describe the situation as one in which the two states of belief
fail in different, incommensurable ways: agent A’s state of belief is historically
inaccurate, whereas agent B is guilty of gastronomic inaccuracy.
However, inaccuracy sharpness rules out this way of describing the situation,
as it forces inaccuracy to be measurable along just one dimension. Given the
varied ways in which states of belief can fail, insisting that overall inaccuracy
can be measured by a single quantity seems unwarranted.
Accuracy-based epistemic norm
Having made these preliminary assumptions about states of belief and their
inaccuracy, accuracy arguments can formulate their central rationality require-
ment as an epistemic norm identifying states of partial belief represented by
certain belief functions as irrational based on their inaccuracy.
The epistemic norm that is most often invoked by accuracy arguments for prob-
abilism is called ‘dominance-avoidance’. A belief function b is said to ‘accuracy-
dominate’ another belief function b′ according to the inaccuracy measure S if
and only if S(b, v) ≤ S(b′, v) for all valuation functions v ∈ V, with strict in-
equality holding for at least one valuation function.4 According to the norm of
dominance avoidance, accuracy-dominated belief functions represent irrational
states of belief.
4It is assumed that all the functions mentioned here have a common domain.
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To see why dominance-avoidance is seen as compelling, suppose that one belief
function bA representing agent A’s state of partial belief dominates agent B’s
belief function bB according to the inaccuracy measure S. Then, according
to S, agent B is at least as inaccurate as agent A in all possible states of
the world, and more inaccurate in at least one state. A’s state of belief is more
accurate than B’s in this sense. Moreover, B could have achieved more accuracy
without having to acquire any new evidence, simply by pondering the situation’s
formal representation. If B fails to do so, one might ask questions about their
rationality.
I can think of two objections to dominance avoidance.
First, it is conceivable that situations might arise where the true state of the
world is known to depend on an agent’s state of belief. Such cases are analogous
to act-dependence in decision theory, which is known to frustrate dominance
reasoning. It is argued at Caie (2013) that the possibility of belief-dependence
makes accuracy-dominance an unreliable norm. Greaves (2013) also points out
cases where belief-dependence can complicate accuracy-based reasoning.
Secondly, a rational agent might choose an accuracy-dominated state of belief
because the epistemic good of having an accurate state of belief is outweighed
by another epistemic good, such as epistemic helpfulness.
For example, consider the case of Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson. In Arthur
Conan Doyle’s stories, these two agents form an epistemic community who col-
lectively seek to solve mysteries. Watson has the knack of making observations
and suggestions that, despite or even perhaps due to their foolishness, cause
Holmes to make crucial deductions. In other words, Watson has a tendency
to form inaccurate states of belief that are nonetheless epistemically helpful.
If Watson were offered the opportunity to exchange his state of belief for a
slightly more accurate but less helpful alternative—say by attending a criminol-
ogy night-class—he might rationally decline. The increased accuracy is unlikely
to make Watson’s community able to solve any mysteries that it would not have
solved anyway as Watson would merely learn things that Holmes knows already.
However, the loss of an evening’s worth of interactions might well cause some
mysteries to go unsolved because of Holmes being unable to take advantage of
Watson’s capacity as an intellectual springboard.
Assessment of preliminary claims
Accuracy arguments aim to make comparatively uncontroversial preliminary
claims about states of partial belief, the correct functional form of inaccuracy
measures and the relationship between inaccuracy and irrationality.
The idea is to shift any controversy away from this kind of claim and towards
claims about which inaccuracy measures are legitimate; that is, which measures
genuinely represent inaccuracy. By proposing candidate legitimacy conditions,
an argument for probabilism can be built up piece by piece. Eventually, it
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is hoped, legitimacy conditions will be found that are both intuitively well-
motivated and collectively powerful enough to ensure that all non-probabilistic
belief functions are accuracy-dominated.
However, many preliminary assumptions made by accuracy arguments for prob-
abilism are not as uncontroversial as intended. We have seen that it is not safe
to assume that every state of belief is inaccurate to a real-valued degree, nor
that all states of belief represented by accuracy-dominated belief functions are
irrational. We shall see later that some preliminary assumptions about states
of partial belief are also difficult to justify. There therefore seem to be problems
with the overall strategy underlying accuracy arguments for probabilism.
Nonetheless, it will still be useful to consider the merits of some legitimacy con-
ditions for inaccuracy measures that have been proposed recently. The next few
subsections cover four of these: sum-decomposability, proposition-neutrality,
strict propriety and continuity.
If a sufficiently compelling and strong collection of legitimacy conditions were
found, then accuracy arguments for probabilism would apply in certain cir-
cumstances. Specifically, probabilism would be vindicated in circumstances
where inaccuracy uncontroversially takes real-valued degrees and dominance-
based reasoning is clearly appropriate.
On the other hand, if, as I shall argue, the sufficiently strong collections of condi-
tions that have been proposed so far are dubiously compelling, then this would
strengthen the case against accuracy arguments. As well as an external cri-
tique according to which accuracy arguments for probabilism have questionable
presuppositions, there would also be an internal critique, according to which ac-
curacy arguments are unsuccessful even when their presuppositions are granted.
Sum-decomposability
An important legitimacy condition for inaccuracy measures, made in most accu-
racy arguments that are currently thought to be viable, is sum-decomposability.
An inaccuracy measure S : B × V → R satisfies sum-decomposability if it is
related to a proposition-specific inaccuracy measure L : Ω×[0, 1]×{0, 1} → [0, 1]




L(X, b(X), v(X)). (4.1)
Sum-decomposability ensures that the number representing the ‘global’ inac-
curacy of a state of belief is the sum of the numbers representing the ‘local’
inaccuracies of its individual partial beliefs in particular propositions.
Leitgeb and Pettigrew argue at (Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010, §5.2.1) for sum-
decomposability on the grounds that local, proposition-specific inaccuracy and
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global, state-of-belief-oriented inaccuracy ought to be related in some system-
atic way. If there were no such systematic relationship, they claim, then the
two conflicting forms of inaccuracy could force rational agents into dilemmas.
The imperative to pick a state of belief with minimal inaccuracy would con-
flict with the imperative to choose individual beliefs each of which is minimally
inaccurate. Legitimate inaccuracy measures, they argue, could never produce
such situations. Accepting on these grounds that there must some systematic
relationship between global and local inaccuracy Leitgeb and Pettigrew settle
on summation as an easily available and well-understood candidate.
Against this line of argument it can be objected that, where the two conflict,
global inaccuracy should always trump proposition-specific inaccuracy because
of the need to evaluate features of states of belief that are irreducibly global,
such as patterns between different beliefs.
Only global inaccuracy can evaluate states of belief in a holistic way, taking into
account all degrees of beliefs in all propositions at the same time. Proposition-
specific inaccuracy cannot do this and should therefore, I claim, be over-ruled
in cases of disagreement.
To illustrate this point, suppose that agent A is particularly inaccurate when
it comes to propositions about their favourite football team. Whereas the inac-
curacies of their beliefs about other topics are unremarkable, they inaccurately
believe that the red team will win all of its matches, that it plays an intrin-
sically more beautiful game, that its players are excellent people, and so on.
Intuitively, this pattern in agent A’s beliefs should be relevant to the inaccuracy
of their overall state of belief. Arguably the agent’s overall state of belief is less
inaccurate than that of agent B whose equal number of equally inaccurate be-
liefs are distributed randomly among many different topics. Alternatively, agent
A’s clustered inaccurate beliefs might be thought to make them more globally
inaccurate than agent B’s evenly spread ones. The author’s intuitions on this
point are not entirely conclusive: however it seems clear is that it is not safe to
assume that A and B have the same global inaccuracy.
Whether agent A’s clustering brings about an extra penalty or a partial reprieve,
the two agents would have identical local inaccuracies but different global inac-
curacies. Faced with this conflict, it seems clear that we should evaluate the two
agents according to their global inaccuracy rather than their local inaccuracy.
To do the reverse would neglect the importance of the pattern in agent A’s state
of belief.
However, since sum-decomposability imposes a systematic relationship between
local and global inaccuracy measures, it prevents global inaccuracy from trump-
ing local inaccuracy in this way. It therefore ignores an important aspect of
inaccuracy.
Another problem with sum-decomposability concerns the nature of the rela-
tionship between local and global inaccuracy, supposing that one exists. As
Landes (2015) argues and Leitgeb and Pettigrew admit, there is no particu-
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lar reason why this relationship should be described by summation over all
propositions rather than by any other operation. The conflict between global
and proposition-specific imperatives could have been avoided by an alternative
form of decomposability, such as one which required global inaccuracy to be
the product of proposition-specific inaccuracies rather than their sum. Leitgeb
and Pettigrew’s argument does not, therefore, go far enough to fully justify
sum-decomposability, but only a weaker restriction asserting that legitimate in-
accuracy measures should be decomposable in some way or another. It is not
yet clear whether a successful accuracy argument can proceed on the basis of
such a weaker form of decomposability.
To sum up, it is not clear that there is a systematic relationship between global
and local inaccuracy. Even if there is such a relationship, a compelling case that
it is described by summation over all propositions has not yet been made.
Proposition Neutrality
Proposition neutrality is a condition on local, proposition-specific, inaccuracy
measures. It stipulates that, for any legitimate local inaccuracy measure L,
if b(X) = b(Y ) and v(X) = v(Y ), then L(X, b(X), v(X)) = L(Y, b(Y ), v(Y )).
Proposition neutrality ensures that, if two propositions have the same truth
values and are believed to the same degree, then they each contribute the same
amount of local inaccuracy. If a local inaccuracy measure is proposition-neutral,
then it is effectively a function with only two arguments—a degree of belief and
a truth value—any influence by the first argument is ruled out.
Many prominent accuracy arguments for probabilistic necessity, including Pet-
tigrew (ming) and Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010) suppose that legitimate local
inaccuracy measures are proposition-neutral.
However, proposition-neutrality is an unattractive legitimacy condition because
it prevents local inaccuracy from taking into account evidence. Whether or not
a proposition is supported by one’s evidence, believing it strongly will contribute
the same amount to one’s inaccuracy, according to a proposition-neutral local
inaccuracy measure.
The following example illustrates this point. Suppose that agents A and B are
each presented with evidence supporting the proposition that a certain patient
has cancer: the result of a very reliable test was positive. Having taken this
evidence into account, agent A believes this proposition strongly, whereas agent
B ignores the evidence, taking the more ambivalent position of believing the
proposition to the degree 1/2. In addition, both agents have attitudes towards
the proposition that the number of fish on Earth is odd, about which they
have minimal evidence. Agent A believes this second proposition to degree 1/2,
whereas agent B believes it very strongly: in fact exactly as strongly as agent A
believes that the patient has cancer. Suppose that both propositions happen to
have the same truth value: either the patient has cancer and there are an odd
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number of fish on Earth, or the patient doesn’t have cancer and the number of
fish is even.
Agent A’s beliefs seem to be appropriate in view of the available evidence,
whereas agent B’s beliefs are very inappropriate. In this sense agent A seems
to be more accurate than agent B. However, this difference cannot easily be
captured by a proposition-neutral inaccuracy measure.
To see why, suppose that the two propositions are represented by members
Can and Odd of an appropriate set Ω, that the belief function bA represents
agent A’s beliefs and that bB represents those of agent B. Suppose that the local
inaccuracies of bA and bb are measured by a proposition-neutral local inaccuracy
L
Since L is proposition neutral, and given the stipulated facts about the propo-
sitions’ truth values and the agents’ degrees of belief, the following equalities
will hold:
• L(Can, bA(Can), v(Can)) = L(Odd, bB(Odd), v(Odd))
• L(Odd, bA(Odd), v(Odd)) = L(Can, bB(Can), v(Can))
Despite the evidential mismatch, the local inaccuracy of agent A’s belief in Can
will be represented as being the same as that of agent B’s equally strong belief
in Odd, and the local inaccuracy of agent A’s belief in Odd will be the same
as that of agent B’s equally strong belief in Can. As a result, contrary to the
intuition that agent A’s beliefs are more accurate than agent B’s, L will give
bA and bB the same total scores with respect to Can and Odd.
Two possible responses to this objection proceed as follows.
First, a proponent of proposition-neutrality might reject the intuition according
to which agent A’s beliefs are more accurate than agent B’s, arguing that the
two agents are actually equally inaccurate. This would seem to imply that
one can sometimes avoid inaccuracy while responding inappropriately to one’s
evidence. This would be puzzling as taking evidence into account appropriately
seems to be a key component of rationality.
This response therefore weakens the key claim of accuracy arguments that all
accuracy-dominated belief functions represent irrational states of partial beliefs.
If accuracy and responding appropriately to evidence can come apart in this way,
then some accuracy-dominated belief functions may represent rational states of
partial belief that take evidence into account sensibly. Similarly, some non-
dominated belief functions might represent irrational states of belief that fail to
do so.
Secondly, the proponent of proposition-neutrality might argue that a good global
inaccuracy measure would give bA a lower overall aggregate score than bB in
the case described above, despite the fact that both belief functions would have
the same local scores with respect to Can and Odd. There would have to be a
difference in bA and bB with respect to other members of Ω. In order for this
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response to be convincing, however, it would need to be shown with respect to
which members of Ω it would be safe to assume that bB is more inaccurate than
bA.
Neither of these responses seems promising. As a result the status of proposition-
neutrality as a genuine legitimate condition for local inaccuracy measures is
dubious.
Strict propriety
Strict propriety is another condition on local inaccuracy measures. According
to (Landes, 2015, p.9)5, a local inaccuracy measure L is strictly proper if and
only if it satisfies the following two properties:
• The expression L(Ω, b(Ω), 1) + L(∅, b(∅), 0) is uniquely minimised when
b(Ω) = 1 and b(∅) = 0.
• If X is not Ω or ∅, then for all p ∈ [0, 1], the expression pL(X, b(X), 1) +
(1− p)L(X, b(X), 0) is uniquely minimised when b(X) = p.
Strict propriety has received a lot of attention in the literature on accuracy ar-
guments - see, for example, (Joyce, 2009, §8), Pettigrew (2013) and (Pettigrew,
ming, Ch. 4). Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010) restrict their attention to quadratic
inaccuracy measures that are strictly proper, but do so not because quadratic
measures have this property, but rather because they do not place agents in epis-
temic dilemmas. However, the dilemmas that Leitgeb and Pettigrew envisage
involve imperatives to minimise different forms of expected inacccuracy, and the
meat of my objection to strict propriety is that non-probabilistic agents need
not obey such imperatives. Consequently, my objection may also pose problems
for Leitgeb and Pettigrew’s accuracy argument.
Pettigrew hints at a possible motivation for the conclusion that legitimate inac-
curacy measures are strictly proper, according to his definition of this notion6:
[Provided that] a scoring rule is proper, then, a probabilistic
agent with credence p in a proposition expects that credence and
only that credence to be epistemically best.
(Pettigrew, 2013, p.28)
Our definition of strict propriety validates this observation. Suppose that L is
a strictly proper local inaccuracy measure, and an agent has the probabilistic
credence p in a proposition X. The expected proposition-specific inaccuracy
of another credence b(X) with respect to X and p is pL(X, b(X), 1) + (1 −
5Definitions of strict propriety vary slightly between different papers - I take it that choosing
this definition will not affect any of the substantive points that I make below.
6Pettigrew uses the term ‘scoring rule’ to describe a proposition-neutral local inaccuracy
measure. Pettigrew defines strict propriety as a property of such scoring rules which holds if
and only if, for any number p ∈ [0, 1], the expression pL(X, b(X), 1) + (1 − p)L(¬X, b(X), 0)
is uniquely minimised when b(X) = p.
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p)L(X, b(X), 0)). Since L is strictly proper, this quantity is uniquely minimised
when b(X) = p. If we equate Pettigrew’s idea of a credence expecting itself to be
epistemically best with the property of a credence minimising its own expected
local inaccuracy, then the observation is clearly correct.
Pettigrew’s observation hints that strict propriety might be motivated by con-
siderations of consistency similar to those that underpin Moore’s paradox. Just
as it seems absurd to say “it is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining” so
it would be odd for a rational agent’s probabilistic belief function bpr to assign a
proposition a certain probability bpr(X) = p, even though the agent knows that
another belief function b
′
pr has better expected accuracy with respect to bpr.
The belief function bpr seems self-undermining, in a certain sense, since, when
thinking about probabilistic agents, we usually require that agents’ degrees of
belief agree with certain expected values. A non-strictly-proper inaccuracy mea-
sure might lead to situations where rational probabilistic agents say odd things
like ‘it is probably going to rain but I expect it would be more accurate to
say that it probably won’t rain’. Legitimate inaccuracy measures, it might be
argued, would never force agents to contradict themselves in this way.
In a similar argument, Joyce also appeals to the intuition that legitimate inac-
curacy measures should not force probabilistic agents to self-undermine7, artic-
ulating the intuition in the form of a principle he calls ‘immodesty’. According
to this principle, if a belief function represents a state of belief that is rational,
given some state of the world, then it must uniquely minimise expected local
inaccuracy with respect to itself and the domain-member that represents that
state of the world. Joyce notes that a form of strict propriety is jointly implied
by immodesty, together with another principle called ‘minimal coherence’.
There therefore seems to be a tendency in the literature on strict propriety
towards defending this principle on the grounds that it guards against self-
undermining.
Defences of strict propriety that invoke self-undermining have a common prob-
lem, when used as part of accuracy arguments for probabilism. It is that the
link between expectation and self-directed beliefs is only plausible in the case
of probabilistic agents. A non-probabilistic agent’s degree of belief b(¬X) in a
negation need not be equal to 1 − b(X). Consequently, expected proposition-
specific inaccuracies, which effectively use the quantity 1 − b(X) as a weight,
need not have any particular significance for non-probabilistic agents.
This objection applies to both Pettigrew’s hint and Joyce’s argument. Petti-
grew notes that his argument from self-undermining only applies to probabilistic
agents, but does not make clear that the concept of expectation itself is hard
to make sense of outside this context. Similarly, Joyce’s principle of immodesty
fails to restrict expectation to the probabilistic context, dictating that even non-
7See (Joyce, 2009, p.276-279). Note that despite the fact that Joyce’s paper presents this
argument in favour of strict propriety, its central accuracy argument ultimately does not
incorporate it.
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probabilistic belief functions must uniquely minimise their expected local inac-
curacy in order to represent rational states of belief. However, non-probabilistic
belief functions that fail to minimise expected inaccuracy do not necessarily rep-
resent self-undermining states of belief. Arguments for strict propriety based on
self-undermining therefore seem hard to sustain. I am not aware of any other
grounds on which it has been argued that inaccuracy measures should be strictly
proper.
Continuity
A local inaccuracy measure is ‘continuous’ if it has the following property:
for every proposition X ∈ Ω, truth value v(X) ∈ {0, 1} and sequence of
real numbers b1(X), . . . , bn(X) converging to b(X) ∈ [0, 1] it is the case that
limn→∞ L(X, bn(X), v(X)) = L(X, b(X), v(X))8. The requirement of continu-
ity amounts to a stipulation that, for each proposition X, small changes in
degree of belief in X lead to small changes in proposition-specific inaccuracy
with respect to X.
Continuity is a problematic legitimacy condition because there are seem to be
legitimate non-continuous local inaccuracy measures. One example can be con-
structed based on the intuition that it is a lot worse, epistemically, to hold that
a false proposition is more plausible than not, even only slightly, than to be am-
bivalent about it. As a result, believing a false proposition to a degree slightly
greater than 1/2 should arguably make one substantially more inaccurate than
if one had believed it to degree exactly 1/2.
This intuition suggests that local inaccuracy measures should assign substan-
tially higher scores to beliefs of degree slightly greater than 1/2 than to than
beliefs of degree exactly 1/2. I include a graphical representation of such a
proposition-specific inaccuracy measure below.
8Definition from (Landes, 2015, p.10).







The requirement of continuity rules out this kind of local inaccuracy measure: it
therefore seems to be incompatible with a plausible intuition about inaccuracy.
Conclusion
Many prominent accuracy arguments assume that legitimate global inaccu-
racy measures are sum-decomposable and that local inaccuracy measures are
proposition-neutral, strictly proper or continuous. At least one of these assump-
tions is part of every currently-defended accuracy argument for probabilism that
I am aware of.9 As we have seen, Leitgeb and Pettigrew’s accuracy argument as-
sumes sum-decomposability; it also assumes continuity10. Though these authors
do not claim to establish probabilistic necessity, the argument in Predd et al.
(2009) shows that sum-decomposability, strict propriety, proposition neutrality
and continuity jointly entail probabilism. Arguments for probabilistic necessity
based on this demonstration need to make these assumptions as well. The ac-
9The accuracy argument in Joyce (1998) does not make any of these assumptions, but
is highly controversial for other reasons: see Maher (2002) for discussion. Joyce no longer
defends this argument.
10See (Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010, § 5.2.3).
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curacy argument in Joyce (2009) does not assume sum-decomposability11 but
falls short of establishing that all non-probabilistic belief functions are accuracy
dominated with respect to all legitimate inaccuracy measures.
The discussion above shows that all of these assumptions about the measure-
ment of inaccuracy are problematic. Sum-decomposability has not been argued
for in sufficient detail, proposition-neutrality conflicts with intuitions about ev-
idence, strict propriety lacks a convincing rationale and continuity rules out
potentially plausible inaccuracy measures.
Together with the general objections to accuracy arguments outlined above, the
problems with these assumptions show that such arguments cannot yet establish
probabilistic necessity.
4.2.4 Are the different arguments for probabilistic neces-
sity mutually reinforcing?
I have argued above that, considered individually, neither betting arguments,
Cox’s axiomatic argument nor accuracy arguments establish that all rational
states of belief can be represented by probability functions. This does not quite
settle the matter of whether these arguments establish probabilistic necessity,
however. It is possible that, considered collectively, the different arguments
combine into a convincing argument. Views along these lines are expressed at
(Gelman et al., 1995, p.13-14) and (Paris, 1994, Ch. 3). Both works argue that,
while each individual argument for probabilistic necessity might not be fully
convincing, the overall case is strong because the different arguments reinforce
one another.
Whether the different arguments can combine into a strong argument for prob-
abilistic necessity seems to depend on how much they have in common. The
greater the extent to which the arguments are genuinely different, the more
surprising it would be that they have the same conclusion, and the stronger the
circumstantial support they would provide to probabilistic necessity. See Polya
(1954) for a discussion of this kind of reasoning.
In this section I argue that the three kinds of argument for probabilistic necessity
have many important features in common. Overall the differences between
the justifications are not large enough for the arguments to combine into a
compelling collective case for probabilistic necessity.
Similar assumptions
The arguments for probabilistic necessity that we have considered share many
assumptions. Each assumes that rational states of belief are, in one form or
11See (Joyce, 2009, p.208).
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another, classical, sharp and logically omniscient. In addition, many accuracy
arguments make assumptions about aggregating quantities by adding them that
are analogous to an assumption that appears in betting arguments.
Classicality
Each of the arguments for probabilistic necessity appeals to situations in which
rational states of belief concern the sentences of a propositional language, and
the true state of the world is described by a classically admissible valuation
function.
Both of these assumptions are problematic. Propositional languages have cer-
tain limitations: for example, they cannot express reasoning about general state-
ments like ‘all cats are mammals’, yet rational states of belief sometimes concern
such statements. First-order languages with quantifier symbols are required to
express this kind of reasoning. While there is a version of the classic Dutch-book
argument for first-order languages12, and first-order analogues of Cox’s argu-
ment and accuracy arguments might be found, this does not solve the problem.
Rational states of belief plausibly concern statements whose logical features
even first-order languages cannot adequately describe, such as generalisations
over properties.
Secondly, it is not clear that all aspects of the true state of the world can be
described by a classically admissible valuation function. One problem with this
assumption is that classical logic cannot easily deal with vagueness. Suppose
that the sentence H expresses the proposition that a collection of fifty grains
of sand forms a heap. Since all classically admissible valuation functions have
the range {0, 1}, there are only two possibilities: either v(H) = 0 or v(H) = 1.
Arguably, however, there are at least three possibilities as to the truth of the
proposition in question: the pile either makes a heap, does not make a heap,
or sort of makes a heap. See Colyvan (2004) for further arguments in favour of
this and other difficulties with classicality.
The natural way to respond to concerns about classicality is to restrict the scope
of the corresponding arguments. Even if esoteric phenomena like generalisations
or vagueness frustrate the standard arguments for probabilistic necessity, it
might be thought, these phenomena are mostly absent from the contexts where
we want to evaluate peoples’ partial beliefs for rationality.
Unfortunately, this pragmatic response is not available to the defender of prob-
abilistic necessity, who must hold that every single rational state of belief can
be represented by a probability function. A restricted form of probabilistic
necessity—for example, one that only applied to situations that do not feature
vagueness—would open the door to non-probabilistic approaches to formalising
inductive reasoning in esoteric circumstances.
Consequently, probabilistic necessitarians must demonstrate that phenomena
12See (Paris and Vencovska´, 2015, Ch. 5).
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which appear to frustrate classicality do not actually do so, and that all epis-
temologically relevant aspects of belief can be described in a framework where
viable arguments for probabilistic necessity can be formulated.
This task seem very difficult, and the difficulty is faced by all three kinds of
argument for probabilistic necessity.
Sharp degrees of belief
According to assumptions of sharpness, every rational state of partial belief
can adequately be represented by a single belief function that associates sen-
tences with single positive real numbers. This stipulation rules out imprecise
approaches to formalising uncertain reasoning, in which sets of belief functions
represent states of partial belief.
The question of whether all rational states of belief are sharp is the subject of an
ongoing debate in the formal epistemology literature. Elga (2010), for example,
argues in favour of sharpness, whereas Bradley and Steele (2014) and Chan-
dler (2014) dispute Elga’s argument and Joyce (2010) argues that sharpness
sometimes leads to irrationality.
I shall not attempt to settle this argument here. Nonetheless, it is clear that
the arguments for probabilism share a contentious assumption.
Logical omniscience
In order to avoid being irrational according to probabilistic necessity, one must
ensure that one’s state of belief can be represented by a probability function.
However, doing this can be very difficult because it requires extensive logical
knowledge.
Specifically, in order to ensure that the belief function representing one’s state
of belief satisfies the condition P1, assigning the value 1 to each logical truth,
one must consider every logical truth in the relevant domain. There might be
very many of these.
Moreover, P2 requires all logical falsehoods to be assigned the value 0 and that
logically equivalent sentences are assigned equal values. Even more checking is
required!
Unless an agent knows all of the logical truths and falsehoods of the language
that represents the objects of their belief, that is unless they are ‘logically om-
niscient’, they will surely fail to ensure that their state of belief is represented
by a probabilistic belief function and thereby risk being judged irrational.
However, it can be difficult to know, in general, which of a language’s sentences
are logically true and false. See Parikh (1995) for a discussion of exactly how dif-
ficult it is. This difficulty provokes doubts about whether having a probabilistic
state of belief is really a rationality requirement. For example, Hacking (1967)
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notes that, because of the cost of computation, it is sometimes not appropriate
to work out all relevant logical truths before making a decision.
A possible response to the problem of logical omniscience is to deny that ra-
tionality constraints like probabilistic necessity need to be attainable by real,
non-logically-omniscient beings. Someone making this response might point out
that the reach of some similar evaluative concepts extends outside the realm of
possible fulfilment. For example, consider the evaluative concept of being a good
digit-rememberer. Most people would have no problem saying that someone who
knew the first ten billion digits of pi would be a better digit-rememberer than
someone who could only recall five billion, even though both feats are unattain-
able. Clearly it is possible to apply the concept of good remembering even in
such hypothetical, unattainable, cases. Analogously, it might be argued, people
with probabilistic states of belief, if they existed, would be more rational in a
certain respect than non-probabilistic believers.
This analogy does not work, in my opinion, because the arguments for prob-
abilistic necessity assert that all rational states of belief exhibit logical omni-
science. According to the arguments, the form of rationality that representabil-
ity by a probability function embodies is not instantiated by any real states of
belief. In contrast, the concept of good digit-remembering applies to real re-
memberers as well as to hypothetical ones. In order for it to be a useful concept,
there should surely be some real-world cases of rationality.
In order to meet the objection from logical omniscience, the defender of proba-
bilistic necessity would therefore need to show that the rationality required to
ensure representability by a probability function is an extension into the hypo-
thetical realm of a less demanding kind of rationality that is instantiated in the
real world. It is not clear that this can be done.
Sum-aggregation
Betting arguments and accuracy arguments both assume that certain quantities
should be aggregated using summation rather than by other means.
As we saw in the above discussion of the packaging objection, the classic Dutch
book argument assumes that the aggregate value of a package containing mul-
tiple bet-outcomes is the un-weighted sum of the values of the contents of the
package. Similarly, accuracy arguments usually assume that the global inac-
curacy of a state of belief is the un-weighted sum of the local inaccuracies of
the degrees of belief it assigns to all propositions. Although values of bets and
proposition-specific inaccuracies are different in nature, their aggregates play
similar roles in the respective arguments. Betting arguments effectively claim
that betting functions should not be dominated with respect to aggregate bet-
value13, whereas accuracy arguments claim that belief functions should not be
dominated with respect to aggregate proposition-specific inaccuracy.
13The full Dutch book theorem, as proved in Kemeny (1955), entails that every non-
probabilistic betting function is dominated by a probabilistic one.
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There is thus a structural similarity between betting arguments and accuracy
arguments. Admittedly, aggregating the values of bets and aggregating local
inaccuracies are very different activities, and different arguments surely apply
in each case. Nonetheless, someone who objects to the sum-aggregation of
penalties in general might object to both arguments for the same reason.
Appeals to different kinds of reason
It is sometimes claimed that the arguments for probabilistic necessity are dif-
ferent because they reveal different kinds of reasons in virtue of which it is
irrational to have a non-probabilistic state of belief. In this section I argue that
these differences are not so clear-cut as might be thought.
The classic Dutch book argument is often taken as showing that rational agents
should have probabilistic states of belief for pragmatic reasons, in contrast to
the purely epistemic reasons that accuracy arguments, and perhaps also Cox’s
argument, purportedly unearth. For example, Joyce writes:
. . . the Dutch Book Argument . . . establishes conformity to the laws
of probability as a norm of prudential rationality by showing that
expected utility maximizers whose partial beliefs violate these laws
can be induced to behave in ways that are sure to leave them less
well off than they could otherwise be. This overemphasis on the
pragmatic dimension of partial beliefs tends to obscure the fact that
they have properties that can be understood independently of their
role in the production of action.
(Joyce, 1998, p. 576)
However, understood properly, betting arguments are not only relevant to pru-
dential rationality.
It is true, as Joyce says, that non-probabilistic agents can be induced to behave
in ways that are sure to leave them worse off: this would be the case if the clas-
sic Dutch book scenario occurred as a real-life situation. However, situations
can also arise in which probabilistic agents are sure to make themselves worse
off, like the Czech book scenario from Ha´jek (2008). Both possibilities—actual
instantiations of the Czech and Dutch book scenarios—are extremely unlikely.
Thus, as far as potentially instantiated hypothetical scenarios are concerned,
there does not seem to be much difference between how vulnerable probabilistic
and non-probabilistic agents are to sure losses. If the classic Dutch book argu-
ment’s only significance was to demonstrate such vulnerability, it would clearly
be un-compelling.
However, Joyce’s assertion can be interpreted differently. Perhaps he thinks
that the classic Dutch book argument is only relevant to prudential irrational-
ity because this is all that it is possible to infer from a pathological betting
disposition. Recall that, in the classic Dutch book argument, an agent’s choice
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of a bookable betting function is taken to indicate that they have a patholog-
ical betting disposition, and this fact is then taken to show that their state of
belief is irrational. The crucial question, then, is whether it is possible to infer
non-prudential irrationality from a person’s pathological betting disposition.
I think that this is possible. Suppose I observe my friend’s behaviour at a
roulette table, noticing that they tend to bet unreasonably ambitiously after
they lose, while betting unreasonably cautiously immediately after winning.
I take my friend’s pathological betting behaviour to indicate that they are a
victim of the gambler’s fallacy: they hold a mistaken belief about the gambling
apparatus, according to which wins are more likely than usual immediately after
losses. I think that my friend is irrational—they ought to be able to work out
that the roulette table does not work in this way—but the irrationality is non-
prudential, as their behaviour is sensible, given their belief. My friend is simply
mistaken about a matter of fact.
Similarly, it is possible to interpret the pathological betting dispositions that the
classic Dutch book scenario purportedly unearths as evidence of non-prudential
irrationality. Thus, betting arguments like the classic Dutch book argument
can, like accuracy arguments, reveal non-prudential irrationality.
As a result, one putative difference between betting arguments and other kinds
of argument for probabilism is not as stark as might have been thought.
Discussion
The different arguments for probabilistic necessity have important differences.
Betting arguments appeal to hypothetical scenarios, accuracy arguments make
descriptive claims about the nature of inaccuracy, while axiomatic arguments
use none of these techniques. However, overall it seems that the differences
between these kinds of argument are not as significant as their many similari-
ties. All three kinds of argument make similar problematic assumptions about
rational states of belief. Betting arguments and accuracy arguments depend on
similarly unwarranted appeals to summation as an aggregation method. It is
not clear that the different kinds of argument really appeal to different kinds of
irrationality.
As a result of these similarities, the different arguments for probabilistic neces-
sity do not combine into a compelling collective argument. It is not surprising
that these arguments point in the same direction, given how similar they are: as
a result, this fact does not lend their joint conclusion much additional support.
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4.2.5 Conclusion: probabilistic necessity has not yet been
established
I have considered three kinds of argument for probabilistic necessity, the claim
that all rational states of partial belief can be represented by probability func-
tions: betting arguments, axiomatic arguments and accuracy arguments.
We have seen that each kind of argument has specific problems that prevent
it from providing a compelling standalone case for probabilistic necessity. I ar-
gued that agents without pathological betting dispositions can sometimes choose
bookable betting functions in the classic dutch book scenario, that some of Cox’s
axioms are not compelling and that currently available accuracy arguments
make implausible claims about inaccuracy and rationality.
In addition, the different arguments share many problematic features and so
do not reinforce each other very much. As a result, these arguments do not
combine into a strong joint argument for probabilistic necessity.
This discussion has not covered all possible arguments for probabilistic necessity.
There may be other kinds of argument that establish it. Within each of the
categories that I have considered, there may be alternative versions that do
not suffer from the objections I have highlighted. Consequently I do not claim
to have shown that probabilistic necessity is false. Nonetheless, I think it is
fair to say, in light of the preceding discussion, that probabilistic necessity is
epistemologically controversial.
Subjective Bayesian inductive logic therefore has a dubious commitment. This is
a major problem for this research programme, especially compared to Carnapian
inductive logic, which makes no comparably controversial epistemological claim.
It might be thought that commitment to probabilistic necessity is a price worth
paying in order to benefit from the technical fruitfulness of being able to model
degrees of plausibility as being probabilistic. This ability is indeed very useful:
the success of Bayesian methods in statistics is good evidence for this. However,
there is no need to commit to probabilistic necessity in order to use the prob-
ability axioms in this way. On the contrary, just as it can use other axioms to
formalise inductive assumptions about, say instantial relevance, so Carnapian
inductive logic can employ the probability axioms to formalise general assump-
tions about how inductive reasoning should proceed.
The next section addresses the other central epistemological claim of subjective
Bayesian inductive logic, probabilistic sufficiency.
4.3 Probabilistic sufficiency
According to probabilistic sufficiency, all states of belief that can be represented
by probability functions are rational. In this section I discuss three kinds of
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argument for probabilistic sufficiency. The first two draw on topics that we
have already encountered, namely the grue problem and accuracy arguments.
A third kind of argument, due to Colin Howson, appeals to an analogy between
the probability axioms and deductive logic. I argue that none of these arguments
is successful: as a result, probabilistic sufficiency is a dubious commitment.
4.3.1 Grue-based arguments
One way to argue for probabilistic sufficiency takes advantage of the ‘grue’
paradox. Howson and Jeffrey put the point as follows:
Increasing observational data certainly, provably, reinforces some hy-
potheses at the expense of others, but only if we let it by a suitable
assignment of priors. We would like to think that an unbroken se-
quence of viewings of green emeralds reinforces the hypothesis that
all emeralds are green. Unfortunately, it can equally be regarded as
reinforcing the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue, which is incon-
sistent with the favoured hypothesis, unless we prevent it doing so
by assigning appropriate prior weights.
(Howson, 2000, p. 240)
. . . if you are to update your judgemental probabilities by Bayes’s
theorem your prior distribution must include a programme of re-
sponses to the data, in advance. . . . Nelson Goodman’s graceful il-
lustration of this is a philosophical joke about the colours of emer-
alds: all that have been observed so far have been both (1) green
and (2) grue, i.e., green if observed before the time t, blue otherwise.
Our unhesitating choice of pattern (1) for prevision reflects a prior
judgement that is dictated by experience only in the subjective sense
that we are constituted so that in the light of that experience we are
incapable of taking the “grue” hypothesis seriously.
(Jeffrey, 1988, p. 8, emphasis original)
The following train of reasoning seems to lie behind these quotations. First,
the conditional probability method for taking evidence into account is assumed.
It is then noted that whenever a given probability function seems to represent
the view that a certain piece of evidence supports a certain hypothesis, there
is an alternative, grue-like interpretation of its domain according to which the
same probability function represents the view that that evidence undermines
the hypothesis.
Something along these lines seems to be true. For example, suppose that we
think that the evidence that a large sample of n emeralds examined before
the crucial time t and found to be green supports the hypothesis that the first
emerald examined after t will be found to be green. We decide to represent the
evidence with a sentence Ga1 ∧ . . . ∧ Gan = E ∈ SLpred and the hypothesis
with the sentence Gan+1 = H ∈ SLpred. We depict our view that the sample in
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question supports the hypothesis by representing our beliefs with a probability
function pr? : SLpred → [0, 1] such that pr?(H | E) > pr?(H). To our disap-
pointment, however, we find that, had we chosen an interpretation of SLpred
according to which G represented grueness rather than greenness, H would have
represented the hypothesis that the first emerald examined after t is blue, not
green. Since it would still have been the case that pr?(H | E) > pr?(H), un-
der this interpretation the probability function pr? would have represented the
view that our sample undermined the hypothesis, rather than the view that it
supports it.
Analogously, the argument goes, any probability function that represents a par-
ticular strategy according to a familiar interpretation of its domain represents
a completely different strategy strategy according to a grue-like interpretation.
The grue problem therefore illustrates Hume’s point that all strategies for mak-
ing predictions on the basis of evidence are equally unsound. Since every prob-
ability function represents a strategy for taking evidence into account, the fact
that all such strategies are, in a sense, equal suggests that all probability func-
tions should be considered equal as well.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the grue problem shows that which induc-
tive assumption many inductive logical axioms represent depends crucially on
how the domains of the measure functions they govern are interpreted. Accord-
ing to proponents of the grue-based argument, the probability axioms are not
interpretation-sensitive in this way, but rather represent the same, plausible, as-
sumptions under all interpretations of their measure functions’ domains. This
fact, they conclude, shows that only the probability axioms represent genuine
rationality constraints.
The key claim of this argument is that axioms that formalise genuine rationality
principles are not interpretation-sensitive. If an axiom formalises a rationality
constraint under one interpretation, the argument claims, it should do so under
every interpretation. I shall now argue that this claim is false: on the contrary,
there seem to be genuine, interpretation sensitive rationality principles.
It is widely accepted that responding appropriately to one’s evidence is impor-
tant for maintaining one’s rationality. In order to respond appropriately to one’s
evidence one must distinguish propositions that are evidentially supported from
those that are not, and treat these two categories of propositions differently.
Formal rationality principles encoding what constitutes a reasonable response
to evidence—call them ‘evidence principles’—must consequently impose a sim-
ilar distinction between formal objects that represent evidentially-supported
propositions and formal objects that represent other propositions. However,
any principle whose content depends on which propositions particular formal
objects represent is interpretation-sensitive. Thus the principle that one should
respond appropriately to one’s evidence seems to be interpretation sensitive.
To illustrate this point, consider the Principal Principle, an evidence principle
that attempts to represent what constitutes appropriate reasoning when one
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has evidence about chance propositions. The Principal principle applies to el-
ements of rich domains Drich with the form 〈Ch(H) = p〉, which are intended
to represent propositions about physical chances, namely that the proposition
represented by H has certain physical chance p. According to the Principal
principle, if bpr : Drich → [0, 1] represents a rational state of belief, then
bpr(H | 〈Ch(H) = p〉) = p. Clearly the Principal principle has very different
content depending on how the members of Drich are interpreted. If elements like
〈Ch(H) = p〉 are interpreted as intended, then the Principal principle arguably
represents a rationality requirement. However, if, for example, the element
〈Ch(H) = p〉 is interpreted as representing the proposition that H has physi-
cal chance p/2, then unless p = 0, the principal principle represents a clearly
irrational attitude. Thus the Principal principle is interpretation-sensitive.
A defender of interpretation-neutrality might argue that this is not a problem,
as it merely shows that the principal principle does not formalise a genuine
rationality constraint. In any case, they might continue, the principal principle is
highly controversial - what could be so bad about taking the perfectly defensible
position that it is not a rationality constraint?
This response avoids the main issue, however. Interpretation-neutrality does
not just rule out the principal principle, but seemingly any principle that distin-
guishes evidentially supported propositions from evidentially undermined ones.
As a result the pertinent aspect of the example is not the principal principle’s
substantive content, but the fact that it is interpretation-sensitive. While the
former is indeed controversial, it is not usually argued that the principal prici-
ple’s interpretation-sensitivity precludes the possibility of its being a genuine
rationality constraint.
To sum up, Grue-based arguments for probabilistic sufficiency depend on the as-
sumption that all genuine rationality principles are interpretation-neutral. How-
ever, there seem to be at least some formal principles that formalise how one
should rationally take evidence into account, and it seems likely that any such
principle would be interpretation-sensitive, I conclude that Grue-based argu-
ments for probabilistic sufficiency are unsucessful.
4.3.2 Dominance-avoidance
Another way to argue for probabilistic sufficiency draws on accuracy arguments
for probabilism, which we encountered in section 4.2.3 above. This kind of argu-
ment for probabilistic sufficiency is particularly noteworthy as one was advanced
by De Finetti in De Finetti (1990).
Many accuracy arguments for probabilism not only show that only probability
functions avoid accuracy-domination, but also that every probability function is
non-dominated. In other words, if one grants accuracy arguments’ preliminary
assumptions and claims about legitimate inaccuracy measures, then one must
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accept that representability by a probability function is sufficient for avoiding
accuracy-domination. Predd et al. (2009) contains a result along these lines.
This kind of result can be turned into an argument for probabilistic sufficiency
by assuming the epistemological principle, which I shall call Dom, according to
which every belief function that is not accuracy-dominated represents a rational
state of belief.
We saw above that many of the assumptions underlying accuracy arguments
for probabilistic necessity are suspect: these objections also apply to accuracy
arguments for probabilistic sufficiency.
Moreover, accuracy arguments for probabilistic sufficiency have an additional
problem: just like interpretation-neutrality, Dom frustrates plausible evidence-
based rationality principles.
Suppose that, according to a certain body of evidence, a certain state of the
world is possible but very unlikely; for example, suppose that, given the evi-
dence, it is extremely implausible that unicorns exist. Suppose that, contrary
to the evidence, agent A assigns a very high degree of belief to the proposition
that unicorns exist. Given their extreme defiance of the evidence, we might be
tempted to conclude that agent A is irrational. This would remain the case even
if it turned out that that there were, in fact, unicorns - this would be a case of
mere epistemic luck rather than sound judgement, and so ought not affect our
judgement that A is irrational.
However, if the unicorny state of affairs that they believe in were true, then we
would have to conclude that, at least as far as this proposition is concerned,
agent A is very accurate. Since the existence of unicorns cannot be ruled out
altogether, a belief function representing agent A’s state of belief will never be
accuracy-dominated despite defying all the available evidence. Therefore, if we
accept Dom, we seem forced to conclude that agent A’s state of belief is rational.
Due to the problems that accuracy arguments for probabilistic sufficiency share
with accuracy arguments for probabilistic necessity, together with the implau-
sibility of Dom, I conclude that such arguments cannot establish probabilistic
sufficiency.
4.3.3 Howson’s logical argument
In (Howson, 2000, Ch. 7) and several related articles—Howson (2003), Howson
(2012), Howson (1997a), Howson (2001), Howson (1997b)—Howson argues that
the probability axioms are “complete”. Unlike stronger collections of axioms,
he claims, the probability axioms can underpin a discipline with properties that
Howson takes to characterise “genuine” logic. Insofar as axioms that represent
rationality principles must be genuinely logical in this sense, Howson’s argument
can be used to support probabilistic sufficiency.
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In this section I investigate Howson’s proposed criteria of genuine logicality. I
argue that, depending on how we interpret what Howson writes, genuine logi-
cality either fails to distinguish the probability axioms from stronger collections
of axioms or else does not constitute a compelling standard of rationality. In
either case, Howson’s argument fails to establish probabilistic sufficiency.
Howson’s argument
Howson’s argument begins with the following proposed criteria of genuine log-
icality. Satisfying all of these criteria, he claims, is necessary and sufficient for
any discipline to be a genuine logic:
GL(a) It involves statements and relations between them.
GL(b) It adjudicates some mode of non-domain-specific reasoning.
GL(c) It is ‘about consistency’. More specifically, it should incorpo-
rate a semantic notion of consistency which can be shown to be
extensionally equivalent to one characterizable purely syntacti-
cally; this equivalence is the content of what are called sound-
ness and completeness theorems for the corresponding system.
(Howson, 2000, p. 127, ‘GL’s added)
The first criterion, GL(a), is satisfied by all putative logics that we will inves-
tigate and so does not require further investigation. GL(b) requires genuine
logics to govern modes of reasoning that are not ‘domain-specific’. Howson does
not fully explain what makes a mode of reasoning domain-specific, though he
does mention that Bayesian probability satisfies GL(b) because “any proposi-
tion whatsoever can be in the domain of a probability function” (Howson, 2000,
p. 127). This suggests the following fleshing out of Howson’s criterion: genuine
logics must be capable in principle of representing reasoning about arbitrary
propositions.
The final criterion, GL(c), stipulates that genuine logics must involve extension-
ally equivalent syntactic and semantic notions, and that these must be notions
of consistency. Howson claims to have found a logic of uncertain reasoning that
satisfies all of these criteria.
Howson takes the probability axioms to provide this logic’s syntactic notion of
consistency: a measure function is syntactically consistent if and only if it is a
probability function.
Howson obtains a semantic notion of consistency by interpreting measure func-
tions as possible actions in a betting scenario. A measure function is semanti-
cally consistent, according to this notion, if and only if it represents a ‘fair’ bet.
Howson proposes semantic conditions that, he claims, characterise fairness.
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Informally, for a bet on a proposition A to be fair in Howson’s sense means that,
given some possible state of knowledge, it is equally advantageous to take either
side of the bet. More formally, Howson claims at (Howson, 2003, p. 159) that it
makes sense to equate bets with ‘betting quotients’ p(A) ∈ [0, 1], representing
the proportions into which a disinterested but principled third party might think
it would be appropriate to split some wagered money if the truth of A has not
yet been revealed. p(A) represents the proportion of the money that the arbiter
gives to the person who stands to gain the whole lot if A is revealed to be true,
and 1−p(A) the proportion that is given to the person who takes the other side
of the bet.
Such betting quotients are fair, Howson claims, just when they satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions:
H1 If p is a fair betting quotient then 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
H2 If A is a logical truth then P (A), the fair betting quotient for
A, is 1, and. . . if A is a logical falsehood P (A) = 0.
H3 Fair bets must obviously be invariant under change of sign of
the stake: if the bet on A has no advantage over the bet against
A, the converse must hold too.
H4 If a fair bet on some proposition A, or a sum of fair bets on some
subset of propositions, determines a bet on some proposition
B with stake S and betting quotient q, then. . . p [is] the fair
betting quotient on B.
(Howson, 2000, p. 129, ‘H’s and square parentheses added)
Howson proves that these two notions of consistency are equivalent in this sense:
all measure functions that represent fair bets are probability functions, and all
probability functions represent fair bets. Consequently, probabilism is sound
and complete, in Howson’s sense, with respect to his notion of fairness, as spelled
out by H1 − 4. On this basis Howson concludes that the probability axioms
underpin a genuine logic.
Furthermore, Howson argues, as a consequence of the probability axioms’ com-
pleteness relative to his semantics, super-probabilistic collections of axioms can-
not be part of genuine logics of uncertain reasoning. This can be seen from the
following quotations:
According to the Bayesian theory the probability axioms express a
complete logic of credibility judgements.
(Howson, 2000, p. 178, emphasis original)
[the logical view of the principles of subjective probability] also tells
us what the inductive premise will look like: it will be a probability
assignment that is not deducible from the probability axioms.
(Howson, 2000, p.134)
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Under the aspect of logic the probability axioms are as they stand
complete: they are, with a qualification we shall discuss in Chapter 9,
a complete set of constraints for consistency. Hence any extension of
them–as in principles for determining ‘objective’ prior probabilities–
goes beyond pure logic.
(Howson, 2000, p.132)
To summarise, then, Howson claims that the probability axioms are the strongest
genuinely logical axioms for measure functions. Unlike stronger collections of
axioms, he claims, the probability axioms can provide the basis of a discipline
that satisfies his requirements of genuine logicality GL(a)− (c).
Response: an alternative logic of uncertain reasoning
I shall now object to this method of arguing for probabilistic sufficiency. The
probability axioms, I claim, either are not the strongest inductive logical axioms
that can underpin a genuinely logical discipline, or else axioms that are not
genuinely logical can nonetheless express rationality principles.
In order to make this case I will attempt to replicate Howson’s procedure for a
stronger collection of inductive logical axioms. Following Howson, this means
that I shall need to find syntactic and semantic notions of consistency and show
that they are extensionally equivalent, and then show that the the discipline
drawing on these notions, which I call the ‘alternative logic’, satisfies conditions
GL(a) and GL(b). I will claim that, depending on how we interpret Howson’s
criterion GL(b), the alternative logic is either genuinely logical according to
his criteria, or else shows that the criteria can be contravened by rationality
principles. In either case, it will be clear that Howson’s argument does not
establish probabilistic sufficiency.
Syntactic notion of consistency
The alternative logic’s syntactic notion of consistency is given by the collection
of axioms consisting of the probability axioms and also the axiom of constant
exchangeability Ex.14 This collection of axioms is super-probabilistic because
it is strictly more restrictive than the probability axioms.
Semantic notion of consistency
The alternative logic’s semantic notion of consistency interprets measure func-
tions as determining betting quotients relating to the game ‘Spinner’. In this
game an arrow is spun around on a pin with the end pointing at some coloured
circle-sectors. The result of a round of the game is determined by the final rest-
ing point of the end of the arrow. If the apparatus is set up correctly then the
results of previous rounds are uninformative as to the result of the next round.
14It is assumed in this section that the domain of a probability function is the set of sentences
SLpred of a unary predicate language.
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Just as in Howson’s betting scenario, a disinterested third party is asked to di-
vide a stake that has been bet on a certain proposition A. In this case, however,
the proposition A specifies a future sequence of outcomes of the spinner.
Suppose that H1−H4 are, as Howson claims, appropriate semantic conditions
for betting in general; as a result they would also apply to the specific case
of bets on spin outcomes. Furthermore, I claim that the following semantic
principle is also a fairness condition for Spinner moves:
H5 If A is a proposition specifying a certain sequence of spin outcomes, and
B is a proposition specifying a sequence that is a permutation of of the
sequence specified by A, then a fair betting quotient for A should also be
a fair betting quotient for B.
This condition is necessary for fair division of stakes in the Spinner scenario. If
it could be sensible to make a different division of stakes for A than for B, then
the spins would not be unpredictable in the way required for fair play. H5 is
therefore surely at least as compelling as H1−H4.
We can now formulate the alternative logic’s semantic notion of consistency. A
measure function is semantically consistent, according to the alternative logic,
if and only if it represents betting quotients for spin outcomes that satisfy the
principles H1−H5.
Soundness and completeness
The syntactic notion of consistency specified by the probability axioms, together
with Ex is sound and complete with respect to the semantic conditions charac-
terising fair bets on spin outcomes in exactly the same way that the probability
axioms are sound and complete with respect to the semantic conditions that
characterise Howson’s betting game. By Howson’s argument, H1-H4 guaran-
tee soundness and completeness with respect to probabilism, while H5 merely
restates the definition of Ex according to the interpretation of sentences as
spinner sequences specified above.
The alternative logic therefore satisfies Howson’s criterion GL(c). It also clearly
involves statements and relations between them: Howson’s condition GL(a) is
therefore satisfied.
Domain-specificity
It remains to be seen whether the alternative logic satisfies Howson’s criterion
GL(b), that is, whether it “adjudicates some mode of non-domain-specific rea-
soning”. This task is difficult because, as mentioned above, Howson is not
entirely clear as to what GL(b) entails.
Drawing on Howson’s apparent claim that his probability-based logic is non-
domain-specific because “any proposition whatsoever can be in the domain of a
probability function”, we might be tempted to conclude that the alternative logic
138 CHAPTER 4. SUBJECTIVE BAYESIAN INDUCTIVE LOGIC
is non-domain-specific as required. After all, just as a member of a probability
function’s domain can be interpreted as representing any proposition, the same
is true of a member of the domain of a probability function satisfying Ex. If
this were all there is to GL(b), then the alternative logic would seem to satisfy
this condition, and would therefore be a genuine logic, according to Howson’s
criteria.
However, although the axioms that constitute the alternative logic’s syntax
might just as non-domain-specific as the probability axioms, the alternative
logic’s semantics of spinner bets seem to be limited in a way that Howson’s
semantics of betting in general are not. Whereas Howson’s conditions H1 − 4
are arguably requirements of fair betting on any proposition whatsoever, H5 is
only a fairness requirement for bets on propositions that specify outcomes of
the spinner, or else are analogous to such propositions.
This difference might make one think that, even though the alternative logic
can represent reasoning about any proposition, it does not truly adjudicate a
mode of non-domain-specific reasoning because one of its semantic conditions
only applies within a certain domain of propositions. As a result, one might
continue, the alternative logic fails to satisfy Howson’s criterion GL(b).
This reading of GL(b) suggests that any discipline whose betting-based semantic
conditions do not apply to bets on arbitrary propositions cannot be a genuine
logic. Whether or not it is a requirement of genuine logicality, satisfying this
form of GL(b) is surely not a requirement for axioms representing genuine ratio-
nality principles. Some axioms seem to represent genuine rationality principles,
yet fail this test.
Consider again the principal principle, which was introduced above in section
4.3.1. As mentioned there, it arguably formalises a rationality principle, so long
as terms with the form 〈Ch(H) = p〉 are interpreted as intended, as representing
the right kind of chance proposition. However, as we have seen, the principal
principle is interpretation-sensitive: as a result it seems that any logic based
on the principal principle will be domain-specific and therefore fail to satisfy
GL(b). Even if the principal principle is not accepted as a genuine rationality
requirement, we saw above that it is difficult to capture rational evidence-based
reasoning without interpretation sensitivity. It therefore seems that, on the
second reading, GL(b) is not satisfied by all genuine rationality principles.
To sum up, if we interpret Howson’s condition GL(b) in the first way, then it is
too liberal. On this reading the alternative logic is genuine according to How-
son’s criteria, and the probability axioms are not, as he claimed, the strongest
axioms that underpin a genuine logic. On the other hand, if we interpret GL(b)
in the second way, then it is too restrictive. On this reading, there are genuine
rationality principles that fail to underpin genuine logics. On both readings,
Howson’s arguments cannot be used to establish probabilistic sufficiency.
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4.3.4 Probabilistic sufficiency has not been established
Neither grue-based arguments, accuracy arguments nor Howson’s logic-based
argument satisfactorily established probabilistic sufficiency. Grue based argu-
ments depend on the dubious assumption that axioms representing rationality
principles are interpretation-neutral. Accuracy arguments, among other prob-
lems, require all non-accuracy-dominated belief functions to represent rational
states of belief. This requirement is hard to square with the fact that irrational
states of belief can be accurate due to luck. Finally, Howson’s logic-based ar-
gument either fails to establish that super-probabilistic collections of axioms
cannot underpin genuine logics, or else prevents some axioms that represent
rationality principles from doing so.
As each of these arguments for probabilistic sufficiency is unsuccessful, and these
are the only such arguments that I am aware of, I conclude that a compelling
case for probabilistic sufficiency has not yet been made.
4.4 Which kind of inductive logic is best?
This section directly compares subjective Bayesian and Carnapian inductive
logic. I argue that Carnapian inductive logic is preferable to subjective Bayesian
inductive logic because its philosophical presuppositions are less controversial,
and because it is more versatile.
4.4.1 Philosophical comparison
Subjective Bayesian inductive logic is committed to probabilistic sufficiency and
probabilistic necessity: we have seen above that both of these epistemological
claims are dubious. It is also committed to the view that rational agents take
evidence into account using the conditional probability method for representing
evidence, though I will not discuss the epistemological merits of this commit-
ment.
Carnapian inductive logic makes none of these epistemological claims. It is un-
controversial that Carnapian inductive logic was not committed to probabilistic
sufficiency - all of the systems of inductive logic that Carnap proposed went
beyond the probability axioms. Probabilistic necessity goes against Carnapian
inductive logic’s commitment to tolerance, as it entails rejecting some systems
of inductive logic on philosophical rather than pragmatic grounds. Finally, Car-
napian inductive logic was not committed to using the conditional probability
method in all cases. This can be seen from passages like (Carnap, 1971a, p.120),
where Carnap argues that evidence should sometimes be represented informally
in the choice whether to employ axioms such as exchangeability, and Carnap
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(1967b) where Carnap entertains an alternative formal method for representing
uncertain evidence.
The main commitments that Carnapian inductive logic did make—to explica-
tion, systems of inductive logic and tolerance—are philosophically uncontentious
in comparison to those of subjective Bayesian inductive logic.
Although some authors, notably Strawson (1963), have objected to Carnap’s
method of explication on general grounds, these objections can be overcome, as
shown, for example, by Maher (2007). Recently several authors, including Lutz
(2012), Leitgeb (2013) and Olsson (2014), have proposed explicitly explicative
projects, showing that this method is widely regarded as viable.
The suitability of systems of inductive logic as explicata for inductive assump-
tions is questionable in principle but far more defensible than probabilistic ne-
cessity and sufficiency. In any case, subjective Bayesian inductive logic effec-
tively shares this commitment. It too proposes to represent certain inductive
assumptions—those of rational agents—with certain systems of inductive logic,
namely systems (D, {pr}) where the members of D represent possible objects
of partial beliefs and pr represents the credences of a rational agent.
Finally, Carnapian inductive logic’s commitment to tolerance, according to
which systems of inductive should be evaluated according to their practical
rather than philosophical merits, is surely far less controversial than the com-
mitments of subjective Bayesian inductive logic.
It seems, then, that subjective Bayesian inductive logic is more philosophically
contentious than Carnapian inductive logic.
4.4.2 Methodological comparison
Subjective Bayesian inductive logic is undeniably simpler than Carnapian in-
ductive logic. Rather than addressing systems of inductive logic in general, it
restricts its attention to the far smaller class of probabilistic systems of inductive
logic, arguing that other systems fall outside the purview of pure logic. Rather
than dealing with the problem of formalising inductive assumptions in general,
it addresses only the task of formalising rational partial beliefs. Rather than
allowing any old epistemological theory to be represented, subjective Bayesian
inductive logic restricts its attention to subjective Bayesian epistemology.
If it were never practically useful for inductive logic to depart from any of these
prescriptions, then subjective Bayesian inductive logic’s comparative simplicity
might make it more attractive than Carnapian inductive logic, in spite of any
qualms about its philosophical commitments. However, this is not the case.
On the contrary, the practical benefit of subjective Bayesian inductive logic’s
comparative simplicity is outweighed by other practical advantages of Carnapian
inductive logic.
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Since it countenances a far wider range of inductive assumptions, Carnapian in-
ductive logic can be used for many tasks that subjective Bayesian inductive logic
cannot be used for. For example, Carnapian inductive logic can formalise the
inductive assumptions of agents with non-probabilistic states of belief. Whether
or not such agents are strictly rational, they are thought to be common—see,
for example, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) for a discussion of this point—
and as such their inductive assumptions surely merit formalisation. Similarly,
Carnapian inductive logic can also address relationships between inductive as-
sumptions that do not enter the picture within subjective Bayesian inductive
logic. For example, it was shown in Gaifman (1971) that the axiom of constant
exchangeability entails the axiom of non-negative instantial relevance, showing
an interesting relationship between the assumptions that these two axioms for-
malise. Such insights fall outside the purview of subjective Bayesian inductive
logic as both axioms are stronger than probabilism.
As well as being able to formalise a wider range of inductive assumptions, Car-
napian inductive logic gains a practical advantage from the fact that it is not
restricted in how it can express evidence. Whereas, within subjective Bayesian
inductive logic, all evidence must be represented in the domain of a probability
function, Carnapian inductive logic allows evidence to be represented using an
alternative formal method, as in Carnap (1967b), or alternatively allows evi-
dence to be represented informally in the choice of a system of inductive logic.
For example, if the available evidence suggests that the order of experiments
is inductively irrelevant, this evidence can be represented informally through
the choice of a system of inductive logic that employs the axiom of constant
exchangeability. We shall see in chapter 6 that this flexibility allows Carnapian
inductive logic to capture the practices of working statisticians more effectively
than would be practicable within subjective Bayesian inductive logic.
These examples seem to indicate that Carnapian inductive logic makes a better
trade-off between generality and simplicity than subjective Bayesian inductive
logic. As a result, Carnapian inductive logic seems to be preferable to subjective
Bayesian inductive logic from a practical point of view.
4.4.3 Conclusion
Subjective Bayesian inductive logic makes commitments that are more philo-
sophically contentious than those of Carnapian inductive logic, cannot formalise
as great a range of inductive assumptions, and cannot represent evidence as
flexibly as Carnapian inductive logic. On the other hand, subjective Bayesian
inductive logic is simpler in a certain sense.
While a trenchant proponent of subjective Bayesian inductive logic might argue
that the benefit of their chosen discipline’s simplicity is so great that it offsets
each of the points in favour of Carnapian inductive logic, I think that this
stance would be unreasonable. Simplicity is not such an important feature
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of an approach to inductive logic that it trumps all other philosophical and
methodological factors. I therefore conclude that Carnapian inductive logic is




Objective Bayesian epistemology, or objective Bayesianism, asserts that all ra-
tional states of partial belief can be represented by probability functions, but
denies that all states of belief that can be so represented are rational. In this
chapter I explore two ways of connecting objective Bayesian epistemology with
Carnapian inductive logic. I focus on the form of objective Bayesian epistemol-
ogy presented in Williamson (2010).
The first way uses objective Bayesian epistemology to construct a distinct objec-
tive Bayesian form of inductive logic. This approach is analogous to subjective
Bayesian inductive logic which, as we saw in the previous chapter, uses subjec-
tive Bayesian epistemology to construct subjective Bayesian inductive logic.
I compare objective Bayesian inductive logic with Carnapian inductive logic,
arguing that Carnapian inductive logic is philosophically preferable, while both
forms of inductive logic have distinct methodological advantages.
The second, ‘assimilative’, approach to connecting objective Bayesian epistemol-
ogy and Carnapian inductive logic treats the rational norms that characterise
the former as inductive assumptions to be formalised.
I describe in general terms how this can be achieved, showing how a system of
inductive logic might formalise objective Bayesian epistemology, and argue that
this would be a good idea.
I conclude by comparing the two approaches. While objective Bayesian induc-
tive logic and the assimilative approach are very different, I claim that they
should not be thought of as opposed to each other and might even be comple-
mentary.
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5.2 Objective Bayesian epistemology
Many of the most famous proponents of objective Bayesian epistemology have
not been professional philosophers, but rather philosophically minded scientists,
such as Laplace, Leibniz, Jeffreys, Jaynes and Berger. Disciplinary boundaries
notwithstanding, I shall include these authors in the category ‘objective Bayes-
ian epistemologists’.
Objective Bayesian epistemologists are united by the belief that a rational state
of partial belief should be representable by a probability function, and also
satisfy some additional constraints. Objective Bayesian epistemology therefore
shares with subjective Bayesian epistemology a commitment to probabilistic
necessity, but differs from it by rejecting probabilistic sufficiency. All objec-
tive Bayesian epistemologists think that some probabilistic states of belief are
irrational. Some proponents of objective Bayesian epistemology support condi-
tionalisation, whereas others reject it in favour of alternative ways of describing
how rational agents should react to evidence.
I shall focus on the form of objective Bayesian epistemology defended by Jon
Williamson in Williamson (2010). It would be difficult to do justice to all the
authors mentioned above, and Williamson’s version of objective Bayesian epis-
temology shares many features with the others. In addition, Williamson’s posi-
tion is distinguished by being particularly distinct from subjective Bayesianism.
First, Williamson, like many other objective Bayesian epistemologists, supports
a form of the equivocation norm, according to which rational agents ought to
distribute their degrees of belief as evenly as possible. Second, and perhaps
more unusually, Williamson’s position also differs from subjective Bayesianism
as to how rational agents ought to react to evidence.
5.2.1 Norms of rational belief
Williamson’s form of objective Bayesian epistemology position imposes two
norms on rational states of partial belief in addition to the probability norm.
These are called calibration and equivocation. These norms are presented in
Landes and Williamson (2013) as follows:
Probability The strengths of an agent’s beliefs should be rep-
resentable by a probability function.
Calibration The strengths of an agent’s beliefs should satisfy
constraints imposed by her evidence E .1
1Note that, here and in what follows, I use the caligraphic symbol E to represent an
agent’s evidence, whereas the presentation in Landes and Williamson (2013) use the symbol E.
This is to distinguish the symbol representing an agent’s evidence from symbols representing
propositions or sentences.
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Equivocation The agent should not adopt beliefs that are
more extreme than is demanded by her evidence E .
(Landes and Williamson, 2013, p. 1)
The probability norm forces rational states of partial belief to be representable
by probability functions. It is effectively equivalent to probabilistic necessity.
The calibration norm dictates how a rational agent should take evidence into
account. Every possible state of evidence E is taken to determine a correspond-
ing set EE ⊆ P of probability functions which are calibrated with that evidence.
The calibration norm stipulates that any rational state of partial belief that
takes into account E should be representable by a probability function in EE .
For the sake of readability I sometimes omit the subscript E below when there
is no need to indicate which state of evidence corresponds to a particular set of
calibrated probability functions.
The problem of working out which set EE contains the probability functions
that are calibrated with a given state of evidence E is somewhat open-ended.
This is perhaps fitting, as there are many ways in which evidence can con-
strain the strengths of one’s beliefs. Landes and Williamson present one form
of constraint—information about physical probabilities—as follows:
In particular, if the evidence determines just that physical probabil-
ity (aka chance) P ? is in some set P? of probability functions. . . then
[the probability function representing the strengths of an agent’s be-
liefs] should be calibrated to physical probability insofar as it should
lie in the convex hull E = 〈P?〉 of the set P?.
(Landes and Williamson, 2013, p.1, parentheses original)
In addition, objective Bayesian epistemologists envisage other kinds of eviden-
tial constraint. One’s evidence might compel one to consider only probability
functions which assign certain expected values to particular random variables.
(Jaynes, 1995, Ch. 11) explains how this kind of evidence can help to determine a
set of calibrated probability functions. At (Williamson, 2010, p.28) Williamson
considers ‘structural’ constraints corresponding to evidence about things other
than physical probabilities.
The equivocation norm indicates which states of partial belief among those
permitted by their evidence a rational agent ought to adopt. Given a set of cal-
ibrated probability functions EE and a desired level of equivocation, the equivo-
cation norm identifies a set ⇓ EE of sufficiently equivocal probability functions.
It stipulates that rational states of partial belief taking into account E should
be representable by probability functions in ⇓ EE .
The precise content of the equivocation norm depends on how exactly degrees
of equivocation are measured and on what level of equivocation is deemed to
be sufficient. In the case of a domain Ω that is a state space generated by a
finite number of atomic states, Williamson proposes that the degree of equiv-
ocation of a given probability function p should be measured by its Shannon
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entropy H(p) = −∑ω∈Ω p(ω) log p(ω). Analogues of this quantity can be found
for domains that are sets of sentences of propositional or unary predicate lan-
guages: see Landes and Williamson (2013) for details. The level of equivocation
required for membership of ⇓ EE is typically the maximum level possible,though
Williamson allows that in some cases it might be preferable to set a very high
but sub-maximal level.
I will not dwell on the issues of how to measure equivocation and what is the best
level. I shall assume that a set of sufficiently equivocal calibrated probability
functions can be defined uncontroversially in any circumstance.
5.2.2 Are the norms justified?
Objective Bayesian epistemology advocates the probability norm, which is tan-
tamount to probabilistic necessity; it is therefore just as vulnerable as subjective
Bayesian epistemology to the epistemological objections laid out in section 4.2
above.
Since I take it that the arguments in section 4.2 already establish that the
probability norm is dubious, I will not direct very much attention towards the
question of whether the calibration and equivocation norms are justified. Landes
and Williamson (2013) discusses these issues at length.
5.2.3 Methods of representing evidence
The calibration norm introduces a novel ‘calibration-based’ way of representing
the effect of taking evidence into account. According to the calibration norm,
every state of evidence E determines a set of calibrated probability functions EE .
Taking evidence into account is represented by adopting a probability function
in EE .
This calibration-based method of representing taking evidence into account dif-
fers from the conditional probability method that subjective Bayesian episte-
mology employs. Like the calibration-based method, the conditional proba-
bility method begins by stipulating that rational states of belief should be
represented by probability functions. However, unlike the calibration-based
method, the conditional probability method represents every state of evidence
E by a specific member EE ∈ D of the relevant domain. The effect of taking
E into account is then represented by the difference between minitial(•) and
mnew(•) = minitial(• | EE).
Mirroring the presentation of the calibration-based method, one could formu-
late the conditional probability method as a norm according to which, if one’s
evidence is represented by EE , then one’s state of belief should be represented
by a belief function in the set PEE = {m : m ∈ P and m(EE) = 1} of probability
functions that assign the value 1 to EE .
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The main novelty of the calibration-based method is that, except insofar as it
must determine a set EE , evidence itself need not be represented formally. In
particular, states of evidence need not be assigned degrees of belief.
In contrast, the conditional probability method of representing evidence requires
that all possible states of evidence must be represented formally as domain-
members and therefore be assigned degrees of belief.
In addition, the calibration-based method allows a sharp distinction between
considerations to do with evidence and other considerations. In Williamson’s
objective Bayesian epistemology, the calibration norm encompasses all evidence-
related considerations, whereas the probability and equivocation norms do not
have to do with evidence. The conditional probability method does not make
this kind of distinction.
Agreement and disagreement between the two methods
In certain cases the two ways of representing evidence agree. For example,
suppose that the only effect of taking into account the state of evidence E is to
recognise the truth of some proposition represented by the domain-member X.
In this case, the calibrated set EE should plausibly contain all and only those
probability functions that give probability 1 to X. This is the same as the set
PX recommended by the conditional probability method.
However, the two methods do not always agree, as the effect of taking evidence
into account is not always to recognise the truth of propositions corresponding to
domain-members. In particular, evidence can impart information about physical
probabilities. Suppose, for example, that the state of evidence Ech dictates only
that the physical probability of the proposition represented by domain member
A is between 1/2 and 2/3. The calibration-based method must represent Ech
by making sure that EEch contains only probability functions that assign A
values between 1/2 and 2/3. On the other hand, the same effect need not occur
under the conditional probability method. Even if the proposition that Ech is
taken into account corresponds to a domain-member—call it Ech—the set PEch
can in principle contain probability functions that assign A values outside the
interval [1/2, 2/3]. Unless an axiom along the lines of the principal principle
is imposed, the calibration-based method and the domain-based method will
therefore disagree in this case.
(Williamson, 2011, § 4) explains, in general, when the two methods agree and
when they do not.
Advantages and disadvantages of each method
Not having to represent states of evidence in measure functions’ domains con-
fers several advantages on the calibration-based method for representing taking
148 CHAPTER 5. OBJECTIVE BAYESIANISM
evidence into account.
From a philosophical point of view, the calibration-based method is, in princi-
ple, liberated from holding that evidence always takes the form of a collection
of propositions. Objective Bayesian epistemologists may therefore potentially
allow that certain objects may constitute evidence. This is desirable because in
some contexts people describe objects as evidence: in a court case, for example,
a blood-stained knife might be referred to as a piece of evidence.
Practically speaking, it is advantageous to be able to represent states of partial
belief using probability functions whose domains do not necessarily include rep-
resentions of all possible states of evidence. In many cases it is not possible, let
alone useful, to enumerate all possible states of evidence.
On the other hand, the domain-based method is entrenched in scientific working
practices and lends itself to the easy explication of certain inductive assump-
tions. For example, the assumption that evidence of past instances renders
future instances more plausible is straightforwardly explicated by the axiom of
positive instantial relevance. We shall see below that it is not clear how this
assumption should be represented using the calibration-based method.
5.3 Objective Bayesian inductive logic
The first way of relating objective Bayesian epistemology and inductive logic
articulates a distinct objective Bayesian form of inductive logic similar to the
subjective Bayesian form discussed in chapter 3.
Objective Bayesian inductive logic aims to formalise the inductive assumptions
that might be made by agents who are rational according to objective Bayes-
ian epistemology. Just as in the subjective Bayesian case, objective Bayesian
inductive logic is distinguished from objective Bayesian epistemology because
it has a different goal: it aims to produce useful formal models of inductive
reasoning rather than true claims about rational states of partial belief. The
general instructions of objective Bayesian inductive logic are as follows:
Objective Bayesian inductive logic
Suppose that P is the set of probability functions on a certain domain D whose
members represent propositions whose plausibility is of interest. In addition,
suppose that the relevant evidence in a particular situation determines a set of
calibrated probability functions E and that ⇓ E is the set of sufficiently equivocal
calibrated probability functions corresponding to E.
Then, for the purposes of formalising the inductive reasoning of a rational agent,
use only systems of inductive logic (D,M) satisfying three conditions:
OBIL1 (Probability): M⊆ P
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OBIL2 (Calibration): M⊆ E
OBIL3 (Equivocation): M⊆⇓ E
As in the subjective Bayesian case, objective Bayesian inductive logic is
largely determined by its epistemological counterpart. OBIL1 excludes sub-
probabilistic systems of inductive logic, as befits a form of inductive logic that
accepts the probability norm for rational beliefs. OBIL2 follows from objec-
tive Bayesian epistemology’s commitment to the calibration norm, and OBIL3
from the equivocation norm. The three stipulations increase in logical strength:
OBIL3 entails OBIL2, which entails OBIL1.
This approach seems to match the outline of the objective Bayesian inductive
logic presented in (Williamson, 2015, § 5). Williamson construes the norms of
objective Bayesian epistemology as providing a semantics for inductive logic:
this is essentially the situation if one follows the instructions of objective Bayes-
ian inductive logic. To see why this is the case, consider Williamson’s inductive
logical schema:
φX11 , . . . , φ
Xk
k |≈ ψY
According to Williamson, objective Bayesian inductive logic defines semantic
rules for this kind of entailment relationship under a certain interpretation. On
this interpretation, φ1, . . . , φk, ψ are members of a set D representing propo-
sitions of interest, X1, . . . , Xk are sets of probabilities, representing states of
evidence about these propositions and Y is a set of probabilities represent-
ing possible rational degrees of belief in ψ, given the corresponding evidence.
Williamson defines objective Bayesian inductive logic as stipulating that an en-
tailment relationship fitting the above schema obtains if and only if Y contains
the value p⇓E(ψ) of every probability function p⇓E in the set ⇓ E, where E is a
set of calibrated probability functions determined by the values in X1, . . . , Xk.
See (Williamson, 2015, § 5.4) for a full discussion of this procedure.
Similarly, the instructions of objective Bayesian inductive logic define semantic
rules governing the relationships between sets E and M, under the interpre-
tation that these sets represent states of evidence and possible rational states
of belief. Williamson’s formulation differs from mine in two main ways. First,
Williamson’s presentation specifies how a set E of calibrated probability func-
tions is to be determined based on a collection X1, . . . , Xk of sets of probabilities,
whereas my presentation leaves this question open. Second, Williamson’s pre-
sentation concerns a set Y representing possible rational degrees of belief in a
single proposition, whereas my presentation concerns a setM representing pos-
sible rational states of belief in many propositions. Neither of these differences
is fundamental.
Objective Bayesian inductive logic, defined according to the above instructions,
is distinct from both Carnapian and subjective Bayesian inductive logic. It is
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incompatible with Carnapian inductive logic because, like the subjective Bayes-
ian approach, it rejects certain systems of inductive logic—for example, sub-
probabilistic ones—in all circumstances, for purely philosophical reasons. This
amounts to a rejection of Carnap’s hard core commitment to tolerating all sys-
tems of inductive logic at a philosohical level. In particular, due to its epis-
temological commitment to the calibration norm, objective Bayesian inductive
logic must represent evidence using the calibration-based method rather than
the conditional probability method, regardless of the methodological merits of
this decision. Carnapian inductive logic may in principle use any method.
Objective Bayesian inductive logic is also incompatible with subjective Bayesian
inductive logic, as it uses the calibration-based method to represent evidence,
whereas subjective Bayesian inductive logic is committed only to using the con-
ditional probability method.
In the next few sections I compare objective Bayesian inductive logic with Car-
napian inductive logic. I argue that objective Bayesian inductive logic has both
relative disadvantages and relative advantages. The relative disadvantages are
that objective Bayesian inductive logic’s commitment to probabilistic necessity
is philosophically dubious, and that its commitment to the calibration-based
method makes it difficult to represent certain kinds of evidence. On the other
hand, objective Bayesian inductive logic leaves less discretion to inductive lo-
gicians than Carnapian inductive logic, and can formalise assumptions about
physical probabilities that are difficult for Carnapian inductive logic to capture.
5.3.1 Scope for formalising different inductive assump-
tions
The main way for objective Bayesian inductive logic to represent different induc-
tive assumptions is by varying the set E of calibrated probability functions so as
to represent different states of evidence. Representing different assumptions by
adjusting other aspects of objective Bayesian inductive logic is difficult, given
its epistemological commitments.
Objective Bayesian epistemology takes probability functions’ domains to repre-
sent the set of propositions under consideration: this set does not necessarily
change depending on the inductive assumption in question. As a result, using
different domains to represent different assumptions seems inappropriate, except
where different propositions are being represented.
The required level of equivocation also cannot be changed so as to model dif-
ferent inductive assumptions: it is explained at (Landes and Williamson, 2013,
p.15) that the main motivation for not formulating the equivocation norm so
as to rule out all non-maximally-equivocal probability functions is to deal with
unusual constraints. In order to keep in the spirit of objective Bayesian epis-
temology, the threshold must be set so high that near-maximal equivocality
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is required. If this is done, then the set of sufficiently equivocal probability
functions will typically be very small.
In contrast, Carnapian inductive logic can represent inductive assumptions by
varying all parts of a system of inductive logic: both the set of measure functions
and the domain. The set of measure functions can be manipulated by choosing
axioms that reflect the assumption that is to be formalised, whether evidential or
not. For example, constant exchangeability might be appropriate if, according
to the available evidence, a list of observations records successive rolls of a
die, in which case the order of observations would impart no information, but
inappropriate if the evidence specifies that the list records successive states of the
weather, in which case the order of observations would be important. Carnap
makes this point at (Carnap, 1971a, p.129). Similarly, different domains can be
chosen so as to reflect different kinds of assumption. Carnap discussed this kind
of manipulation at (Carnap, 1971a, p.49-52): for some applications, he argued,
it is appropriate to formulate evidence in an ‘observation’ language, whereas for
other applications the same evidence can be formulated within a ‘theoretical’
language.
5.3.2 Evidence about physical probabilities
Objective Bayesian epistemology offers ample instructions as to how the set
E should vary so as to reflect evidence about physical probabilities, or phe-
nomena that behave like them. Objective Bayesian inductive logic is therefore
well-equipped to represent inductive assumptions about which degrees of plau-
sibility are appropriate given such evidence. In addition, objective Bayesian
inductive logic can easily handle inductive assumptions about degrees of plau-
sibility in light of evidence that fixes the expected values on certain random
variables. Both of these forms of evidence directly rule out certain probability
functions, and so can naturally be represented as constraints on sets of calibrated
probability functions.
This kind of evidence is difficult to depict for inductive logics that rely on
the conditional probability method of representing evidence. According to this
method, evidence about physical probabilities, or evidence about the expected
values of random variables, must be represented as domain-members: this might
make the resulting system of inductive logic very unwieldy.
Since it can formalise assumptions about physical probabilities relatively suc-
cinctly, objective Bayesian inductive logic therefore has an advantage compared
to subjective Bayesian inductive logic, which is committed to using the con-
ditional probability method in all circumstances. It also has an advantage
compared to Carnapian inductive logic: although the latter discipline is not
committed to using the conditional probability method in all circumstances, it
has not yet developed a method that can represent assumptions about physical
probability as succinctly as objective Bayesian inductive logic.
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However, inductive assumptions that do not have to do with physical probabil-
ities and do not fix the expected values of random variables pose a potential
problem for objective Bayesian inductive logic. In particular, it is not imme-
diately obvious how to formalise inductive assumptions of instantial relevance:
those according to which instances of a certain kind of observation affect the
plausibility of future instances of the same kind. I shall now investigate whether
objective Bayesian inductive logic is sufficiently comprehensive to overcome this
difficulty.
5.3.3 Evidence about relevance
Consider the case of a nature enthusiast who wants to find out about the habits
of the elusive, possibly mythical, Suffolk tiger. This species of tiger is said to
roam the countriside in the county of Suffolk in South East England, mostly at
night, and always when nobody is looking.
The enthusiast sets up tiger-sensitive cameras in two propitious-seeming locations—
one on a hill, and another in a path through a wood—and then returns home
and waits for the traps to send images to a computer. Initially, the enthusi-
ast’s evidence and background knowledge about the situation are very limited.
However, while the enthusiast is at home waiting for images, their friend—a
renowned tiger expert—pops in and says that, if the camera in the wood were
to spot a tiger, that would make it more plausible that the camera on the hill
would spot one as well. In other words, the enthusiast receives evidence ac-
cording to which one event, namely observing a tiger in the wood, is positively
relevant to another, namely observing a tiger on the hill.
Suppose that, in order to benefit from the clarity of formal language, the en-
thusiast decides to formalise their reasoning in this situation using objective
Bayesian inductive logic.
A very simple domain could be used to represent the possibilities, namely the
set SLtiger of sentences of a unary predicate language Ltiger with one predicate
T and two constant symbols a1 and a2. Each constant symbol represents a trap-
experiment, and the predicate T represents a positive result, i.e. the trap taking
a photo of a tiger. Ltiger has four state descriptions—Ta1 ∧ Ta2, Ta1 ∧ ¬Ta2,
¬Ta1∧Ta2 and ¬Ta1∧¬Ta2—corresponding to the four possible combinations
of outcomes of the enthusiast’s two experiments.
In addition, a set of measure functions representing possible degrees of plausi-
bility would be required. According to objective Bayesian inductive logic, this
should be a subset of the set ⇓ E of sufficiently equivocal probability functions
that are calibrated with the available evidence. The main problem is to find a set
of probability functions Epre that are calibrated with the enthusiast’s evidence
before receiving advice from the friendly tiger expert, and another set Epost of
functions that are calibrated with the enthusiast’s evidence after receiving the
new information.
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Figure 5.1: The set P4 of probability functions on SLtiger
Since the enthusiast initially has very limited evidence and background knowl-
edge about the Suffolk tiger, either statistical or qualitative, Epre should plau-
sibly be the set P4 of all probability functions whose domains are SLtiger. One
might argue that any reasonable person would have good evidence that there
are no tigers in Suffolk, given this county’s tiger-unfriendly environment, the
fact that there are very few tigers of any kind remaining in the world and the
absence of any other big cat that is capable of living in a densely populated area
without leaving any trace of its existence. I shall assume that the enthusiast
wishes to formalise a more open-minded inductive attitude.
This initial set P4 is represented geometrically in figure 5.1 below.
Each point in the tetrahedron represents a probability function whose domain
is SLtiger. Each vertex represents a probability function that gives probabil-
ity 1 to one state description and probability 0 to all others. Edges represent
probability functions that give two state descriptions positive probability, other
points on the surface represent functions that give three state descriptions pos-
itive probability, and points in the interior allocate positive probability to all
state descriptions. The point at the centre of the tetrahedron represents the
equivocator function, which gives the same probability 1/4 to all four state
descriptions.
A natural choice for Epost is the set IR+ of probability functions that satisfy
the axiom of positive instantial relevance; that is, those functions p such that
p(Ta2 | Ta1) > p(Ta2). To see which region of the P4 tetrahedron IR+ oc-
cupies, consider the independence surface depicted below, which represents the
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Figure 5.2: The set of probability functions p such that p(Ta2 | Ta1) = p(Ta2)
probability functions p such that p(Ta2 | Ta1) = p(Ta2). IR+ occupies the
region below this surface.
Unfortunately, objective Bayesian inductive logic cannot straightforwardly choose
IR+ as Epost because IR+ is non-convex. This can be seen from the diagram:
there are line-segments connecting points in IR+ that pass outside of it.
Objective Bayesian epistemology typically requires sets of calibrated probabil-
ity functions to be convex because it can be technically difficult to apply the
equivocation norm to non-convex sets. Identifying which probability functions
within a convex set have the greatest Shannon entropy is, in general, a much
simpler problem than in the non-convex case. The former problem is one of
convex optimisation whereas the latter is a problem of non-convex optimisa-
tion. Boyd and Vandenberghe note at (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2009, §1.3.1)
that “very effective” methods are available for solving problems of convex op-
timisation, and that “ it is reasonable to expect that solving general convex
optimization problems will become a technology within a few years”, offering
no similar assurances for non-convex optimisation problems. Allowing Epost
to be non-convex while measuring equivocality using Shannon entropy therefore
leads to a methodological problem: finding a set ⇓ Epost of sufficiently equivocal
probability functions becomes more difficult.
Williamson makes a proposal at (Williamson, 2010, p.45)—the convex-hull method—
for ensuring that all calibrated sets are convex. According to this method, if
one’s evidence suggests adopting a non-convex set of probability functions Ev,
then one should take as one’s set of calibrated probability functions Ev’s convex
hull 〈Ev〉. The convex hull of a set of probability functions is the smallest set
containing Ev that is closed under convex combinations.
Whatever the merits of the convex hull approach in general, it does not provide
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an attractive solution in our case. Following the convex hull approach would
suggest taking 〈IR+〉, the convex hull of IR+ as the set of calibrated probability
functions Epost. However, as can be seen from the figure above, this set would
contain all of the probability functions in P4. Following the convex hull approach
would therefore make it the case that Epre = Epost = P4. This would mean that
the evidence provided by the enthusiast’s friend had no effect on the enthusiast’s
epistemic situation, which would be very unintuitive as the friend’s evidence
seemed informative.
In order to formalise their reasoning using objective Bayesian inductive logic,
then, the enthusiast seems to be faced with a choice between two unattrac-
tive options: allowing a non-convex set of calibrated probability functions or
interpreting the friend’s evidence as uninformative.
I shall now consider some possible ways out of this predicament.
Calibrating to a different set
One response to this dilemma is to represent the states of belief that are cal-
ibrated with the enthusiast’s second evidential state using a set of probability
functions other than IR+. Such an alternative might well be attractive to an ob-
jective Bayesian inductive logician in any case, as the appeal of IR+ depends on
taking the conditional probability p(Ta2 | Ta1) to indicate the degree to which
the event represented by Ta2 is plausible, given evidence according to which
the event represented by Ta1 occurred. In other words, choosing IR
+ takes
for granted an instance of the conditional probability approach to represent-
ing evidence. Since objective Bayesian epistemology is committed to a method
of representing the effect of evidence that is in general inconsistent with the
conditional probability approach, an objective Bayesian epistemologist’s first
instinct might be to lay that this way of representing relevance is the cause of
the problem.
There are two obstacles blocking this escape route. First, it is hard to think
of an alternative set of probability functions to IR+ that would represent the
enthusiast’s second evidential state without appealing to the conditional proba-
bility approach. Even if an alternative set were found, this set is not guaranteed
to be convex. Second, it is difficult to see why an objective Bayesian should ob-
ject to taking p(Ta2 | Ta1) to represent the degree to which a positive result
at trap two is plausible, given that trap two took a picture of a tiger. None
of the conditions outlined at (Williamson, 2011, p. 73), under which objective
Bayesian updating disagrees with the conditional probability approach, seem to
apply in this case.
Both of these obstacles would need to be overcome in order for the problem to
be resolved by starting with an alternative set of probability functions.
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Accept that Epost = P4
Alternatively, objective Bayesian inductive logic could accept the outcome of
the convex-hull method and formalise the enthusiast’s second evidential state
as the whole of P4, while interpreting it so as to avoid the counter-intuitive
implication that the enthusiast should ignore their friend’s evidence.
One way to do this is might be to claim that the friend’s evidence has further
significance, beyond constraining the choice of Epost. Perhaps it constrains the
enthusiast’s future choice of calibrated probability functions in case they learn
the outcome of the first trap experiment before learning about the second. If
this were the case then an objective Bayesian could perhaps allow that the
enthusiast’s second evidential state is represented by the whole of P4 without
having to conclude that the enthusiast has to ignore the new evidence.
This approach faces a general problem. If the friend’s evidence affects the
enthusiast’s reasoning in a way that is not captured in the choice of Epost, then
objective Bayesian inductive logic does not fully formalise their reasoning.
How significant is this problem?
In sum, while the enthusiast’s reasoning might possibly be formalised using
objective Bayesian inductive logic, a plausible way to do so has not yet been
found.
The problem seems to generalise in at least two ways. First, the particular inter-
pretation, with cameras, tigers and an enthusiast, was inessential: the problem
applies to any structurally similar situation, in which evidence must be taken
into account according to which one experimental result is probabilistically rel-
evant to another. Secondly, the number of experiments was not important.
While the case with two experiments is the only one where the situation can
easily be visualised, the set of probability functions satisfying the axiom of pos-
itive instantial relevance is also non-convex in cases with greater numbers of
experiments.
Objective Bayesian inductive logic therefore faces a challenge: how should it
formalise evidence according to which results of a certain kind are relevant to
others of the same kind, if not by calibrating to the set of probability functions
that satisfy the axiom of positive instantial relevance?
A qualification
Williamson (2013) outlines how objective Bayesian inductive logic can formalise
a certain kind of evidence about relevance, namely evidence according to which,
if a certain result is frequent in a long sequence of independent and identically
distributed observations, then subsequent observations of the same kind should
be more plausible.
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Williamson’s argument can be illustrated using the following example. An agent
must decide to what degree they believe the proposition—call it H100—that the
result of the hundredth coin toss in a sequence would be heads. The possibilities
are heads and tails, so the agent must choose a function within the set P2 of
probability functions with a two-member domain. In the absence of any evidence
one way or the other the calibrated set is the whole of P2, and the most equivocal
choice assigns probability 1/2 to H100.
However, suppose the evidence includes the results of the previous 99 tosses—
suppose they were all heads—together with the information that each toss
should be regarded as probabilistically independent and as assigning the same
probability to heads as the probability that should be assigned to H100. Classi-
cal statistical methods teach us that, in these circumstances, it is very plausible
that H100 should be assigned a probability greater than 6/10. If the ‘ruling
out’ proposition that H100 should be assigned a probability greater than 6/10
is plausible enough in light of the results, then a rational agent should arguably
incorporate this proposition into their evidence. The set of calibrated probabil-
ity functions is now not the whole of P2, but rather the subset of probability
functions that assign H100 probability greater that 6/10. The most equivocal
choice now assigns probability 6/10 to H100: the combined result of the in-
stances, together with the assumption of independent and identical objective
probabilities, was to increase the probability of H100.
This example seems to show that, given the right background conditions, ob-
jective Bayesian inductive logic can accommodate evidence about positive rel-
evance. However, for several reasons, only a limited array of evidence about
relevance can be represented in this way. First, the background conditions need
to obtain - if one’s evidence suggests that there should be positive relevance
in a case that does not feature a long sequence of independent and identically
distributed events, then this evidence cannot be formalised using Williamson’s
method. Second, the degree of positive relevance depends on the exact thresh-
old at which the ruling out proposition becomes plausible enough to be incor-
porated as evidence. Whether all rational agents have ‘Lockean thresholds’ is
philosophically controversial—see, for example Hawthorne (2009)—and identi-
fying a suitable threshold for a particular application would surely be difficult.
Even if a threshold is found in a particular case, the degree of positive relevance
that it and the available statistical evidence imply may not match the degree
of positive relevance suggested by non-statistical evidence about relevance. Fi-
nally, it is not clear that this method could be extended for the case of evidence
about negative relevance.
5.3.4 Conclusion
To sum up the preceding discussion, it is possible to construct a distinct ob-
jective Bayesian form of inductive logic that draws on objective Bayesian epis-
temology. This objective Bayesian inductive logic offers a good framework for
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formalising inductive reasoning that incorporates evidence about physical prob-
abilities and evidence that fixes the expected values of random variables. On
the other hand, objective Bayesian inductive logic faces a challenge as to how it
should formalise evidence about relevance. So far, this challenge has not been
met in full.
I shall now briefly compare objective Bayesian inductive logic with Carnapian
inductive logic.
At a philosophical level, Carnapian inductive logic seems to be preferable to ob-
jective Bayesian inductive logic. Whereas Carnapian inductive logic makes only
comparatively uncontroversial philosophical commitments, objective Bayesian
inductive logic is committed to probabilistic necessity, which is epistemologi-
cally dubious.
From a methodological point of view, objective Bayesian epistemology is far
more specific than Carnapian inductive logic. Whereas Carnapian inductive
logic affords much discretion to the practising inductive logician—for example,
which axioms to impose, which method to represent evidence with—objective
Bayesian inductive logic makes these decisions automatically. As a result, ob-
jective Bayesian inductive logic seems to be preferable to Carnapian inductive
logic for applications that involve the kind of evidence that it specialises in. On
the other hand, Carnapian inductive logic can represent inductive assumptions
that are difficult for objective Bayesian inductive logic to formalise, such as
assumptions involving evidence about instantial relevance.
In order to determine whether Carnapian inductive logic or objective Bayesian
inductive logic should be used for a given application, it must be determined
what kind of evidence is to be formalised. If the application involves only
formalising evidence about physical probabilities, then objective Bayesian in-
ductive logic may well be preferable to Carnapian inductive logic due to its
specificity. On the other hand, if the application involves evidence about in-
stantial relevance, then Carnapian inductive logic is likely to be preferable.
Whether Carnapian and objective Bayesian inductive logic turn out to be vi-
able will depend on whether there are sufficiently many, sufficiently important,
applications of the kind that it is most suited for. This is difficult to predict
in advance; nonetheless, in chapter 6 I will attempt to outline an area of ap-
plication for Carnapian inductive logic—to formalising assumptions that arise
during statistical investigations—which is both important and to which other
forms of inductive logic do not seem apt. Whether there are niches in the scien-
tific landscape that are similarly suitable for objective Bayesian inductive logic
remains to be seen.
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5.4 The assimilative approach
Rather than attempting to find a distinctive objective Bayesian inductive logic,
it is also possible to treat the objective Bayesian norms as inductive assumptions
and attempts to formalise them within Carnapian inductive logic. In this sec-
tion I examine this ‘assimilative’ approach to the problem of relating objective
Bayesian epistemology and inductive logic.
I attempt to describe, in general terms, what a system of inductive logic that for-
malises the objective Bayesian norms would look like and to judge the viability
of the assimilative approach on that basis.
Before doing so, it is necessary to address an objection to the very idea of
formalising the objective Bayesian norms within Carnapian inductive logic. A
proponent of objective Bayesian epistemology might, at first glance, consider
the assimilative approach to be fundamentally at odds with the spirit of ob-
jective Bayesian epistemology. Epistemological principles, they might contend,
are quite different from inductive assumptions. An inductive assumption is
speculative—depending on the facts, it might be wise or unwise—whereas an
epistemological principle is not: acting in accordance with a genuine principle
of rationality is wise regardless of the facts. By construing the norms of ob-
jective Bayesian epistemology as inductive assumptions, the proponent might
continue, the assimilative approach risks glossing over any debate about whether
the norms are genuine rationality requirements. Even worse, the assimilative
approach might even seem to pre-judge this debate, presupposing that the ob-
jective Bayesian norms are not rationality requirements but only mere assump-
tions.
I can think of two responses to this objection. First, it is not clear that objective
Bayesian epistemologists typically conceive of their norms as absolutely excep-
tionless principles. For example, Williamson acknowledges in his discussion of
the probability norm at (Williamson, 2010, p. 38) that that the probability
norm need not constrain the partial beliefs of agents who find themselves in
unusual betting scenarios. Similarly, objective Bayesian epistemologists might
allow that, in certain unusual circumstances, agents might rationally contravene
the other norms without threatening those norms’ statuses.
Thus it is not clear that practising epistemologists hold to the kind of sharp dis-
tinction between exceptionless principles and fact-dependent assumptions that
the objection envisages. As a result construing its norms as assumptions per-
haps does less of an injustice to the objective Bayesian epistemology than might
be thought at first glance.
Secondly, and more importantly, adopting the assimilative approach need not in-
volve the epistemological presuppositions that the objection implies. Carnapian
inductive logic does not aim to settle epistemological questions, but rather to
avoid them by focusing on the practical, rather than epistemological, merits
of formalising different views. Formalising the objective Bayesian norms within
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Carnapian inductive logic does not necessarily commit one to the view that they
are not genuine rationality principle. One need only decide that formalising the
norms is useful: it is possible to maintain this position at the same time as
thinking that the norms are genuine epistemological principles.
To take a similar case, both someone who thinks that the future tends to re-
semble the past and an inductive sceptic who doubts that this is the case might
have good pragmatic reasons to formalise the assumption of positive instantial
relevance within Carnapian inductive logic. Analogously, both people who think
that the objective Bayesian norms are universal principles and those who doubt
this may reasonably adopt the assimilative approach.
5.4.1 Objective Bayesian epistemology as a system of in-
ductive logic
In order to carry out the assimilative approach, a system of inductive logic—
that is, a domain and a set of permitted measure functions—must be found that
formalises the norms of objective Bayesian epistemology.
The measure functions that may represent rational states of belief, according to
objective Bayesian epistemology, will be characterised by axioms corresponding
to the norms set out in section 5.2.1 above. Following the normal approach
of Carnapian inductive logic, the effect of taking evidence into account will be
represented using the conditional probability method.
The main challenge will be to find a way, consistent with the conditional prob-
ability approach, to formulate the calibration norm. This norm conceives of a
body of evidence as a collection of constraints as to which measure functions
can be adopted, rather than as a proposition that can be conditionalised upon.
Fortunately, by developing an argument from Skyrms (1985) it is possible to find
a method for formalising the calibration norm. Skyrms argues that objective
Bayesian updating—the process of repeatedly applying the objective Bayesian
norms under changes of evidence—can be analysed as a special case of the ap-
plication of the rule of conditionalisation. Skyrms’s key idea is to expand the
domains of the conditionalising probability functions so that they include mem-
bers that represent what he calls “propositions about” physical probabilities.
The same idea can work for our purposes: in order to describe the calibration
norm as an axiom, we must consider measure functions with rich domains whose
members can represent not only propositions about possible states of affairs, but
also propositions about possible evidential states. Call such a domain D+. I
shall now describe how such a domain can be constructed.
In order to represent all relevant propositions about states of the world, the new
domain D+ must contain a sub-domain whose members represent such states.
Within objective Bayesian epistemology the most basic approach, followed in
Williamson (2010) and Landes and Williamson (2013), is to presume that the
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objects of rational agents’ beliefs can be represented by members of a finite
propositional domain Dprop. I will follow this approach in what follows: the
richer domain D+ will be taken to contain a propositional domain Dprop whose
members will be taken to represent propositions about possible states of affairs.
As a result of starting in this way with Dprop, rather than a richer domain, the
approach sketched here will not formalise the more sophisticated form of ob-
jective Bayesian epistemology explored in Landes and Williamson (2015) where
predicate domains are considered. Nonetheless, a similar analysis ought to apply
to such cases with appropriate modifications.
In addition to containing Dprop, D+ must contain another sub-domain DEv
whose members represent possible states of evidence, construed as sets of cali-
brated probability functions overDprop. Since any set of probability functions on
Dprop can in principle be a calibrated set, it seems like DEv must be P(PDprop),
the powerset of the set of all probability functions over Dprop.
Beyond the fact that it must contain both both Dprop and DEv, I will not
explore exactly how D+ ought to be constructed. One way to construct D+ so
as to contain both Dprop and DEv would be to specify that D+ = Dprop ∪DEv,
setting D+ as the union of these two sets. Many issues need to be addressed
in order to determine whether this is the best choice. For example, would it
be preferable for D+, unlike D+ = Dprop ∪ DEv, be a boolean algebra, and
therefore closed under union and intersection? If so, how should we interpret
members like X ∪ E, where X ∈ Dprop and E ∈ DEv = P(PDprop)? While
such issues would need to be addressed in order to carry out the assimilative
approach fully, they do not bear directly on this programmatic discussion, for
which purposes we may assume that a suitable domain D+ can be found.
Suppose, therefore, that a suitable domain D+ is found that contains both Dprop
and DEv. We can now think about how to reconstruct the norms of objective
Bayesian epistemology as axioms for measure functions whose domains are D+.
The probability norm can be reproduced as an axiom requiring measure func-
tions on D+ to have restrictions to Dprop that are probability functions.
In order to reconstruct the calibration norm, some way must be found to dis-
tinguish the set of probability functions that represents the state of evidence
associated with a given state of belief. One way to do this would be to stipulate
as a preliminary axiom that each measure function over D+ should assign the
value 1 to exactly one member of DEv—taken to represent its corresponding
state of evidence—while assigning the value 0 to all the other sets of proba-
bility functions in DEv. The calibration norm may then be reconstructed as
the requirement that, if a measure function m assigns the value 1 to a set of
probability functions E, then mDprop , the restriction of m to Dprop, must be a
member of E.
Finally, the equivocation norm can be reconstructed along similar lines to the
calibration norm. It must stipulate that, if m assigns the value 1 to E, then
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mDprop must be a member of the set ⇓ E.
To sum up, given a domain D+ containing a set of propositions Dprop and a set
DEv of sets of probability functions over that domain, the norms of objective
Bayesian epistemology are plausibly captured by the following axioms:
Objective Bayesian axioms
Allow only measure functions m : D+ → R such that, for all E ∈
DEv:
Probabilism: mDprop ∈ PD+ .
Pre-calibration: m assigns the value 1 to exactly one member
of DEv, and assigns the value 0 to all other members of DEv.
Calibration: If m(E) = 1, then mDprop ∈ E.
Equivocation: If m(E) = 1, then mDprop ∈⇓ E.
Suppose that these axioms are satisfied by a set of measure functions MOBE .
The system of inductive logic that explicates the norms of objective Bayesian
epistemology within Carnapian inductive logic is then (D+,MOBE).
Since it seems possible in principle to construct systems like (D+,MOBE), it
therefore appears possible to formulate the norms of objective Bayesian episte-
mology within Carnapian inductive logic.
5.4.2 Advantages of the assimilative approach
What could be the benefit of formalising the norms of objective Bayesian episte-
mology within Carnapian inductive logic? I can think of two. First, formalising
the norms makes it possible to compare objective Bayesian systems of inductive
logic like (D+,MOBE) with other systems of inductive logic. This may help
to inform philosophical discussions about the relationship between objective
Bayesian epistemology and alternative epistemological positions. Secondly, by
spelling out the main claims of objective Bayesian epistemology fully formally,
the assimilative approach can clarify its substantive claims about rationality,
making it easier to assess their plausibility.
Comparison
If the assimilative approach is carried out, it will be possible to compare objec-
tive Bayesian systems of inductive logic like (D+,MOBE) with other systems of
inductive logic. In particular, it will be possible to compare objective Bayesian
systems with systems representing alternative epistemological positions. This
may help to clarify the differences between these positions more than would be
possible without such a formalisation, and also allows pragmatic argumentation
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to be introduced into debates about objective Bayesian epistemology in a way
that would not be available otherwise.
Specifically, thanks to the assimilative approach, objective Bayesian epistemol-
ogy can be compared with alternative positions based on the pragmatic merits
of the systems of inductive logic that formalise them. Systems of inductive logic
are easier to compare on a pragmatic basis than informal epistemological claims,
firstly because they are fully explicit and secondly because many areas of sci-
ence are already in the business of comparing similar formal structures, such as
statistical models. As we shall see in the next chapter, there are strong parallels
between statistical models and systems of inductive logic. As a result, the same,
or similar, methods that statisticians use to compare the usefulness of statis-
tical models can potentially be used to compare objective Bayesian systems of
inductive logic with alternatives that formalise rival positions.
Comparing the pragmatic merits of different systems of inductive logic will
not definitively settle debates about the relative merits of their corresponding
epistemological doctrines. At best it will show that one doctrine is more germane
to useful formalisation than the other. However, such pragmatic considerations
can still be relevant to epistemological debates. Often such debates can only
be resolved by choosing between incompatible yet equally empirically adequate
intuitions; such decisions can be very difficult to justify one way or the other. In
these circumstances, any difference between two epistemological positions, even
if it is ‘merely’ pragmatic, can be useful as a way of breaking the deadlock.
As an example of the potential benefit of connecting debates about objective
Bayesian epistemology with pragmatic discussions using the assimilative ap-
proach, consider the objective Bayesian conception of evidence. According to
this conception, states of evidence should be thought about as determining sets
of calibrated probability functions, to be taken into account using the calibra-
tion method. Alternatively, according to the conditional conception, states of
evidence should not be thought of as sets of probability functions, but rather as
propositions to be taken into account using the conditional probability method.
There has been much philosophical debate about how the objective Bayesian
and conditional conceptions of evidence compare philosophically. For example,
Skyrms (1987) argues that the objective Bayesian conception captures taking
evidence into account in a ‘supposing’ kind of way, whereas the conditional
conception describes taking evidence into account in an ‘updating’ kind of way.
Shimony (1985) argues that the conditional conception is generally preferable
on philosophical grounds. Williamson (2011) gives a philosophical defence of
the objective Bayesian conception.
The assimilative approach can introduce a new way to resolve this debate by
comparison of the practical merits of each conception’s inductive logical coun-
terpart.
For a given application of inductive logic, the objective Bayesian conception of
evidence can be represented by the specification of a domain with a structure
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like that of D+, together with the ‘pre-calibration’ and calibration axioms. Al-
ternatively, the conditional conception could be represented by the specification
of a domain representing possible evidence propositions, together with axioms
imposing conditions on conditional measure functions, such as, for example,
axioms of instantial relevance or Johnson’s sufficientness postulate.
If systems of inductive logic in which the objective Bayesian framing assumption
is represented, like (D+,MOBE), turn out to be more useful in practical applica-
tions than systems of inductive logic that represent the conditional conception,
then this would constitute an argument in favour of the objective Bayesian
conception of evidence, and vice versa.
For applications where the available evidence merely reveals the truth of certain
propositions, objective Bayesian systems of inductive logic like (D+,MOBE)
are likely to be unnecessarily complicated. Inductive assumptions about rea-
soning based on this kind of evidence could be formalised more simply using
a conditional-probability-based system of inductive logic with a comparatively
simple propositional domain. On the other hand, objective Bayesian systems
might be more appropriate for formalising assumptions about how to respond
to evidence that reveals facts about physical probabilities. For such purposes,
systems like (D+,MOBE), although complicated, might be more useful than
any purely conditional-probability-based system.
Claims about rationality
A second way in which the assimilative approach can be helpful is to clarify
exactly what objective Bayesian epistemology claims about rational states of
belief.
For example, consider the calibration norm. Stated informally, the calibration
norm might seem like a very strong constraint on rational belief, stipulating
that rational agents treat their evidence in a certain way. However, when the
objective norms are formalised as above, a different picture emerges.
Rather than the calibration axiom itself, it is the choice of the domain D+,
together with the pre-calibration axiom, which do the most work towards rep-
resenting how rational agents conceive of their evidence. As we saw in the
previous subsection on comparison, there are alternatives to the package of D+
and the pre-calibration axiom, such as the use of a standard propositional do-
main whose members represent possible of states of evidence, as suggested by
the conditional-probability conception.
However, after the choice to represent evidence using D+ and the pre-calibration
axiom have been made, it is very difficult to think of plausible alternatives to the
calibration axiom. According to the interpretation suggested by the choice of
D+ and pre-calibration, measure functions that the calibration axiom excludes
represent states of belief that are ruled out by the available evidence. It would
5.4. THE ASSIMILATIVE APPROACH 165
be very difficult to argue that a rational agent should respond to their evidence
by contradicting it in this way.
Formalising the objective Bayesian norms therefore seems to make clear an im-
portant point: it is not the calibration norm itself that most strongly expresses
objective Bayesian epistomogy’s claims about how rational agents respond to
evidence. Rather, it is the collection of background assumptions according to
which rational agents’ evidence determines a set of calibrated probability func-
tions that does most of the work.
This observation may help to improve the debate on the objective Bayesian
conception of evidence.
5.4.3 Problem: unconnectedness
One problem with the assimilative approach is that systems of inductive logic
like (D+,MOBE), and in particular domains like D+, are very different from
other systems of inductive logic and domains that feature in Carnapian inductive
logic. At a formal level, we have seen that D+ will not necessarily be a boolean
algebra. If D+ is not a boolean algebra, then it will be difficult to apply many
familiar axioms which presuppose this condition. For example, the notion of a
probability function presupposes a domain that is a boolean algebra. Another
formal difference from other Carnapian domains is that, since D+ has to contain
an uncountably infinite set of probability functions, it too must be uncountably
infinite.
In addition, even if they have the correct formal structure, domains like D+
must be interpreted differently from the domains that feature in other systems.
Whereas the orthodox approach is to interpret the domains of measure functions
as representing possible states of affairs, some members of domains like D+ must
be interpreted as representing states of affairs, while others represent states of
evidence. Due to this different interpretation, axioms that explicate interesting
inductive assumptions under the assumption that domain-members represent
only states of affairs may not do so in the case of domains like D+.
These differences seem to show that the systems of inductive logic produced by
the assimilative approach lack the quality that Carnap called ‘exactness’. An
explicatum is ‘exact’, Carnap explains at (Carnap, 1950b, p.7), if it is part of “a
well connected system of scientific concepts”. Although the term that Carnap
used to describe this quality is perhaps somewhat misleading—I will instead use
‘well-connectedness’—he was surely right to point out that it is desirable for an
explicatum to connect neatly with other related concepts.
Unfortunately, thanks to its unusual domain, (D+,MOBE) is not very well-
connected in comparison to more familiar systems of inductive logic.
For several reasons, I think that the comparative unconnectedness of the systems
of inductive logic that it produces is not a decisive objection to the assimilative
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approach.
For one thing, any lack of well-connectedness must be weighed against the other
virtues of the explicata that the assimilative approach produces, in order to
determine whether it is worthwhile, all things considered. Systems of inductive
logic like (D+,MOBE) may turn out to be useful despite being poorly connected.
Secondly, while (D+,MOBE) may be poorly connected in comparison with other
systems of inductive logic, it is arguably still fairly well-connected in an absolute
sense. D+ and MOBE are unremarkable sets whose formal properties can be
mathematically investigated. Moreover, the axioms that defineMOBE are well-
connected with the norms that they formalise: these have been comprehensively
studied at both a philosophical, scientific and formal level.
Finally, the assimilative approach may improve its connectedness with time.
Relatively poor connectedness is to be expected when a research programme
begins to produce a new kind of explicatum. Improving the connectedness of
the assimilative approach’s explicata is a natural next agenda item.
5.4.4 Assessment of the assimilative approach
To conclude, the norms of objective Bayesian epistemology, as presented in
Williamson (2010), can in principle be formalised by a system of inductive logic
along the lines of (D+,MOBE). This formalisation is useful as it provides a way
to improve debates about objective Bayesian epistemology, by allowing the intro-
duction of otherwise unavailable pragmatic considerations and by clarifying the
nature of its claims about rational belief. While the systems of inductive logic
that formalise the objective Bayesian norms are somewhat poorly-connected in
comparison with those that feature in the rest of Carnapian inductive logic, this
is not a decisive objection, all things considered.
It is interesting to note how well the assimilative approach fits in with Carnap’s
overall approach to philosophical issues.
By attempting to produce a framework within which objective Bayesian episte-
mology can be compared with alternative epistemological positions, the assim-
ilative approach has a similar goal to Carnap’s first major work, the ‘Logical
Structure of the World’, Carnap (1928). According to recent scholarship, as
summarised in Leitgeb (2011), Carnap’s aim in this work was to produce a
framework within which different meta-ontological positions, such as realism
and idealism, could be formalised and compared. Carnap’s sought to replace
a metaphysical debate over the true nature of the universe, which he saw as
intractable, with a practical debate over whether to use a ‘realistic language’
or an ‘idealistic language’. As I argue above, the assimilative approach may be
used to transform epistemological debates in a similar way: instead of debating
whether objective Bayesian norms, or others, genuinely describe rationality, the
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assmilative approach allows a practical discussion to proceed as to whether to
represent rationality using an objective Bayesian formal language or another.
In addition, the assimilative approach has strong parallels with the strategy that
Carnap pursues in Carnap (1967b). In this late essay, Carnap addresses what
he calls the problem of uncertain evidence: that is, the problem of formalising
the inductive assumptions of rational agents who are not perfectly certain of the
outcomes of certain experiments. In order to solve this problem Carnap appeals
to systems of inductive logic with domains whose basic elements included both
ordinary atomic sentences with the form P1ai ∧ . . . ∧ Pkai and also tuples of
numbers with the form E′i = (ui1 . . . uik), which he called ‘evidential quasi-
propositions’. Evidential quasi-propositions were intended to represent profiles
of credences in each of the k possible outcome of experiment i. The inductive
assumptions of rational agents who are unsure of the outcomes of experiments,
Carnap proposed, can usefully be represented by axioms for conditional measure
functions with this kind of domain.
The assimilative approach can be thought of as an attempt to formalise the
assumptions of agents who receive another kind of unconventional evidence: ev-
idence that changes the space of possible states of belief rather than evidence
that changes their belief in various experimental outcomes. Just as, in order to
describe the latter kind of evidence, Carnap considered measure functions whose
domains include evidential quasi-propositions, so the assimilative approach con-
siders measure functions whose domains include sets of probability functions to
describe the former.
It seems, then, that at a broad conceptual level and a narrow technical level the
assimilative approach is in tune with both Carnap’s early and late philosophy.
5.5 Conclusion
I have argued that there are at least two viable ways of relating objective Bayes-
ian epistemology and Carnapian inductive logic. One constructs a distinct ob-
jective Bayesian form of inductive logic, which is useful for representing inductive
assumptions arising from evidence about physical probabilities, but has a prob-
lem representing evidence about relevance. The other formalises the norms of
objective Bayesian epistemology within Carnapian inductive logic. This makes
it possible to apply pragmatic considerations to debates about objective Bayes-
ian epistemology and, potentially, to clarify the claims of objective Bayesian
epistemology.
The two approaches are very different. Whereas the assimilative approach is
consonant with both Carnapian inductive logic and Carnap’s broader approach
to philosophy, objective Bayesian inductive logic departs fundamentally from
both. It disagrees with Carnapian inductive logic’s commitment to tolerance,
arguing for the use of particular systems of inductive logic on philosophical,
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rather than practical, grounds. Objective Bayesian inductive logic also takes a
different overall philosophical approach: rather than aiming to produce a general
framework for formalising all kinds of inductive assumption, it focuses only on
formalising inductive assumptions that might be made by rational agents.
Despite these differences, I think that the two approaches should not be seen
as opposed to each other. They may even be complementary: the assimilative
approach can aid objective Bayesian inductive logic by clarifying the relation-
ship of its underlying norms to similar alternatives. In the other direction,
objective Bayesian inductive logic can assist the assimilative approach by pro-
viding philosophically and methodologically well-motivated principles for it to
formalise.
The preceding discussion has hopefully shown that Carnapian inductive logic has
the potential to coexist within the same conceptual habitat as forms of inductive
logic based on objective Bayesian epistemology, and even to develop symbiosis
with them. Thus the case for substantively reappraising Carnapian inductive




In this chapter I present an application of Carnapian inductive logic to a con-
temporary philosophical debate. The central question is this: how should the
process of choosing between statistical models be conceived philosophically? In
Gelman and Shalizi (2012), two practising statisticians compare some philo-
sophical accounts of statistical model-choice: the ‘received view of Bayesian in-
ference’ and a falsificationist account. They argue that the latter is preferable,
as the former is incompatible with certain indispensable features of real-world
statistical methodology. I largely agree with these arguments, but think that
the falsificationist account is also problematic. A third philosophical account
of statistical model choice, informed by Carnapian inductive logic, does a much
better job. This application shows that Carnapian inductive logic is relevant to
modern philosophical debates, adding further weight to my previous arguments
that it merits substantive reappraisal.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I introduce the problem of de-
scribing statistical model-choice and discuss its importance. Next I summarise
Gelman and Shalizi’s arguments against the ‘received view’ and in favour of the
falsificationist account. I then introduce the Carnapian account of statistical
model choice, according to which statisticians should treat statistical models
analogously to how Carnapian inductive logicians treat systems of inductive
logic. I explain this analogy in detail, showing that some statistical models that
feature prominently in Gelman and Shalizi (2012) are formally equivalent to sys-
tems of inductive logic, and that good reasons for choosing between systems of
inductive logic can also be good reasons for choosing between statistical models.
I argue that the Carnapian account should be preferred to the falsificationist ac-
count for two reasons. First, it is more technically fruitful, suggesting interesting
lines of research. Secondly, Carnap’s overall philosophical outlook is in much
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better harmony with Gelman and Shalizi’s account of statistical practice than
the philosophy of Karl Popper, which underpins the falsificationist account. I
conclude that the Carnapian account is preferable to the falsificationist account
and the received view, and finish by discussing the significance of this argument.
6.2 Statistical model-choice
The central concept of this chapter is the philosophical account of statistical
model-choice. Gelman and Shalizi (2012) criticises one such account, which it
calls ‘the conventional philosophy of Bayesian statistics’ and proposes a different
account inspired by falsificationist philosophy of science. Below I introduce
another philosophical account inspired by Carnapian inductive logic and argue
that it is better than the falsificationist one.
Philosophical accounts of statistical model-choice are succinct stipulations indi-
cating how statisticians ideally ought to conduct investigations involving statis-
tical models.
Philosophical accounts of scientific methodology are important because they can
influence scientific research. As Gelman and Shalizi put it,
. . . even those [scientists] who believe themselves quite exempt
from any philosophical influences are usually the slaves of some de-
funct methodologist.”
(Gelman and Shalizi, 2012, p.31)
6.2.1 Statistical models
Citing ‘currently accepted theories’, Mccullagh defines statistical models in gen-
eral as follows:
. . . a statistical model is a set of probability distributions on the
sample space S.
(McCullagh, 2002, p. 1225)
A sample space is a set containing a mathematical representation of every pos-
sible outcome of a sample of observations. Typically possible sample results are
represented by profiles of values of random variables defined on an underlying
set Ω of ‘states’ or ‘possible worlds’.
6.2.2 Gelman and Shalizi’s arguments
Criticism of the ‘conventional philosophy of Bayesian statistics’ Gel-
man and Shalizi aim to counteract the influence of what they call ‘the received
view of Bayesian inference’, a philosophical account of statistical model-choice
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that, they claim, has had a negative effect on statistical research. According to
the received view, Gelman and Shalizi write,
Anything not contained in the posterior distribution p(θ | y) is sim-
ply irrelevant. . .
(Gelman and Shalizi, 2012, p.9)
I therefore consider the following, slightly more general, stipulation to be a key
tenet of the received view:
RV All desiderata that are relevant in a statistical investigation should be
represented formally in a statistical model. Other factors should be disre-
garded.
This stipulation does not amount to a fully-fledged philosophy of statistics and
therefore should not be seeen as encapsulating the received view, which must in-
clude other stipulations: perhaps that models should be chosen so as to fit given
data. Nonetheless, since it is where Gelman and Shalizi focus their criticism,
this is the only aspect of the received view that we need to consider.
Gelman and Shalizi argue that RV is incompatible with certain facts about
statistical research as it goes on in the real-world, as there are important uses
in statistical investigations for knowledge that is not represented formally, let
alone within a statistical model.
According to Gelman and Shalizi, RV is incompatible with certain facts about
statistical research as it goes on in the real-world. In practice, they claim
at (Gelman and Shalizi, 2012, p.18), properties of statistical models that are
unrelated to their performance at representing knowledge are often important,
such as mathematical and conceptual tractability.
Similarly, Gelman and Shalizi claim that statistical investigations should some-
times make use of knowledge that is not represented formally. In (Gelman and
Shalizi, 2012, §3) they argue that it is practically impossible to represent all
the assumptions that might be entertained during the course of an investiga-
tion in the form required for a Bayesian statistical analysis. In (Gelman and
Shalizi, 2012, §4), Gelman and Shalizi claim that the way statisticians test sta-
tistical models against empirical data typically incorporates knowledge that is
not represented formally. They cite as an example the knowledge that enables
statisticans to recognise whether discrepancies between real data and data sim-
ulated using a fitted model are systematic and important or patternless and safe
to ignore.
The falsificationist account Gelman and Shalizi propose an alternative
philosophical account of statisticians’ model-selection choices that is inspired
by falsificationism, a prominent approach to the philosophy of science. Given
Gelman and Shalizi’s use of the term, I call this philosophical account ‘falsifica-
tionist’.
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F A candidate statistical model should first be chosen for consideration using
the statistician’s judgement. The model should then be confronted with
data and either rejected or cautiously accepted depending on how well it
is found to resemble the data source.
Gelman and Shalizi think that the way in which resemblance between models
and data sources should be measured, as well as the level of non-resemblance
required for rejection, should depend on the particular circumstances of the
relevant investigation. They write:
. . . the hypothesis linking mathematical models to empirical data
is not that the data-generating process is exactly isomorphic to the
model, but that the data source resembles the model closely enough,
in the respects which matter to us, that reasoning based on the model
will be reliable.
Gelman and Shalizi (2012, p.20)
Gelman and Shalizi’s principled abstention from specifying exactly how ‘re-
semblance’ between statistical models and data sources should be measured
distinguishes their account from the received view. According to RV only re-
semblance that is represented formally in a statistical model can be relevant
in a statistical investigation, whereas the falsificationist account allows tests of
resemblance that do not have this property.
The key feature of resemblance between models and data, according to Gelman
and Shalizi, seems to be that, if there is resemblance, then the assumption that
“reasoning based on the model will be reliable” is justified. This desideratum
encompasses standard tests of model-fit to the extent that reasoning based on
poorly-fitting models is unreliable.
Below I take Gelman and Shalizi’s claims about statistical research in practice
for granted. Specifically, I assume that working statisticians often have reasons
other than knowledge-representation for choosing between statistical models, as
well as uses for knowledge that is not represented in the form of a statistical
model. In addition I assume that statisticians do and should choose models
in roughly the way suggested by Gelman and Shalizi’s account F, cautiously
adopting models after testing them for reasoning-justifying resemblance to data
in the situation- and priority-sensitive way that Gelman and Shalizi outline.
These assumptions allow me to focus on other aspects of Gelman and Shalizi’s
account that I find controversial.
Despite the fact that I do not dispute its empirical adequacy, I argue below that
Gelman and Shalizi’s falsificationist philosophical account should be rejected in
favour of an alternative Carnapian one.
In the next section I outline this account before claiming that it is more fruit-
ful than the falsificationist one and also in better harmony with Gelman and
Shalizi’s arguments.
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6.3 The Carnapian account
Many statistical models are formally equivalent to systems of inductive logic,
and, I argue in this section, can plausibly be evaluated according to the same
criteria. Zabell (2011) makes essentially this point, arguing that statistical
research can be improved by characterising families of statistical models ac-
cording to qualitative conditions discussed within Carnapian inductive logic,
such as constant exchangeability and Johnson’s sufficientness postulate. The
‘Carnapian’ account of statistical model-choice that this view suggests can be
summarised as follows:
C Statisticians ought to choose statistical models that correspond to sys-
tems of inductive logic that are good explications of whichever inductive
assumptions they wish to entertain.
I shall now make this connection explicit by showing exactly how statistical
models correspond to systems of inductive logic.
Statistical models as systems of inductive logic
As McCullagh points out in the quotation above, statistical models generally
consist of a sample space and a set of probability functions. Since sample spaces
can be thought of as inductive logical domains, and sets of probability functions
are sets of measure functions, there is a trivial sense in which statistical models
are systems of inductive logic. However, I shall now argue that there are deeper
parallels: in fact, many domains of Carnapian systems of inductive logic can
naturally be interpreted as sample spaces, and many sample spaces that are
important in statistics can be interpreted in terms of Carnapian inductive logic.
First, consider a unary predicate language L1,n with one predicate R, the
usual connectives, no quantifiers and n constants a1, a2, . . . , an. L
1,n has two
atoms, R(x) and ¬R(x). The set of equivalence classes of L1,n’s sentences
can naturally be associated with the sample space generated by the two-valed
random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn defined on the underlying state space Ω =
{ω1, ω2, . . . , ω2n}. More generally, if L1,n has q unary predicates, and there-
fore 2q atoms, its non-equivalent sentences can be associated with a state space
generated by 2q-valued random variables.
Working in the other direction, state spaces generated by finite-valued random
variables can be associated with a set of sentences as follows.
Suppose that a sample space S is generated by random variables X1, . . . , Xn,
Y1, . . . , Yn and that the random variables from the X category each have vX
possible values, while those in the Y category have vY . The required set of sen-
tences will be generated by a unary predicate language Lq,n with n constants
and q = vX + vY predicates P
X




1 . . . . , P
Y
vY . This language has one
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predicate corresponding to each possible value of each category of random vari-
able. The set SLq,n of sentences generated by Lq,n has a member corresponding
to every possible sample in S. For example, the sentence PX50(a1)∧PY10(a1) cor-
responds to the possibility (X1 = 50, Y1 = 10). However, SL
q,n also contains
some sentences that do not represent possible samples, and so need to be ex-
cluded from consideration. For example, PX50(a1) ∧ PX49(a1) must be excluded
as X1 cannot have the value 49 and 50 at the same time. Fortunately, Car-
nap demonstrated how to exclude these sentences at (Carnap, 1971a, p. 81).
Predicates must be segregated into ‘families’ corresponding to the categories
of random variables that they represent, and it must be stipulated by means
of a basic assumption that every constant instantiates exactly one predicate
from each family. In our example there will be two families, one containing
PX1 , . . . P
X
vX and another containing P
Y
1 , . . . P
Y
vY .
Once a sample space has been identified with a set of sentences, the next step
is to translate the model’s constraints on probability functions into inductive
logical axioms. To show how this can be done I shall now work through an
example, considering two statistical models that are prominent in Gelman and
Shalizi (2012).
Example
Gelman and Shalizi introduce the following models as exemplars of statistical
research in practice at (Gelman and Shalizi, 2012, §2.1). The models were part
of an actual investigation into how voting behaviour is related to income in
different states of the USA.
Pr(y = 1) = logit−1(as + bx) (Model One)
and
Pr(y = 1) = logit−1(as + bsx) (Model Two)
The voting models in standard presentation
In these models y, s and x stand for categories of random variables y1, . . . , yn,
s1, . . . , sn and x1, . . . , xn, for some very high number n.
1 The indices 1, . . . , n
represent voting acts.
Each random variable in the y category has vy = 2 possible values, 1 and 0,
representing their corresponding vote going to party 1, the Republicans, or party
0, the Democrats. Variables in category s have vs = 50 values, representing
states in which a vote might occur, and those in category x have vx = 5 values
1In practice, for reasons of mathematical convenience, these sequences of random variables
might be taken to be countably infinite.
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1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 representing the income quintiles to which the person who casts
a vote might belong.
The letters ai are real-valued parameters representing the degree to which, in
state i, a vote is more likely to be for the Republicans. The letter b is a
real-valued parameter representing a degree to which income-level makes voting
Republican more likely. In model two, b is replaced by multiple parameters bi
representing state-specific income effects.
The term logit−1 stands for the logistic function, which is a transformation used
to make the linear constraints on the right hand sides of the equations in each
model apply to the probabilities on the left hand sides.
Both models have the same underlying sample space Smod, which contains all
possible configurations of y1, . . . , yn, s1, . . . , sn and x1, . . . , xn.
The models differ in the sets of probability functions that they allow over Smod,
however. These differences are made explicit in the equations above.
The voting models as systems of inductive logic
To construe the two models as systems of inductive logic, we must first find a
language Lmod corresponding to the sample space Smod.
Lmod must have a family of predicates for every category of random variables,
each with one member for every possible value of the variables in the corre-
sponding family. In other words, Lmod must have vy + vs + vx = 57 predicates,
organised into a party family Ry1 , R
y
0 , a state family R
s
1, . . . , R
s
50 and an in-
come quintile family Rx1 , . . . , R
x
5 . A basic assumption must stipulate that each
constant instantiates exactly one predicate from each family.
To recreate the models’ sets of probability functions, we must find axioms char-
acterising two different sets of measure functions Mmod1 and Mmod2 . Clearly,
probabilism is required to make sure that each set contains only probability
functions. Less clearly, constant exchangeability is also needed to make sure
that the order of the votes in the sample is ignored. This condition is implicit in
the standard presentation’s specification of the models in terms of the categories
y, s and x rather than the individual random variables y1, y2, . . .. Finally, the
restrictions stipulated above as equations must be reproduced as the following
axioms:
m(Ry1ai ∧Rsjai ∧Rxkai) = logit−1(aj + bk) (Axiom 1)
and
m(Ry1ai ∧Rsjai ∧Rxkai) = logit−1(aj + bk,j) (Axiom 2)
Given a suitable specification of the parameters2, these axioms reproduce the
2In the axioms, the b parameters must be more complicated—a vector in the first case and
a matrix in the second—in order to reproduce the effect of the values of the random variables
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standard constraints exactly, though the inductive logical notation forces the
presentation to be more complicated. The required systems are then system 1,
(Lmod,Mmod1), and system 2, (Lmod,Mmod2).
This example shows that two models that are typical of current statistical re-
search can not only be thought of as systems of inductive logic in an abstract
sense, but have a very similar structure to the systems that Carnap studied.
Choosing between the models
Gelman and Shalizi report that model 2 was preferable to model 1 because, on
comparison with a real-life sample recording facts about actual voting events,
the parameters in model 1 could not be adjusted so as to achieve a satisfactory
fit: the extra flexibility of model 2’s extra parameters, representing state-specific
income effects, was required. Since the knowledge that enabled the researchers
to judge whether a satisfactory fit had been achieved was not represented in any
statistical model, Gelman and Shalizi argue that this example vindicates their
rejection of RV.
Applying their falsificationist account, they claim that model 1 had been com-
pared with data, found not to resemble the data source enough to make future
predictions reliable, and therefore rejected. Model 2, in contrast, passed this
test and was therefore provisionally accepted.
According to the Carnapian account of statistical model choice, which model
is preferable depends on which out of system 1 and system 2 is the most apt
formalisation of a collection of inductive assumptions. Since the two models
are otherwise identical, the question is which out of axioms 1 and 2 does a
better job. Axiom 1 is simpler, as it has fewer parameters. On the other
hand, the two axioms represent different assumptions: axiom 1 postulates a
single income effect, whereas axiom 2 represents the assumption that the effect
may vary between different states. Given the real life sample that Gelman and
Shalizi describe, the assumption formalised by axiom 1 is clearly not entirely
appropriate. Which system is best will depend on how system 1’s comparative
disadvantage of representing a less appropriate inductive assumption is weighed
against its advantageous simplicity.
Both the falsificationist account and the Carnapian account can claim to be able
to reconstruct the reasoning that led real researchers to prefer model 2 to model
1. For the falsificationist account, model 1 was falsified, but model 2 was not.
For the Carnapian account, model 1 was found to represent an inapt inductive
assumption, whereas model 2 was found to be a useful explication.
xi in the original models being numerical.
6.4. ADVANTAGES OF THE CARNAPIAN ACCOUNT 177
6.4 Advantages of the Carnapian account
While the Carnapian account and the falsificationist account can both account
for examples like the one above, the Carnapian account has two impotant ad-
vantages. It is more technically fruitful than the falsifcationist account, and has
a better developed philosophical foundation.
6.4.1 Technical fruitfulness
The Carnapian account is technically fruitful, as considering statistical models’
corresponding systems of inductive logic can allow statisticians to express some
of their reasons for choosing models more articulately than would be possible
otherwise.
When it is possible to find a model’s corresponding system of inductive logic,
and that system explicates a particular inductive assumption, the model can be
defended or attacked according to how appropriate that assumption is. In this
way, previously unarticulated justifications can be replaced by transparent ones
based on explicitly stated principles.
Finding statistical models’ corresponding systems of inductive logic can also
help to make clear whether, in a particular case, a model’s adoption is primarily
based on analytical convenience or if it represents a substantive judgement about
the nature of the scientific problem being confronted.
This advantage has previously been identified by Zabell, who argues at in
(Zabell, 2011, p. 291) that statisticians’ reasons for choosing models often lack
such clarity.
To demonstrate this technical fruitfulness, I present below two examples of
important classes of statistical models that are characterised by systems of in-
ductive logic that formalise natural inductive assumptions.
Independent, identically distributed random variables and constant
exchangeability
De Finetti’s theorem identifies a duality between an important class of statistical
models, the ‘IID models’, and systems of inductive logic with unary predicate
languages and sets of measure functions characterised by the axioms probabilism
and constant exchangeability.
An IID model consists of a sample space S generated by an infinite sequence
of random variables X1, X2, . . ., together with a probability function Pr : A→
[0, 1], known as the ‘De Finetti prior’, from the set A of independent and iden-
tical distributions over X1, X2, . . . to the unit interval. A probability function
pr is a member of A if and only if it satisfies the following properties:
178 CHAPTER 6. AN APPLICATION
Independence
pr(Xi = vi, Xj = vj) = pr(Xi = vi) ·pr(Xj = vj) for any natural numbers
i and j and possible values vi and vj .
Identical Distribution
pr(Xi = vk | θ) = pr(Xj = vk | θ) for any natural numbers i and j,
possible value vk, and any θ ∈ S.
De Finetti’s representation theorem shows, for unary predicate languages with
infinitely many constants, that every IID model has a unique corresponding in-
ductive logical measure function satisfying the axioms of probabilism and con-
stant exchangeability. In the other direction, every probabilistic, exchangeable
measure function has a unique corresponding IID model.
See (Paris and Vencovska´, 2015, Ch. 9) for a full modern presentation of De
Finetti’s theorem. See (Carnap, 1980, p.217) and Jeffrey (1971) for discussions
by Carnap and his coworker Richard Jeffrey.
Thanks to the correspondence between IID models and the axioms of proba-
bility and constant exchangeability, statisticians’ choices to use IID models can
be justified or criticised according to whether these axioms represent reason-
able inductive assumptions in the relevant scientific situation. For example, in
circumstances where the order of experiments carries information, constant ex-
changeability is not a reasonable inductive assumption, giving a reason not to
use IID models, according to the Carnapian account.
This recommendation seems to have been adopted in principle by the statistical
community. For example, Gelman et al. write:
The usual starting point of a statistical analysis is the (often
tacit) assumption that the n values yi [in this context these in-
dices are analogous to constants of a logical language] may be re-
garded as exchangeable. . . A nonexchangeable model would be ap-
propriate if information relevant to the outcome were conveyed in
the unit indexes. . . Generally, it is useful and appropriate to model
data from an exchangeable distribution as independent and identi-
cally distributed. . .
(Gelman et al., 1995, p.6, round parenthesis and italics original,
square parenthesis added)
The Carnapian account gives a plausible interpretation of what is meant by the
condition that states “may be regarded as exchangeable”: it means that constant
exchangeability and probabilism explicate appropriate inductive assumptions.
Dirichlet models and Johnson’s sufficientness postulate
Every IID model whose De Finetti prior is a member of the Dirichlet family
corresponds to an inductive logical measure function that satisfies, in addition
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to probabilism and constant exchangeability, the axiom ‘Johnson’s sufficientness
postulate’.
This relationship was demonstrated in principle by Johnson (1932) in the 1930s.
(Kemeny, 1963b, § 4) later used Johnson’s sufficientness postulate, probabilism
and constant exchangeability to characterise the so-called ‘continuum of induc-
tive methods’, but did not explicitly connect these inductive methods with IID
models with Dirichlet distributions. Zabell (1982) makes this connection (see
equation 2.14), as well as presenting a more rigorous and general version of
Johnson’s proof.
The same reasoning that favours using IID models when constant exchange-
ability is justified extends to this more specific case: statisticians following the
Carnapian account can therefore adopt IID models with Dirichlet priors on a
principled basis. The scientific situation they face must render appropriate the
inductive assumption that the satisfaction ratio of the values of the variables
in some samples, together with the sample sizes, should be the only factors
relevant to predictions of future values of the variables.
According to (Zabell, 2011, p.292), future work may produce more correspon-
dences of this kind, allowing statisticians to clarify the assumptions underlying
other choices of models. Such research can only add to the Carnapian account’s
technical fruitfulness.
6.4.2 Philosophical foundations
Carnap’s philosophy is in remarkable harmony with the actual practice of statis-
tics, as reported by Gelman and Shalizi. The Carnapian account of model
choice therefore has a sounder philosophical foundation than the falsificationist
account.
This harmony confers two important advantages on the Carnapian account.
First, it shows that statisticians can adopt the Carnapian account without com-
mitting to unfamiliar or implausible philosophical positions. It therefore consti-
tutes evidence of the Carnapian account’s feasibility. Second, it shows that the
Carnapian account is part of a more general underlying philosophy of science.
This kind of well-connectedness is advantageous as it allows similarities between
foundational problems in statistics and other areas to be more easily identified
and exploited.
In constrast, the philosophy of Karl Popper, which underpins Gelman and Shal-
izi’s falsificationist account, is in tension with what they say about the practice
of statistics. The falsificationist account therefore has none of these advantages.
Carnapian harmony
Gelman and Shalizi report that, in practice, statistical models often have func-
tions other than representing knowledge. Carnap argued that systems of induc-
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tive logic need not represent beliefs in order to be useful explicata. Carnap’s
expression of this point of view is very similar to Gelman and Shalizi’s:
The adoption of an inductive method is neither an expression
of belief nor an act of faith, though either or both may come in as
motivating factors. An inductive method is rather an instrument
for the task of constructing a picture of the world on the basis of
observational data. . .
(Carnap, 1950b, §18)
[A choice of inductive method] will take into consideration . . . the
truth-frequency of predictions and the error of estimates; further, the
economy in use, measured by the simplicity of the calculations re-
quired; maybe also aesthetic features, like the logical elegance of the
definitions and rules involved.
(Carnap, 1952a, p.55)
. . . the model, for a Bayesian, is the combination of the prior
distribution and the likelihood, each of which represents some com-
promise among scientific knowledge, mathematical convenience and
computational tractability. . . . we do not have to worry about mak-
ing our prior distributions match our subjective beliefs. . .
(Gelman and Shalizi, 2012, p.19-20)
Similarly, Carnap would have been at ease with other aspects of the practice
of statisical research that Gelman and Shalizi describe. Carnapian inductive
logicians can safely take into account “respects that matter to us”, tolerate
some degree of non-resemblance between predicted and observed data and use
informal assessments of whether or not “reasoning based on the model will
be reliable” in the future as an important desideratum for choosing between
systems of inductive logic.
Carnap thought that inductive logic was essentially a tool for formalising sci-
entific assumptions. From this pragmatic point of view it is only natural that
systems of inductive logic should be evaluated in a way that depends on the pri-
orities of the investigator. He would also have seen nothing problematic about
failing to reject statistical models that are not completely satisfactory: this is
exactly his view of a system of inductive logic that he advocated:
It will not be claimed that c? [the only confirmation function allowed
by the system of inductive logic that Carnap was advocating] is
a perfectly adequate explicatum. . . For the time being it would be
sufficient that c? be a better explicatum than the previous methods.
(Carnap, 1950b, p.563, square parentheses added)
Finally, just as, according to Gelman and Shalizi, practising statisticians see no
problem in leaving the Bayesian inferential framework in order to evaluate sta-
tistical models, Carnap saw no problem with leaving the inferential framework
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of inductive logic in order to evaluate systems of inductive logic. Such external
questions, he thought, ought to to be answered using testing and the experience
of specialists rather than general philosophical proscriptions:
To decree dogmatic prohibitions of certain linguistic forms in-
stead of testing them by their success or failure in practical use,
is worse than futile. . . Let us grant to those who work in any spe-
cial field of investigation the freedom to use any form of expression
which seems useful to them; the work in the field will sooner or later
lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful function.
(Carnap, 1950a, §5)
Popperian tension
In contrast to their natural fit with Carnap’s philosophy, the prevailing views of
practising statisticians, as reported by Gelman and Shalizi, are hard to square
with the philosophy of Karl Popper.
Contrary to Gelman and Shalizi’s view that measures of resemblance between
models and data sources should take into account the investigation’s priorities,
Karl Popper argued that disagreement between scientific systems and empirical
facts should be investigated in an objective way that does not depend on what
matters to scientists. The nature of Popper’s view is clear from this passage,
where he criticises a proposal by Reichenbach to define statistical hypotheses’
probability as the relative frequency with which they have previously been in-
stantiated:
. . . the suggested definition would make the probability of a hy-
pothesis hopelessly subjective: the probability of a hypothesis would
depend upon the training and skill of the experimenter rather than
upon objectively reproducible and testable results.
(Popper, 1959, p.256)
Popper also thought that the conditions under which a theory should be rejected
were sharply defined: he claimed at (Popper, 1959, p.56) that rejection should
occur whenever a reproducible effect that is inconsistent with the theory is
discovered. This stance is at odds with Gelman and Shalizi’s portrayal of the
prevailing view among practising statisticians, according to which some kinds
of non-resemblance between models and data sources should be tolerated.
Gelman and Shalizi seem to acknowledge this divergence from Popper’s views
on the question of model-checking, writing at (Gelman and Shalizi, 2012, p.28)
that “Popper’s specific ideas about testing require, at the least, substantial
modification”. However, there are further points of tension between Popper’s
position and the statistical mainstream.
Popper thought that the main concern of proper scientific research should be
attempting to demonstrate that theories are false. He saw activities that do
not assist this process as not strictly scientific. It seems difficult, following such
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an approach, not to construe the adoption and rejection of statistical models
as expressions of belief and disbelief, or to find conscionable the view, which
Gelman and Shalizi say is widespread among statisticians, that desiderata with
little to do with truth and falsity, such as convenience or tradition, should play
important roles in statistical research.
Finally, Popper was an anti-inductivist: he thought that the adoption of scien-
tific theories should never depend on judgements about the accuracy of their
future predictions based on past observations. Popper believed that such induc-
tive judgements were unscientific:
Induction, i.e. inference based on many observations, is a myth.
It is neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one
of scientific procedure. (Popper, 1962, p.53)
In contrast to this view, Gelman and Shalizi report that statisticians do and
should make use of judgements, based on past observations, about the future
reliability of reasoning based on statistical models. Such judgements, they note,
are required in order to determine how to measure resemblance between models
and data sources and how much non-resemblance to tolerate before rejection.
According to Gelman and Shalizi’s assessment, then, practising statistician seem
to be inductivists in Popper’s sense.
For all of these reasons, the practice of statistics seems to be more than superfi-
cially incompatible with Popper’s philosophy of science. Practising statisticians
seem to disagree with Popper on the fundamental questions of why theories
should be accepted and rejected and whether science should be inductive.
6.4.3 Conclusion
In summary, the Carnapian account of statistical model choice seems superior to
the falsificationist account found in Gelman and Shalizi (2012). It is technically
fruitful, potentially allowing more articulate expression of the reasons behind
the selection of particular models. Clearly stated modelling assumptions can
only improve statistical research. In addition, unlike the falsificationist account,
the Carnapian account has a viable underlying philosophy that is in tune with
Gelman and Shalizi’s claims about the practice of statistics.
It is difficult to think of another philosophical research programme that can
play the same role. While subjective Bayesian and objective Bayesian inductive
logic may have interesting applications to philosophical problems in statistics as
well, neither is flexible enough to generate a general account of statistical model
choice. Subjective Bayesian inductive logic is committed to the conditional
probability method of representing evidence, and so cannot countenance the
kind of informal evidential reasoning that Gelman and Shalizi claim is crucial
in real-world statistical model-choice. This kind of reasoning is readily accom-
modated by Carnapian inductive logic, which allows evidence to be represented
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informally in the choice of systems of inductive logic. Statistical investigations
are also a poor match with objective Bayesian inductive logic because they of-
ten make use of the conditional probability method for representing possible
ways of reacting to data. Objective Bayesian inductive logic, unlike Carnapian
inductive logic, rejects this method of representing evidential reasoning.
These advantages show that Carnapian inductive logic can play a useful role
in the contemporary debate over model-choice in statistics. This is a concrete
example of why substantively reappraising it would be a good idea.
It is interesting to note that Carnap himself saw one of the principal application
of his research programme as being to statistics. He argues in (Carnap, 1950b,
§ 49A), entitled ‘Theoretical Usefulness of Inductive Logic in Science’ that Car-
napian inductive logicians should aim to formalise the inductive assumptions
that arise in statistical investigations. He described the benefits of doing so as
follows:
It may be expected that mathematical statistics will thereby gain
for the first time a solid foundation, a systematic unity of its various
methods and a clarity and exactness of its basic concepts. . . . In
spite of the great wealth in methods and results achieved in mod-
ern mathematical statistics . . . it is clearly in need of the theoretical
virtues just mentioned. . . (Carnap, 1950b, p. 244)
The usefulness of the Carnapian account even in modern discussions about
statistics goes some way towards vindicating Carnap’s assessment.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis has argued that a reappraisal of Carnapian inductive logic would
be a good idea, and begun to carry one out. In this section I summarise the
preceding discussions and outline a research agenda for future reappraisers.
7.1 The current state of the reappraisal
This thesis aimed to begin a historical reappraisal of Carnapian inductive logic
by putting forward a new account of its nature and development, and also
to start a substantive reappraisal by pointing out ways in which Carnapian
inductive logic remains philosophically interesting.
7.1.1 Historical reappraisal
My novel historical contributions came mostly in chapters 2 and 3.
Chapter 2 presented and defended a novel reading of Carnapian inductive logic
according to which it is characterised by commitments to explication, systems
of inductive logic and tolerance. This account differs sharply from previous
ones, which have tended to characterise Carnapian inductive logic as a highly
intolerant research programme which tried to identify one uniquely ‘true’ or
‘logical’ system of inductive logic.
Chapter 2 also documented the ways in which Carnapian inductive logic changed
as it developed, arguing that these changes were less drastic than is currently
thought. Whereas much of the secondary literature emphasises purported dif-
ferences between early and late Carnapian inductive logic, I argued that the
programme is noteworthy for the degree to which it remained consistent with
its initial aims and methods.
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Chapter 3 defended Carnapian inductive logic, understood according to my
reading, against what I judeged to be the most important of its many critiques.
It is widely believed that the strength of these critiques caused Carnapian in-
ductive logic to become “moribund” (Williamson, 2002, p.210), exposed a “fatal
flaw”(Hawthorne, 2014, §), showed that it had “faltered”(Sarkar, 2006, p.87)
and so on. My argument suggests that this was not the case.
My thesis made another novel historical contribution in section 5.4.4 on the
assimilative approach. There I argued, contrary to the conventional historical
account of Carnapian inductive logic, that Carnap considered an alternative to
the conditional-probability method for representing evidence, citing a previously
under-appreciated draft essay.
7.1.2 Substantive reappraisal
This thesis began a substantive reappraisal of Carnapian inductive logic by
arguing that Carnapian inductive logic is a viable and interesting research pro-
gramme.
Chapter 2 argued that Carnapian inductive logic was successful according to
Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes. This amounted to
a prima facie argument for its viability, but, I noted, should not be relied on
too heavily. For one thing, Lakatos’s methodology is not without its critics.
For another, three important issues gave independent reasons to doubt whether
Carnapian inductive logic remained relevant. First, it has been heavily and ap-
parently successfully critiqued. Second, one might doubt whether Carnapian in-
ductive logic can hope to survive in the modern conceptual ecosystem, given the
proliferation of similar research programmes that might outcompete it. Third,
it is not obvious that Carnapian inductive logic can solve any contemporary
problems. The subsequent chapters addressed these issues.
Chapter 3 argued that the most important of the many critiques of Carnapian
inductive logic can be overcome. Lakatos set out explicitly a mistaken assump-
tion that seems to underlie many of the critiques, according to which Carnapian
inductive logic aimed to discover certain a priori, theoretically justified truths.
This kind of critique can be dispelled through a careful reading of Carnap’s
writing about inductive logic, which shows clearly that theoretical justification
was not its aim. The ‘grue’ problem can be addressed by noting that Car-
napian inductive logic can formalise reasoning about both projectable and non-
projectable properties, together with further close reading to show that Car-
napian inductive logic did not aim to produce interpretation-neutral axioms.
Worries stemming from concerns about Carnapian inductive logic’s treatment
of exchangeability, partial entailment, reliability in the limit and universal hy-
potheses can also be assuaged.
Chapters 4 and 5 addressed the question of Carnapian inductive logic’s relation-
ship with rival research programmes. We saw that one rival programme, sub-
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jective Bayesian inductive logic, makes philosophically dubious commitments
to probabilistic necessity, the claim that all rational states of partial belief can
be represented by probability functions, and probabilistic sufficiency, the claim
that every state of partial belief that can be so represented is rational. Car-
napian inductive logic is preferable to subjective Bayesian inductive logic from a
philosophical point of view as it avoids making such controversial claims about
rationality. On a methodological level, Carnapian inductive logic can formalise
all of the inductive assumptions that subjective Bayesian inductive logic can,
but the reverse is not true. Subjective Bayesian inductive logic’s commitment
to representing evidence using the conditional probability method prevents it
from being as comprehensive as Carnapian inductive logic. While subjective
Bayesian inductive logic is arguably simpler than Carnapian inductive logic, on
balance Carnapian inductive logic seems methodologically preferable.
Objective Bayesian inductive logic has advantages and disadvantages compared
to Carnapian inductive logic. One disadvantage is that, like subjective Bayesian
inductive logic, it is committed to the philosophically dubious claim of proba-
bilistic necessity. Objective Bayesian inductive logic’s other commitments make
it difficult for it to represent certain kinds of evidence, in particular evidence
according to which some events are relevant to others. On the other hand ob-
jective Bayesian inductive logic is more specific than Carnapian inductive logic,
leaving less room for the inductive logician’s discretion: this is a methodological
advantage in certain cases. I concluded that whether objective Bayesian or Car-
napian inductive logic is preferable will depend on the nature of the problems
to which they are applied.
I also argued in chapter 5 that, as well as being used to define an alternative
form of inductive logic, the norms of objective Bayesian epistemology can also
be formalised within Carnapian inductive logic. This ‘assimilative approach’ to
relating Carnapian inductive logic and objective Bayesian epistemology could
usefully inform philosophical debates about objective Bayesian epistemology by
clarifying its commitments and allowing the introduction of pragmatic argu-
ments. However, in order to formalise the norms adequately, Carnapian in-
ductive logic must be extended to rich domains whose members can represent
both states of the world and states of evidence that take the form of sets of
probability functions.
Chapter 6 presented an application of Carnapian inductive logic to the problem
of philosophically describing statistical model-choice. I argued in favour of the
Carnapian account of statistical model choice, which draws an analogy between
this activity and that of choosing between systems of inductive logic. This
account is consistent with the practice of statistical research, as reported in a
widely-cited paper, and is preferable to an alternative falsificationist account
as it is more technically fruitful and based on a more appealing underlying
philosophy.
Taken together, the arguments in these chapters provide a sound basis for a
substantive reappraisal of Carnapian inductive logic. Not only was it progressive
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according to Lakatos, it is also able to overcome its critiques, compete with its
rivals and inform contemporary philosophical debates about objective Bayesian
epistemology and statistical model-choice.
7.2 The case for ongoing reappraisal
The tasks of motivating and practising reappraisal are, I believe, complementary.
The more successful a new programme of reappraisal is, the more attractive a
prospect participating in it becomes. To a large extent, then, my argument
that Carnapian inductive logic should be reappraised is encapsulated by the
reappraisal that I have attempted to begin.
However, it remains conceiveable that a reader, even though they are convinced
by all of the preceding arguments, might still be hestitant about committing
their time and attention to the reappraisal of Carnapian inductive logic. They
might be worried that there is not very much more to say about it. In order
to allay this kind of doubt, I outline below a research agenda following on from
the arguments in this thesis.
7.2.1 Reassessing the context of Carnapian inductive logic
In order to reappraise a philosophical research programme properly, its historical
and intellectual context must be thoroughly understood. There have been great
advances in our understanding of Carnap and the logical positivists over the last
few decades, but there is still much to be gained from further research. Here
are some examples of what I think are interesting and open historical questions
about Carnapian inductive logic.
First, it is interesting that, after Carnap’s death in 1970, few of his co-workers
carried on working on Carnapian inductive logic. For example, John Kemeny,
Yehoushua Bar-Hillel and Haim Gaifman pursued research into largely unrelated
topics; Richard Jeffrey developed a different philosophical programme that was
more inclined towards subjective Bayesian epistemology.
I argued in chapter 3 that Carnapian inductive logic survived its many cri-
tiques. Given that this was the case, it is an interesting and unsolved question
why Carnap’s coworkers discontinued his research programme. An alternative
explanation, besides the revelation by critics of its fundamental unviability, is
required.
Secondly, it would be informative to know more about how Carnap’s views on in-
ductive logic relate to those of the other logical positivists. Hans Reichenbach,
Herbert Feigl and Carl Hempel corresponded with Carnap frequently during
the time when he was working on Carnapian inductive logic, and all had well-
documented views about the philosophical problem of induction. See Salmon
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(1991) for an account of Reichenbach and Feigl’s views, and Hempel (1981) for
those of Hempel. Nonetheless, it is unclear exactly what they thought about
Carnapian inductive logic, and how their views developed in dialogue with Car-
nap. Although Otto Neurath died before Carnap published on inductive logic,
it would also be very interesting to know the extent to which he and Carnap
exchanged ideas about probability and induction - see Lehrer (1993) for some
interesting informed speculation on this point.
Finally, it would be helpful if Carnap’s early views on induction, before the
1940s, were better understood.
It will surely become easier to answer these questions in the near future, as
various investigations into Carnap’s early views are ongoing. A growing amount
of archival material is available online at the university of Pittsburgh library
website. Electronic copies of other material are available on request. In addition,
several historical research projects on Carnap are ongoing. The project ‘Early
Carnap in Context - Three Case Studies and the Diaries’ is seeking to translate
diaries that Carnap kept between 1910 and 1935 and assess their significance.
Another research project is seeking to collate Carnap’s complete works, with
commentaries by experts.
7.2.2 Carnap’s conception of logic
As we have seen, Carnap was keen to stress parallels between his research pro-
gramme and deductive logic. I noted that these parallels make sense with respect
to Carnap’s conception of logic, according to which systems of inductive logic
qualify as logical on the basis that they are systems of formal rules specifying
what follows from what within a language. However, I did not dwell at length
on Carnap’s conception of logic, either to track its historical development or
to assess its viability. In my opinion, the question whether or not Carnapian
inductive logic merits reappraisal does not depend on whether it is correct to
call it a ‘logic’. Nonetheless, the nature and viability of Carnap’s conception of
logic remain pertinent topics for a reappraisal of Carnapian inductive logic.
On a historical level, it would be interesting to find out how Carnap’s mature
conception of logic, according to which systems of inductive logic qualify as
logical, relates to his earlier views. As far as I am aware, no work connecting
Carnap’s views about inductive logic with the development of his views about
logic in general has yet been undertaken. At a conceptual level, a natural
question to ask is whether Carnap’s conception of logic is viable, or at least
salvageable. Carnap’s views on logic have been critically appraised in various
recent works, such as Peregrin (2015), Awodey (2015) and Goldfarb and Ricketts
(1992). A special issue of Synthese entitled ‘Carnap on logic’ is forthcoming.
Again, to my knowledge, these works do not engage with Carnap’s views on
inductive logic. Clearly there is much fertile ground for further work in this
area.
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In addition to questions about Carnap’s conception of logic, one might also ask
whether Carnapian inductive logic would qualify as logical according to alter-
native conceptions. Answering this question may help to explain the frequency
with which Carnapian inductive logic has been attacked on the grounds that it
is not genuinely logical.
7.2.3 Other ways of evaluating research programmes
Chapter 2 applied Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes,
arguing that, according to this methodology, Carnapian inductive logic was a
progressive research programme. However, as I noted in that chapter’s conclu-
sion, there are several outstanding objections to Lakatos’s methodology. For the
purposes of this thesis, the status of Lakatos’s methodology was not of primary
importance, as its role was only to provide prima facie, rather than conclusive,
evidence that Carnapian inductive logic is worthy of substantive reappraisal.
However, a more comprehensive evaluation would be very interesting. In order
to come to a final conclusion about Carnapian inductive logic’s success as a
research programme, an evaluative framework will need to be employed that
either addresses the objections to Lakatos’s methodology or else departs from
it.
The version of Lakatos’s methodology outlined in (Corfield, 2003, Ch. 8) is a
good candidate for the first option. Corfield modifies Lakatos’s approach by
changing its focus from truth-directed propositions to vaguer ‘ideas’. If the
methodology of scientific research programmes, so modified, survives the cri-
tiques that have been aimed at Lakatos’s version, then it could usefully be used
to evaluate Carnapian inductive logic. Alternatively, an evaluative framework
based on Laudan’s work on ‘research traditions’, as sketched in Laudan (1978),
or the ‘philosophical grammar’ approach of Chang (2011) might be preferable.
7.2.4 Carrying out the assimilative approach
The assimilative approach to relating objective Bayesian epistemology and Car-
napian inductive logic was incomplete, as I did not fully explain what would be
the abstract form of an inductive logical domain that can represent both states
of the world and states of evidence. There are many technical questions to an-
swer, such as what kind of algebraic structure this kind of domain should have.
If these technical challenges can be overcome, then it will be possible to com-
pare axioms representing aspects of objective Bayesian epistemology directly
with axioms representing alternative epistemological views. This will open the
possibility for new applications of Carnapian inductive logic to philosophy in
the form of novel arguments for or against objective Bayesian epistemology,
and perhaps even applications to science in the form of useful new systems of
inductive logic.
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7.2.5 Imprecise probability
Carnapian inductive logic has a potential applications to the problem of ascer-
taining the status of imprecise approaches to representing uncertain reasoning.
The question of whether, or in what circumstances, imprecise approaches are
legitimate has become a vexed problem in recent formal epistemology. Con-
struing the question as one of applied Carnapian inductive logic, I claim, might
clarify the situation.
An imprecise model of uncertain belief represents a state of uncertain belief using
a set of measure functions—a ‘representor’ in the terminology of Van Fraasen
(1990)—rather than a single such function.
This approach has been attacked and defended on both methodological and
epistemological grounds.
Epistemological debate
The epistemological debate focuses on sharpness, the claim that, if the objects
of a rational state of partial belief are represented by a domain D, then the state
of belief itself should be representable by a single real-valued measure function
m : D → R.
Proponents of imprecise models argue that sharpness is not a genuine rationality
condition because it incorrectly identifies certain rational states of partial belief
as irrational. In particular, they claim, rational states of partial belief may lead
to dispositions to bet for and against certain propositions at different rates.
Walley (1991) argues at length that such states of belief are, in general, best
represented by sets of probability functions. In addition it has been argued, for
example in Keynes (1921), that rational degrees of belief can be incomparable
in principle. Sharpness forces that all degrees of belief to be comparable and,
according to this argument, consequently mis-classifies such states of belief as
irrational.
Epistemological opponents of imprecise models argue for sharpness by trying
to demonstrate that non-sharp states of partial belief have undesirable features.
For example, Elga (2010) uses a diachronic betting scenario to argue that agents
with non-sharp states of belief tend to behave unwisely. Bradley and Steele
(2014) disputes this argument.
Methodological debate
Defenders of imprecise models point to distinct advantages of representing states
of belief using sets of probability functions. Dubois et al. (1996) argues that
imprecise models are required in order to represent higher-level uncertainty;
(Walley, 1991, § 1.1.4) claims that imprecise models can be used to produce
inferences that are more robust than would be possible otherwise.
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Opponents, on the other hand, argue that imprecise models are difficult to
connect with formal models of decision-making. Whereas the question of how
agents with sharp states of partial belief should make decisions is comparatively
well-understood theoretically, the theory of how imprecise agents should make
decisions is still fairly young.
How Carnapian inductive logic can help
Both the epistemological and methodological debates over imprecise approaches
to representing uncertain reasoning seem to lack an over-arching framework for
deciding whether each kind of argument is decisive. This, I claim, is what
Carnapian inductive logic may be able to provide.
Imprecise models and precise models of partial beliefs can both be thought of
as systems of inductive logic. Both sorts of model come with the right kind
of domain, and ready made sets of measure functions. An imprecise model
consisting of a domain of propositions D together with a representor P can
straightforwardly be construed as the system of inductive logic (D,P ). A precise
model with domain D and representing measure function m can naturally be
construed as the system of inductive logic (D, {m})
Since both precise and imprecise models of uncertain reasoning can be thought
of as systems of inductive logic, it is possible to apply Carnap’s standards of
evaluation. It therefore seems feasible to formulate a Carnapian account of
choosing models of partial belief that encompasses both precise and imprecise
models. According to this account models would be judged more or less le-
gitimate to the extent that their corresponding systems of inductive logic are
good ones, according to Carnapian standards. This would provide a framework
within which debates about the epistemological and methodological pros and
cons of each kind of model could proceed.
Using Carnapian inductive logic in this way, rather than merely comparing
imprecise and precise approaches as they appear naturally, would allow a direct,
systematic and unambiguous comparison of the two approaches to formalising
uncertain reasoning.
As in the case of statistical model-choice, other forms of inductive logic do not
seem to be capable of playing the same role. Subjective and objective Bayesian
inductive logic are committed to probabilistic necessity, according to which ra-
tional states of partial belief are probabilistic and consequently sharp. These two
frameworks therefore presume that imprecise models of rational partial belief
are epistemologically illegitimate, and so cannot help with the epistemological
debate. These forms of inductive logic also have little to contribute to the debate
over imprecise models’ methodological legitimacy because they are not capable
of formulating such models.
7.3. CONCLUSION 193
7.2.6 Double-counting
Another potential application of Carnapian inductive logic is to an ongoing
debate over ‘double-counting’ in the context of climate models that is discussed
in Steele and Werndl (2013). Double-counting is the practice of using the same
data to both calibrate parameters within a climate model and to evaluate it
against alternative models. For example, Steele and Werndl refer to a study in
which historic data about the Earth’s temperature was used to find parameters
that represent, within two models, the Earth’s overall climate sensitivity and the
cooling effect caused by aerosols. The same data was then used to evaluate the
two models: one model was judged to be better than the other on the grounds
that, after this process of calibration, its instances achieved a better fit. Some
philosophers and climate scientists hold that using data twice in this way should
be avoided where possible, whereas others, including Steele and Werndl, argue
that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with it.
A similar situation can occur within Carnapian inductive logic. On the one
hand, evidence about experimental results can be used to narrow down the
choice of values of a parameter within a parameterised system of inductive
logic. This practice is described at (Carnap, 1952a, p. 54), where Carnap advo-
cates excluding certain values of the parameter λ in response to evidence about
experimental results. This kind of procedure is analogous to the calibration of
climate models using data. On the other hand, Carnap also thought that exper-
imental evidence can be used to evaluate inductive logical axioms: at (Carnap,
1971a, p. 120) he recommends using the axiom of constant exchangeability in
cases where “experience shows. . . statistical independence.” Carnap seems to
have been comfortable with the inductive logical equivalent of double-counting,
as the use of experimental evidence to choose a value of λ in Carnap (1952a)
would have to be made after an experience-based choice to use the axiom of
constant exchangeability, which is taken for granted in this work.
Paying close attention to Carnap’s discussion of these inductive logical roles
for experimental evidence might make it possible to generalise of Steele and
Werndl’s argument in favour of double-counting in climate science. Steele and
Werndl’s argument assumes that model-choice takes place within a Bayesian
framework: all factors contributing to model-choice are taken to be represented
in a higher-level rational-belief model. These assumptions could potentially
be weakened by reconstructing the argument within Carnapian inductive logic.
This would be desirable as the Bayesian framework is not universally accepted
among climate scientists.
7.3 Conclusion
Carnapian inductive logic has much to offer contemporary philosophy. It is con-
ceptually sound, historically interesting and has as-yet unexplored connections
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with many important problems. In these circumstances, there only seems to be
one sensible course of action: let’s reappraise Carnapian inductive logic!
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